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In this preface I will explain why I, at my age, have written a doctoral thesis and
why I have chosen as a subject "Unpaid work". Women of my generation (I was
born in 1931) withdrew as a matter of course from the labour market when they
got married. Married women were supposed to look after household and
children. Until 1957 Dutch law commanded the dismissal of female civil servants
when they got married. Household work was the main occupation for women of
my generation.
My parents stimulated me to go to university and study economics in case I
would not marry or would become a widow or a divorcee. They thought that
having a good education would enable me to earn a living of my own if
necessary. Only 3% of my fellow students in economics were female. At that time
many people thought that the only reason for a woman to go to university was to
catch a well-earning husband.
On our wedding day my parents gave my husband and I a Bible in which they
wrote the wish that I would become a good housewife. This was no problem for
me as I considered and still consider housekeeping an agreable activity provided
it can be combined with other activities. During my study of economics the idea
of Mrs. Christine Frederick published in a book in 1927 to apply the principles of
scientific management to the household, attracted my special attention. I decided
to use my knowledge of economics in this field. This was not as easy as I thought.
When I had my children it turned out that the only way I could use my
knowledge of economics was to work as a part-time economics teacher at a
secundary school. So I taught my 16 to 19 year old pupils the meaning of
production, consumption etc. Household labour or child care were not
mentioned in any of the books available for secundary schools. It was considered
neither production nor consumption by my fellow economists who had written
these schoolbooks.
It seemed unjust and it annoyed me very much, that work that I regarded very
important for the wellbeing of the family and the society got so little attention in
economic science and economic policy. In the seventies, in order to attract
attention to the phenomenon of unpaid work, I published several scientific
articles in which I calculated the value of unpaid household labour and I
proposed to give housewives a wage. Much public discussion followed and
eventually I reversed my opinion on a wage for housewives, because it does not
give women equal positions in society.
It is a paradox, unpaid work is on the one hand indispensable for the wellbeing of
the next generation, the family and the society and on the other hand it is a
hindrance to improve women's economic position. It is a dilemma that women
have to diminish the time they spend on unpaid activities, which many of them
like doing, in order to do paid work which gives economic independence andalso satisfaction. It is not unpaid work itself, but it is the unequal division of
unpaid and paid work between men and women, mothers and fathers, which
leads to unequal economic positions. If unpaid work would be divided more
equally between the sexes and if society would be willing to grant people some
facilities in the period they are raising young children, this problem could be
solved. I hope this book will contribute to a more equal division of paid and
unpaid work and to more equal positions of men and women.
In 1975 I became an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Faculty of Economics
and Econometrics of the University of Amsterdam and in 1981 I became a
member of the Government Advisory Commission "Emancipatieraad" (the
Commission for Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women). I wrote three
books and numerous articles on women's positions in paid and unpaid labour.
Through the years I received several distinctions for my work. In completion of
my scientific work this doctoral thesis has been written (I did not have the
opportunity to do this earlier in life) on a subject which already attracted my
attention when I was a young woman: the economic value of unpaid work.
At Christmas 1993 I received a Christmas card from Wil Albeda and he asked me
if I had ever considered to obtain a doctorate. In April 1994 we met again and I
told him that I had indeed considered this. Immediately he invited me to write
my doctoral thesis under his conduct. In December 1994 I was introduced to Joan
Muysken who was also willing to act as a promoter. I thank them both for the
inspiring talks we had and the suggestions and advice they gave me. I am grateful
for the discussions and criticism on earlier versions of this book by members of
the "Emancipatieleerstoel" (Chair in Emancipation) of the Faculty of Economics,
University of Amsterdam, as well as by members of the interdisciplinary group of
the project Time Allocation, financed by "NWO - Nederlandse Organisatie voor
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek" (Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research). I enjoyed the meetings of the Feminist Economics Network, where I
was allowed to present one of the chapters of this book. I am thankful for
comments on several chapters of this book by Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Brugt
Kazemier, Marry Niphuis-Nell, Joop Odink, Janneke Plantenga and Jacques
Siegers. Many thanks to Els Berger, who corrected my English in the first chapters
and to Corn£lie Janus-Derks who also corrected my English and made the
manuscript ready for printing. My husband I have to thank for his contribution
in arranging part of the data with the SPSS-programme and the calculations of
the Theil coefficients. I was very happy to have been able to write the greater part
of this doctoral thesis in my beloved Swiss home in the Valais, with one eye on
the beautiful mountains and one eye on my computer.
Haute-Nendaz, March 1996THE ECONOMICS OF UNPAID WORK *
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"It is characteristic of the age in which we live to think too much in terms of economics, to see
things too predominantly in their economic aspect... There is no more important prerequisite to
clear thinking in regards to economics itself than its recognition of its limited place among
human interests at large" (Frank H. Knight 1933(1))
Every recent economics textbook discusses simultaneously the supply and
demand of labour and the way in which labour and wages are determined.
Economists often take it for granted that "labour" automatically means "paid"
labour. Until the nineteen sixties unpaid labour was largely neglected in
economic theory and economic policy. Becker's famous article on the allocation
of time (Becker 1965) was the beginning of a new stream of economic thinking:
the New Home Economics which stated that the household was a unit of
production as well as of consumption. Since that time economic theory has paid
increased attention to unpaid labour. It is not surprising to see this growing
attention for unpaid labour in economic theory, considering the fact that,
worldwide, men as well as women spend a considerable number of hours on
unpaid labour.
Table 1.1. illustrates these factstf). The bulk of time is spent on personal care:
sleeping, eating, personal hygiene etc. consume about 41 to 44% of total time
available. Leisure is the second most important time use: 23 to 30%. Paid work is
the third important for men. For women unpaid work is the third important
time use: they spend more time on unpaid work than on paid work.
The differences in time allocation between countries are greatest regarding the
activities market work and housework. In Japan, men have the longest hours of
market work: 31% of all hours per week are spent on market work; men in
Sweden have the longest hours of housework: 11%. The differences in time men
spend on personal care and leisure are smaller. The total workload of paid and
unpaid activities is highest for men in Sweden: they spend 35% of their time on
work.
1 as quoted by Marc Nerlove in "Toward a new theory of population and economic growth" in
"Economics of the family" (University of Chicago Press 1974 p.527.
2 Juster and Stafford (1991) divided time into work time, in rum subdivided into market work and
household work; into personal care (principally sleep and rest); and into a number of leisure
activities including education, voluntary work, social entertainment, active (sports etc.) and passive
leisure (watching TV etc.) (see Juster and Stafford 1985 p.330-332). Their classification of (unpaid)
household work differed from the classification used by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning
Office and by myself in chapter 4. A more detailed analysis and description of the classification of
different activities is given in sections 2.4 and 4.4. In table 1.1. the classification of Juster and
Stafford is used in order to compare different countries.
13Table 1.1.
Time allocation between countries as a percentage of all hours available per week (100%=168 hours)
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Source: Juster and Stafford (1991), Table 1 and Knulst and Van Beek (Intomart) (1990)0)
Women in Japan are at the top regarding market work: 15% of their time is spent
on this activity. Women in the Netherlands have the longest unpaid hours: 21%
of their time. The workload of women in Japan and Sweden is highest: 33% of
their time is spent on work. Women in the Netherlands have the lowest
workload.
Time men and women spend on housework is considerable compared to time
spent on market work. The leading question of part I of this study is how the
value of unpaid work can be estimated and how its value can be accounted for in
economic phenomena and used in economic policy. The value of unpaid labour
will be determined on the basis of hours of unpaid work in time use surveys in
the Netherlands in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. One of the consequences of
neglecting unpaid labour is that unpaid labour is not at all or scarcely registered
in official statistics and not counted and integrated in economic phenomena.
3 The figures for the USA, Japan and Sweden come from Juster and Stafford 1991, table 1. The figures
for the Netherlands come from the 1985 time use survey of Knulst and Van Beek 1990 appendix C
(Intomart). Juster and Stafford remarked that there were substantial difficulties to put together
consistent data, because classifications of time use, the range of ages and the methodology of time
use research differ from country to country. For the Netherlands the activities of men and women
aged 25-64 were classified (as good as possible) according to Juster and Stafford (1985) p.331.
Gardening, care of pets and plants, sewing, knitting and other fancy needlework, small
do-it-yourself jobs, were counted as leisure according to Juster and Stafford.
14Another consequence is that women's position in society, especially women's
rate of economic independence, differs from men's, because women have a larger
share in unpaid work than men. In the 1995 United Nations Human
Development Report one can read on page 88: "Extensive research was
undertaken on the amount of time women and men spend on market and non-
market activities. A review of the 31 countries in the sample tells a fairly
dramatic story:
- Women work longer hours than men in nearly every country. Of the total
burden of work, women carry on average 53% in developing countries and
51% in industrial countries.
- Of men's total work time in industrial countries, roughly two-thirds is spent in
paid SNA activities and one-third in unpaid non-SNA-activities. For women
these shares are reversed. In developing countries, more than three-fourths of
men's work is in SNA activities. So, men receive the lion's share of income
and recognition for their economic contribution - while most of women's
work remains unpaid, unrecognized and undervalued!*)"
The principal author of the report, Mahbub ul Haq says: "There is an unwitting
conspiracy on a global scale to undervalue women's work and contributions to
society. In virtually every country of the world, women work longer hours than
men, yet share less in the economic reward. If women's work were accurately
reflected in national statistics, it would shatter the myth that men are the main
breadwinners of the world".
Economists' attention is more focused on paid than on unpaid work. Certain
activities and experiences that are historically of greater concern to women than
to men have all too frequently been neglected. Economists are "gender blind":
they think that their assumptions and methodologies are universal and
impartial. Gender blind means that they neglect social differences between men
and women. Mainstream economists assume that greed and rationality
characterize human behaviour. Becker (following Adam Smith) made an
exception by introducing the "altruistic" head of a household. However feminist
economists consider Becker's assumption of an "altruistic" head of a household
as patriarchal and one-sided, because it ascribed the head's behaviour to his
altruism rather than to his power over household resources (Ferber and Nelson
1993). Solow acknowledges that there has been a tendency for male economists to
patronize women. He thinks that women, compared to men, are more involved
in forms of activities based on solidarity, voluntary work, gift exchange and
emphaty. Their experience suggests hypotheses and ideas worth trying out, but he
* In the Intomart time use surveys (see table 4.1. in this book) it is shown that in the period 1975-
1990 women of 12 years and over spent 79-86% of their time on unpaid work, men 39-44%. In unpaid
work activities like painting and papering, repairs in and around the home were taken into account.
In paid work all time spent on the job was taken into account, whether it was directly paid or not.
For the age groups 25-49 the differences between men and women are higher: the percentages spent
on unpaid work vary between 75 to 80% of women's working time and 20 to 25% of men's working
time. Similar results are shown in the 1987 Statistics Netherlands time use survey (SN 1989 p.41).
15is sceptical of the notion that a move from male dominance would change what
he considers the substance of the discipline (Solow, 1993). The question "Why are
economists gender blind", remains unanswered.
Part of the answer may be the concepts of contents and scope of economic science
in the course of time. In chapter two a short historical analysis is given of the
definition of economic science and ideas about production and consumption to
answer the question why unpaid work has got so little attention in economic
science until the second half of this century. It is argued that unpaid work used to
be seen as an unproductive activity and has become a productive one now. It was
considered leisure and now it has become work even if no wages are paid. The
theory of the New Home Economics which was developed by Mincer, Becker,
Gronau and others opened new views on economic phenomena e.g. unpaid
work.
There are several ways to "engender" economics. A first method is to disaggregate
existing variables by gender. This method does not entail incorporation of unpaid
household labour into the analysis. A second method is to introduce economic
variables which capture the structure of gender relations, e.g. the degree of gender
inequality in labour and credit markets. A third method is to conceptualize the
world in two sectors: paid and unpaid work and tracing the feedbacks between the
variables in the two systems. A fourth method is to combine two or more of the
previous methods ((^agatay, Elson and Grown 1995). The third method is
followed in this study.
The question how to determine the volume and value of unpaid labour is dealt
with in chapter three. In order to obtain a calculation of the value of unpaid
work, a measure of the volume of unpaid work multiplied by a price component
is needed. Theoretically the best way to determine the value of unpaid labour is
to determine the value of the output of the household. Because it is very difficult
to measure output, the input of hours of unpaid work has been used in most
calculations to calculate the value. Data on the volume of unpaid work can be
found in demographic statistics or time use surveys. A measure of the "shadow"
price of unpaid work is taken from wages in the market sector.
In chapter four data are presented on the volume and value of unpaid work in
the Netherlands in the period 1975-1990, based on time use surveys and three
different wage estimates: the legal minimum wages, the wage of a home help,
and the average earned wages.
The System of National Accounts was started in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. Unpaid labour was left out then and has never been added since,
although much attention was paid to this question in lengthy discussions about
refinement of the National Accounts. Chapter five discusses why unpaid work is
not counted in National Accounts and how National Accounts would look if
implemented. Implementation would also change other economic phenomena,
e.g. welfare and economic growth, economic fluctuations, employment,
16consumption. The way in which these economic phenomena would change if
unpaid were integrated into economic statistics is discussed in this chapter.
Recent research shows that unpaid work diminishes the differences in personal
welfare. Personal income distribution in the Netherlands including the value of
unpaid work is presented in chapter six.
Chapter seven discusses how unpaid work can be implemented in
macroeconomic models. A model of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau has been
used to demonstrate how this can be done in practice.
In part II people's position in society is discussed in as far as it depends on and is
related to the amount and the quality of paid and unpaid work a person does.
Using this as a standard in chapter eight, a micro- and macroeconomic statistical
measure for economic independence has been developed.
Women's share in unpaid work is much larger than men's and their share in
paid work is much smaller. For that reason women's rate of economic
independence, although increasing, is much lower than men's. Several ways and
means to improve women's economic independence are analysed in chapter
nine. Chapter ten contains a summary and conclusions.
17PART I
UNPAID WORK IN THE NETHERLANDS2. UNPAID WORK IN ECONOMIC THEORY
"Economic theory is a science with a hole in it: economists cannot quantify, cannot measure the
central phenomenon utility" (Jan Pen 1995).
2.1 Introduction
Economists' ideas about the contents and scope of economic science and about
basic economic phenomena including production and consumption, have
changed in the course of time. This may be one of the reasons why so little
attention had been paid to unpaid work until the nineteen sixties. Therefore
sections 2 and 3 give a short historical analysis. First the ideas of the physiocrats
are examined, then the concepts of classical and socialist economists, the
Anglo-American school and finally the ideas of the New Home Economics. Now
ideas about the allocation of time are given in section 4. Section 5 discusses the
wages which can be taken into account for unpaid work. Section 6 contains a
summary and conclusion.
2.2 Contents and scope of economic science
Mark Blaug (1978 p.4) remarks that "the history of economics is not so much the
chronicle of a continuous accumulation of theoretical achievements as the story
of exaggerated intellectual revolutions in which truths already known are
neglected in favour of new revelations". This statement is enlightening if one
regards the different opinions and definitions of economic science. Blaug thinkst
that the title of Adam Smith's "Inquiry into the nature and the causes of the
wealth of nations" represents very well the ideas on economic science in the
nineteenth century. Other important elements in Adam Smith's way of thinking
were the distribution of welfare among people and the division of labour. In
Smith's view people specialize in certain activities and exchange the products of
these activities out of self-interest. "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest" (Smith Penguin reprint 1976 p.119). The only exception Smith
made concerning the motivating force of self-interest in men's economic
activities is his family. "After himself, the members of his own family, those who
usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers
and sisters, are naturally the object of his warmest affections" (Smith as quoted by
Becker 1981 p.172). And in 1881 Edgeworth wrote that "the first principle of
Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest" (Edgeworth as
quoted by Sen 1982 p.84).
This concept of self-interest as the omnipotent force underlying economic
behaviour is criticized by later economists (Sen 1982, Hirshleifer 1985, Nelson and
Ferber 1993). Sen (1982) supposes that Edgeworth thought of exchange equilibria
in competitive markets. Sen remarks that: "Admitting behaviour based on
21commitment would have far-reaching consequences on the nature of many
economic models". He defines commitment as concern for others which did not
affect one's own welfare. Hirshleifer (1985) points out that it was not easy to
separate self-interest and non-self-interest. Suppose a person's ends in life
include the well-being of others. If so, do their interests become his
"self-interest"? Hirshleifer thinks that if one answers this question affirmatively,
the concept of self-interest was robbed of any distinguishable content. Feminist
criticism on the concept of economic science is that it is supposed that individuals
are always free to react to their social and economic environment. Oppression,
differences in power and authority, social and religious obligations, laws
regulating legal competence, legal measures concerning tax, social security and
pensions differ between individuals, social classes, sexes, ethnic groups. They can
and do reduce the possibility to choose in such a way that economic models
become empty boxes (Nelson 1993; Blank 1993; Williams 1993).
Alfred Marshall (1890) defines economics as follows: "Economics is a study of
mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and
social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the
use of the material requisites of wellbeing. Economic goods are all those things,
external to a man, which (1) belong to him and which (2) are directly capable of a
money measure, a measure that represents on the one side the efforts and
sacrifices by which they have been called into existence and, on the other, the
wants which they satisfy" (Marshall eighth edition 1979 p.l and p.47).
Lionel Robbins (1932) suggests a short definition: "Economics is the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means that
have alternative uses" (Robbins 1962 p.16).
Paul A. Samuelson (1955) collected a few definitions:
- "Economics, or political economy, is the study of those activities which, with
or without money, involve exchange transactions among people".
* "Economics is the study of how men choose to use scarce or limited
productive resources (land, labor, capital goods) to produce various
commodities and distribute them to various members of society for
•- consumption".
•* "Economics is the study of how mankind goes about the business of
' organizing its consumption and production activities"
•• "Economics is the study of wealth". : ^- -
- "Economics is the study of how to improve society" (Samuelson 9th ed. 1973
p.3).
Gary Becker (1981) does not speak about economic science, but about "the
economic approach", which in his opinion was applicable to all human
behaviour. "The economic approach" assumes that individuals maximize their
utility from basic preferences that do not rapidly change over time. The economic
approach is not restricted to material goods or to markets with monetary
transactions but also applies to emotional decisions such as marriage, divorce,
22demand for children, discrimination, and to decisions about the division of time
over market and nonmarket production, criminality etc. (Becker 1981 p.xo and
xi). Hirshleifer criticises the imperialist expansion of economics into the
traditional domains of sociology, political science, anthropology and social
biology as being one-sided and pointed out that ultimately it would be impossible
to carve a distinct territory for economics. "Economics impenetrates them all and
is reciprocally penetrated by them. Good economics will also have to be good
anthropology and sociology and political science and psychology" (Hirshleifer
1985 p.53).
Pen (1995) compares economic science to a ring-shaped biscuit: utility is the
central phenomenon in economic science. Because utility is a psychic
phenomenon, a subjective feeling, economists cannot quantify, cannot measure
this central phenomenon. Utility is like the hole in the biscuit (Pen 1995 p.220).
In Robbins' (1962) and Becker's (1981) definition there is no distinction between
economic and non-economic activities. Robbins counted all human behaviour
which was influenced by the tension between ends and scarce means with
alternative uses as belonging to economic science. Both in Robbins' and in
Becker's definitions economics is one of many aspects of human behaviour and
there is no clear distinction between economic and non-economic activities. The
discussion about economic imperialism makes clear that other than economic
motives underlie human activities such as habits, institutions, psychological,
religious and ethical motives. These motives can be very strong and more
important than economic motives. A multi-disciplinary approach or an approach
which implements other than economic motives in economic models is
recommended. ;,::,; . ,-•.-<:;:.. ••••.•, ;.-,
Nelson (1993) suggests, following Georgescu-Roegen, that the primary objective
of economic activity is the self-preservation of the human species, including the
survival of childhood. In this concept non-material services such as attendance
to health care and care for children, sick and elderly people become just as central
to economic science as food and shelter.
Nelson proposes to define economics as: "the study of how humans in
interaction with each other and the environment provide for their survival and
health" (Nelson 1993 p.34). This definition includes without doubt human
activities such as household work, care for the family, do-it-yourself activities
and voluntary work, which were classified as unpaid work according to Juster
and Stafford (1985). Other activities were classified by them as paid work, personal
care or leisure, as was mentioned earlier in the Introduction to this study. The
classification of activities will follow hereafter.2.3 Production or consumption
The next question is whether unpaid labour can be classified as a productive
activity, a consumptive activity or both. Older economists' ideas on economic
science are reflected in their ideas about the production boundary. The so-called
Physiocrats for example, a stream in economic theory building during the
eighteenth century, showed that they thought only land could produce wealth,
because land was the only source of growth of agricultural products. "La terre est
l'unique source des richesses" (The soil is the only source of wealth). In their eyes
only agricultural labour was productive. "Le travail, port£ partout ailleurs que sur
la terre est sterile absolument, car l'homme nest pas cr^ateur" (Labour is only
productive in agriculture, because mankind is not creative) (Quesnay as quoted by
Zimmerman 1955 p.42).
In the views of Adam Smith (1776), the "father" of economic science, only
material goods increased welfare. The labour of household staff, doctors, writers
and all those people who produced services which "generally perish in the very
instant of their performance" was not productive in Smith's eyes and did not
have value because it "does not fix and realize itself in a permanent subject or
vendible commodity". This is the so-called "classical" view on production
(Smith 1776, Penguin ed. 1976 p.430). This narrow concept of production is one of
the reasons why economic science neglected unpaid (household) services for a
long time.
Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832) judged that all labour which produced utility was
valuable, even if the product was not a good but consisted of a service. However,
he restricted the production boundary to goods and services which could be
exchanged in a market (Zimmerman 1954 p.62). This limitation, excluding
nonmarket goods, is another reason why economic science neglected unpaid
work for a long time.
John Stuart Mill (1848) distinguished three kinds of utilities produced by labour:
utilities fixed and embodied in outward objects, utilities fixed and embodied in
human beings and utilities not fixed or embodied in any object, but consisting
merely of a service rendered. In principle he considered productive those
exertions which were embodied in material objects. However: "I shall not refuse
the appellation productive to labour which yields no material products as its
direct result, provided that an increase of material products is its ultimate
consequence". For example the labour of teachers, physicians and government
officials was regarded by him as such (Mill 1848, reprint Kelly 1965 p.46-48).
One of the first authors, before Becker, who proposes to extend the production
boundary to unpaid labour was Margaret Reid (1934)(5) . She proposes to extend
the production boundary to "those unpaid activities which are carried on by and
S A first start in this discussion was given by Wesley Mitchell (1912) in a comparison between the
activities of a housewife and those of professional businessmen which ends: "there is a schema of
values embodied in every housewife's work, whether she knows it or not".
24for the members of the household, which activities might be replaced by market
goods or paid services, if circumstances such as income, market conditions, and
personal inclinations permit the service being delegated to someone outside the
household group" (Reid as quoted by Eisner 1988 p.1621). To my knowledge she is
the first author who formulated the third person criterion.
I add two remarks to this definition:
1. Reid speaks about "activities which are carried on by and for the members of
the household", thereby excluding voluntary activities which are undertaken
for persons in other households. In my opinion such activities should be
included because they have the same characteristics: they comprise unpaid
household work, care for children and sick or old people, do-it-yourself jobs
for other households and voluntary (management) activities for political or
welfare organizations or unions.
2. Unpaid work is done by individuals who do not or cannot work on the
labour market because legal or unwritten rules exclude them (too young, too
old, housewives, handicapped or unemployed persons). So the individuals
actually rendering these services often cannot obtain a market wage. Yet they
represent a value because they can, if necessary, be replaced by market goods
or paid services^). In my opinion the third person criterion is a synonym for
dollar value. Unpaid work comprises the dollar value of household work,
care for children and other members of the family, do-it-yourself activities
and voluntary unpaid work like organized and unorganized care for family
and non-family, participation in political and social organizations, church,
etc. This question of the value of unpaid work by people not participating in
the labour market will also be dealt with in chapter 4.
The "third person" criterion has meanwhile been accepted by most experts,
although Chadeau (1992) remarks that the third party criterion comes up against
borderline cases such as to transport oneself, which would be a productive
activity if connected with paid work and a non-productive activity if connected
with leisure (Gronau 1977 p.1104; Hawrylyshyn 1977 p.87; Hill 1977 p.326; Adler
and Hawrylyshyn 1978 p.334; Gershuny and Robinson 1988 p.544; Chadeau 1992
p.89; Schafer 1992).
Another discussion in economic science deals with the contribution of education
to national output: the so-called human capital revolution (Freeman 1986). If
time spent on education is considered an investment which increases one's
future productivity and earnings, it is a productive activity. This does not rule
out the possibility that education includes important consumption components
(Freeman 1986). Some people use their education for leisure activities, others
sparsely or never use their educational experiences on the labour market because
they are too old or handicapped.
* Hawrylyshyn thought only the dollar value was important to economists and wished to exclude
satisfaction like parental pride or well-being like love (Hawrylyshyn 1977 p.87). Gronau spoke of a
"close substitute in the market" (1977 p.1104). Although for an economist the dollar value is
determined by the market, the personal relationship cannot be replaced by the market substitute.
25Opinions differ whether time spent on education should be considered
consumptive or productive. Juster spoke about investment of time and
subdivided it into seven categories including formal and informal training,
helping children to make or do things etc. Besides that he thought that half of the
time spent on walking, cycling, jogging and hiking should be seen as an
investment of time in one's health (Juster 1985 p.186). Yet he classified studying
as a leisure activity, whereas medical and non-medical help and care for other
adults should in his view, be classified as personal care (Juster 1985 p.331).
Hawrylyshyn (1977) classifies time spent on education as "productive"
(Hawrylyshyn 1977 p.80). He is opposed by Hill (1977): "Mental processes such as
thinking, learning and studying cannot be performed by others and cannot be
treated as productive in an economic sense. The time and efforts spent by
students should not be treated as equivalent to the labour of workers. The
boundary of production is correctly drawn in education between the teacher who
produces and the pupil who consumes the services produced". (Hill 1977 p.323-
326). The Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) does not consider
education unpaid work (Juster 1985 p.330; Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983
p.269). I follow the SCP's definition.
Ideas about consumption have also changed in the course of time. John Stuart
Mill made a distinction between productive and unproductive consumption.
Following Adam Smith in his concept of productive and unproductive labour,
Mill applied the distinction between productivity and unproductivity to
consumption as well. In his opinion the only productive consumers were
productive labourers, but not all consumption by productive labourers was
productive consumption: "that alone is productive consumption, which goes to
maintain and increase the productive powers of the community". He thought
that a certain quantity of the consumer goods produced in an economy entered as
necessary inputs into the production of manpower in the household sector. To
his mind productive consumption was an input, being necessary to maintain
human capital intact. If wages were at a minimum subsistence level, the whole of
the wages bill was required for productive consumption (Blaug 1978 p.190).
Karl Marx continued this line of thought and distinguished "individuelle
Konsumtion" and "produktive Konsumtion". "Die Konsumtion des Arbeiters ist
doppelter Art. In der Produktion selbst konsumiert er durch seine Arbeit
Produktionsmittel und verwandelt sie in Produkte von hoherem Wert als dem
des vorgeschosznen Kapitals. Dies ist seine produktive Konsumtion. Andrerseits
verwendet der Arbeiter das fur den Kauf der Arbeitskraft gezahlte Geld in
Lebensmittel: dies ist seine individuelle Konsumtion."(7) (Marx I p.596). "Daher
betrachtet der Kapitalist nur den Teil der individuellen Konsumtion des
Arbeiters als produktiv, der zur Verewigung der Arbeiterklasse erheischt ist, also
^ The consumption of the labourer is twofold. In the act of production he consumes the means of
production and changes them into products of greater value than the advanced capital. This is his
productive consumption. On the other hand he uses his wage to buy food: that is his individual
consumption.in der Tat verzeht werden musz, damit das Kapital die Arbeitskraft verzehre; was
der Arbeiter auszerdem zu seinem Vergniigen verzehren mag, ist unproduktive
Konsumtion"(8) (Marx I p.598). In so far as labour force was regenerated by
individual consumption, individual consumption was also productive in Marx's
opinion.
The discussion about "productive consumption" did not return in economic
literature until the second half of the twentieth century, when Becker (1965)
wanted the full integration of so-called "productive" consumption into
economic analysis. I will return to Becker's analysis in the next section.
Before Becker's time consumption was usually defined as the expenses for
consumption goods by the household in such a way that the utility of the
household was maximized. Traditional theories did not pay attention to the fact
that shopping and spending money on consumption goods is an activity which
costs time and energy; that a meal does not appear on the table by itself; that
clothes bought in a shop do not stay clean and crisp without time and energy
spent on cleaning and washing, activities mostly done by women. Thorstein
Veblen remarked that "the lady of the house is, according to the ideal scheme of
the pecuniary culture, the chief menial of the household" (Veblen as quoted by
Galbraith 1973 p.79).
In the National Accounts national consumption consists of consumptive
expenses of households and government. Consumption is defined in the
National Accounts as the use of goods and services for non-productive purposes.
So unpaid work in and for households is neither counted as production nor as
consumption. If unpaid work is considered a productive activity, the definition of
consumption also changes. All productive activities increase income in kind and,
as long as no distinction is made between consumption and investment in the
household accounts, consumption is increased by the same amount as
production.
The definition of consumption used in this study is the using up of goods and
services bought on the market and/or produced at home in conformity with the
third person criterion. A more detailed discussion on investment in households
can be found in chapter 5.
There are several reasons why unpaid work used to get and still gets little
attention in economic literature. The concept of economic science and the ideas
about production and consumption have already been mentioned. A second
reason why unpaid work was considered to be neither a productive nor a
consumptive activity is that these activities are difficult to quantify. Economists
want to quantify the economic ideas and concepts. Money is a common
8 The capitalist uses only that part of the individual consumption of labourers as productive that
keeps labourers as a social class intact; that part of the consumption that labourers use for pleasure
is considered unproductive consumption.denominator, which makes it possible to compare and add different goods and
services, to measure welfare, to analyse costs and benefits. In this respect it is
much easier and more efficient to consider only paid work as an economic
activity.
A third reason why unpaid work got so little attention is the era in which
economic theory was developed. The publication of Adam Smith's "Inquiry" in
1776 is often taken as the beginning of Economic Science. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth century household work for the higher classes was mostly done by
underpaid staff. It was not regarded as a profession of high prestige, as one can
read in Adam Smith's "Inquiry". That was probably one of the reasons why
Smith and his contemporaries did not consider these services to be "productive"
ones.
A fourth reason is that since the publication of the "Inquiry", economic science
has mainly been developed by men who did not do unpaid work themselves and
took it for granted that staff took care of the household chores and wives stayed at
home to look after children and household. Most people pay little attention to
things they do not have to do themselves. Economists are no exception to that
rule.
As a consequence unpaid work was seen neither as production, nor as
consumption until the nineteen sixties, when the idea of the "New Home
Economics" was developed by Mincer, Becker, Gronau and othersW .
2.4 The allocation of time: a microeconomic model
Traditional economic theory is based on the assumption that people maximize
their welfare by maximizing a utility function
U = U (Xi ...,Xn; L) . (1)
where X denotes goods and L is leisure time. The utility function is subject to the
budget constraint:
I Pt Xi = w (T - L) + V (2)
where Pi is the price of good Xi, T is total time available, w is the wage rate and V
is other income (Gronau 1986 p.274).
People divide their time between the labour market and leisure activities in such
a way that marginal utility of the last hour on the market equals the marginal
utility of the last leisure hour. The net marginal wage of the last hour on the
labour market is decisive for the labour market supply of individuals. This net
9 Earlier the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) identified the household as the
locus of production and for that reason as the central unit of analysis (Backhaus 1989)
28marginal wage is also decisive for the evaluation of unpaid work, if unpaid work
is seen as the alternative for paid work.
Mincer (1962) was the first economist to remark that the dichotomy between
work and leisure is not true, not even in the case of adult males. "The logical
complement to leisure is work broadly constructed, whether it includes
remunerative production in the market or work that is currently not paid for"
(Mincer 1962, reprint Penguin 1980 p.43). As such he mentions educational
activities of boys and girls and work at home by women.
In Becker's view (1965 p.494) the source of utility is not goods and services
purchased on the market, but "commodities" produced at home by combining
different market goods with time. Becker does not make a distinction between
"leisure" and "consumption" time on the one hand and time spent on
household services on the other hand.
U = U (Zi...., Zn) (3)
where Zi denotes the ith commodity and each commodity is a combination of
goods (Xi) and consumption time (Li).
Zi = fi (Xi,Li) (4)
Instead of dividing their time between labour and leisure, households divide
their time between paid and unpaid (household) labour and leisure. Utility
maximization is subject to two constraints: the budget constraint and the time
constraint. The old dichotomy of time used for work or for leisure has been
replaced by a trinity of time use: paid work, unpaid work and leisure (Becker 1965
p.495; Gronau 1977 p.1100). Becker's article: "A theory of the allocation of time"
was very important to a new view on economic science. In Becker's view
households are both production units and utility maximizers. "In recent years
economists increasingly recognise that a household is truly a "small factory": it
combines capital goods, raw materials and labour to clean, feed, procreate and
otherwise produce useful commodities" (Becker 1965 pp.495/496).
At about the same time as Becker, Lancaster (1966) independently developed an
idea about consumption, which only slightly differed from Becker's, namely that
goods are not the direct objects of utility but that consumers derive utility from
multiple properties or characteristics of purchased goods. A good will have more
than one characteristic and many characteristics will be shared by more than one
good. At the same time if goods are combined they may possess characteristics
different from those pertained to the separate goods. A meal, for instance,
possesses nutritional characteristics, but a dinner party may possess nutritional
characteristics and aesthetic and perhaps intellectual characteristics different from
the combination obtainable from a meal and a social gathering consumed
separately. Even a single good may possess more than one characteristic, so that
29the simplest consumption activity will be characterized by joint outputs
(Lancaster 1966 p.133 and 134). ,
Becker's theory does not distinguish between productive and consumptive
activities. Gronau makes the distinction between production and consumption,
following Reid (1934), in defining work at home as a productive activity for
which one could hire someone else to do it, the so-called third person criterion.
In an extreme case, work at home and work on the market are perfect substitutes;
a person is indifferent to the composition of the goods and services he consumes,
whether they are produced at home or purchased on the market. To put it
formally, assuming a one period and a one person household, the household
maximizes the commodity Z (equation 3), which is the output of home
production with goods X and consumption time L as inputs (equation 4) (Gronau
1986 p.282).
The goods can either be produced at home (Xh) or purchased on the market
(Xm)('0> The two kinds of goods are perfect substitutes:
X=Xh + Xm (5)
The person can secure the goods either by selling time on the market at a fixed
real wage w:
Xm = wN + V (6)
where N denotes market work,
or by producing them at home subject to diminishing marginal productivity:
Xh = f(H) (7)
where H denotes work at home.
The ultimate constraint is the time constraint:
L + H + N = T (8)
In figure 2.1 time is put on the horizontal axis and output on the vertical one.
Figure 2.1 represents a household production function with increasing and
decreasing returns when more time is used. If, for example, only one hour a week
is available for house cleaning, only a small part of the house will become
cleaner, the rest of the house will become dirtier. The use of more cleaning time
will lead to increasing returns until a certain point is reached. After this point
more cleaning time will lead to decreasing returns: the level of cleanness per
10 In this model no distinction is made between market goods or time for different purposes. In
reality market goods are bought for feeding, clothing, recreation etc. and time is spent on cooking,
child care etc. A first step to refine models of time allocation was set by Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1987) who distinguished seven activities.
30hour extra will decrease. The magnitude and shape of the production function




The role of goods X is shown in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2.
In figure 2.2 home production of a person not working on the labour market is
illustrated in the curve Xh-A. The person has a non-labour income Xo. If this
non-labour income is spent on market goods, a consumption level of Xo and
leisure Ta is reached.
31The ultimate constraint is the time constraint: ,
T = Tpc + Th + Ti (9)
where Tpc is time for personal care (not shown in figure 2.2.)
Th = time for home production. Ti = leisure time
Time available for home production and leisure is:
T, = T-Tpc (10)
(not shown in figure 2.2)
If the person does not work on the market, because his potential wage rate is low
or because he is too young, handicapped or too old to work on the market, an
optimum is reached in point B, where the home production possibility curve
(equation 5) reaches the highest possible indifference curve of a combination of
consumption goods and leisure time. The person whose preferences are shown
in figure 2.2. is indifferent to all combinations of consumption goods and leisure
time on this curve. The preferences of individuals, and hence their indifference
curves (equation 3) will vary according to their age, sex, education, mental
attitudes etc. For older women, for example, it is self-evident that a lot of time is
spent on a clean house whereas a young single male is more interested in
spending time on sports, paying visits and dancing.
In point B the marginal value of one hour of home production of this person
(figure 2.2.) equals the marginal value of one hour of his leisure time (Hagenaars
and Wunderink 1990 p.134). The person's time is divided between leisure time,
O-Ti and time spent on home production, T|-Ta.
If the person works on the market, he can buy consumption goods by earning an
income on the labour market at a fixed real wage, w. In this way he can expand
his consumption for a higher indifference curve can now be reached. In point B
in figure 2.3 the wage rate equals the marginal value of leisure time. In point C
the wage rate equals the marginal value of home production, so this person
spends 0-Ti hours on leisure, Ti-Th hours on the labour market and Th-Ta hours
on home production (Gronau 1986 p.283; Hagenaars and Wunderink 1990 p.133).
What happens if non-labour income decreases? X02 is lower than Xoi. The
production function does not change, so the same amount of time is spent on
home work. The loss of income leads to less leisure time (0-Th) and more time










What happens if the production function changes because extra work at home
has to be done, for example when a baby is born? The production function shifts
upwards (figure 2.4.). If preferences do not change, leisure time remains the same,
but time spent on the labour market decreases with Thi-Th2, because the




Pollak and Wachter oppose the view that there is a "household production
function" (Pollak and Wachter 1975). They argue that the household's technology
33does not have constant returns to scale and joint production, so that the price of
the commodities produced by the household depends on the household's
preferences and therefore fail to serve the traditional role in consumer theory.
Technically, they argued, the household devotes time to activities which are both
input and output. The household derives utility or disutility from the time it
devotes to each activity as well as from the nominal "commodity output" of the
activity (Pollak and Wachter 1975 p.255/256/276).
Hawrylyshyn (1977) agrees with Pollak and Wachter that many consumption
goods are used for the joint production of several commodities e.g. a stove that
produces nutrition and gourmet pleasures, the house that provides shelter, rest
and recreation. He thought that the problem was more a theoretical than an
empirical one: one hour of time can be valued by wages. He thought that the
jointness in production was best expressed in the notion that an hour of time
spent on such activities produced both "direct" and "indirect" utility. Direct
utility is the pleasure, the satisfaction that work can give. Indirect utility is the
market price of the goods or services produced.
In the same article Hawrylyshyn makes clear that there is a minimum amount of
time that a household must combine with each unit of goods to produce a basic
commodity. The household may, and sometimes does devote more time.
Hawrylyshyn took as an example a small-town professor with a love for old
stone farm houses, who devoted 1000 hours a vear to restore an old farm house,
whereas the minimum time required to do this job is 500 hours. The 1000 hours
produce both direct utility for the professor's mental relaxation (500 hours) and
indirect utility in the form of housing (also 500 hours). Thus results of
household behaviour which are themselves utility, such as parental pride,
cultural and esthetic satisfaction should be explicitly excluded from evaluation.
Child care values must exclude the satisfactions of developing effective human
beings, but may include the teaching of accepted social mores. Spouses' "services"
would include meals and clean shirts, but exclude personal affection and
companionship. To respond immediately to the inevitable jokes about market
replaceability for conjugal relations, let it be said that of course one can find a
market alternative price for sex in dollar terms, but this has little relation to, and
does not change the fact that the price of love is, well, love" (Hawrylyshyn 1977
p.85/87).
Hill(1979) does not share this view. "The amount of direct satisfaction which an
individual derives from the production of a good or service, whether for the
market or not, cannot affect the measurement of the good or service itself. Many
employees or self-employed workers derive a great deal of personal satisfaction
and sense of achievement out of the goods they create or services they provide
for. The satisfaction they derive is quite separate from the output they produce.
Similarly, the fact that many do-it-yourself activities are undertaken as a form of
recreation is irrelevant when it comes to the measurement of the goods and
services produced. It cannot be blandly assumed that leisure provides satisfaction
while work does not." (Hill 1979 p.35 and 37). In her view the magnitude ofnonmarket goods and services can only be measured by looking at their output
(Hill 1977 p.325). Indeed, intrinsic satisfaction is not a phenomenon exclusively
observed in unpaid work. In several countries data have been collected which
showed that paid work is associated with very high levels of intrinsic satisfaction,
even higher than most leisure activities (Juster 1985 p.336; Juster and Stafford
1991 p.511; Flood and Klevmarken 1992 p.4).
Hill makes these remarks in two articles on the concept, definition and
measurement of a service. Her thorough analysis is of great importance to the
subject of unpaid work. However, it is difficult to measure the output of
household production in exact physical quantities. For that reason evaluations of
household production are practically always made on the basis of the time
household producers use as an input. Hill did not agree with the input method.
The question whether to use the input or the output method to evaluate
household production will be dealt with in chapter 3.
In his microeconomic model Gronau (1986) assumes a one-period, one-person
household. He ignored the sharing of goods, the pooling of resources and the
division of work between members of the family. In conventional labour supply
models it is assumed that the family is the decision making unit. However,
families are made up of individuals: so where do family utility functions come
from? Several answers are possible:
1. All members of the family conform to the preferences of the family head.
This is not a likely solution in emancipated industrialized countries.
2. Social choice conditions for the existence of a well-behaved family utility
function are fulfilled. Such existence conditions are rather stringent, so this
solution is not convincing either.
3. Family members care for each other in the sense that intrafamily resource
transfers do exist (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986 p.130). Becker introduced
the altruistic family member. Altruistic means that a person's utility function
(the husband in Becker's view) depends positively on the well-being of
another family member (the wife). The husband does spend some of his
income on the wife rather than on his own consumption (Becker 1981 p.173).
However, it is not realistic to think that caring and intrafamily transfers
eliminate all conflicts between family members.
4. Leuthold (as quoted by Killingsworth and Heckman 1986) solved this problem
by supposing that each individual family member maximizes his or her own
individual utility, given the decision of other members of the family about
their leisure time. Family members pool their incomes, derive utility from
family consumption subject to the family budget constraint.
A variation of this model is the male-chauvinist model, in which the husband's
income is taken into account by the wife in her labour market decision, whereas
the husband disregards his wife's (possible) contribution to family income. In my
opinion the male-chauvinist model fits in for late twentieth century
industrialized countries where the responsibility for household and child care
rests with the wife.
352.5 The price of unpaid work in economic theory .«,
The value people place on their time affects the optimum combination of inputs
in home production, the price they assign to the products of homework and the
amount of these products. Gronau (1986) distinguishes two methods to evaluate
the unpaid work done by family members at home:
a. market opportunity costs, that is the price this time would have commanded
if the unpaid time would have been spent on the labour market;
b. the market alternative, that is the price it would have cost the household to
purchase the same services on the market. Variations are used for
opportunity costs as well as for market prices.
The model underlying the opportunity costs approach stands for the individual
choosing between spending his time on the labour market or at home. In this
case the rational individual allocates time in a way that marginal net wages are
equal to the marginal returns from unpaid household work as he perceives them
(point C in figure 2.3).
Murphy (1982) mentions the following variations for opportunity costs:
a. average market wages; b. aftertax wages; c. aftertax wages minus certain
work-related costs. She does not explain the reasons. Chadeau (1992) used net
average wages, gross average wages and gross average wages plus employer's
contribution in social security, in both the opportunity cost approach and in the
market cost approach (Chadeau 1992 p.97).
Gronau (1986) points out that the major objection to evaluation of opportunity
costs is the "homemaker's paradox". The value of the same household task done
by say a former professor in microbiology and a former stenographer, whose
potential wage rate is one quarter of the potential wage rate of the professor,
would be four times as high. Gronau explains this paradox by supposing that the
microbiologist and the stenographer must be deriving different utilities from
their home and market jobs. Traditional measures of market output do not
incorporate a measure of workers' "job satisfaction" and, by the same token,
should not include a measure of their enjoyment from work at home. A person's
market wage differs from the value of his marginal productivity at home and
should not be used to measure home outputs (Gronau 1986 p.297).
The model underlying the market cost approach is more production-orientated,
designed to augment GNP by the value of home production. Murphy (1982)
mentioned two variations for the market cost approach: a. replacement cost if the
homemaker is replaced by a single market replacement; b. service cost if the
homemaker is replaced by a variety of market specialists. Chadeau (1985) used the
cost of a general housekeeper or the cost of a variety of trained workers.
Chadeau's alternative approach was to value household output at the price of
equivalent goods and services available on the market and to subtract
intermediate consumption of the household as well as fixed capital consumption(Chadeau 1985 p.242). This line of thought is continued by Goldschmidt (1993),
who remarked that household's productive time should be valued in relation to
the imputed market value of the labour time of the product. However, for some
activities the physical output is difficult to measure or cannot be compared to
market services. Care for sick children for example can only be measured in time
inputs. The same applies to shopping. Even if the physical output can be
measured, the quality and the circumstances of these activities at home differ
very much from the market services.
The growing labour market supply of women in many Western countries in the
second half of this century has given rise to research and scientific publications
about women deciding to participate in the labour market. Mainstream economic
theory states that women decide to participate in the labour market if net
marginal wages on the labour market become higher than the reservation wages.
The reservation wages are the minimum wages which induces a nonworking
person to join the labour force (Gronau 1986 p.295). If, as Ferber and Greene (1983
p.152) pointed out, full-time homemakers are not acquainted with the wages
they can expect on entering the labour market, researchers can assume that they
would receive wages related to their education and labour market experience.
This is considered their reservation wage. The reservation wage of other groups
who are not acquainted with their reservation wage either, because the law, their
age or their health do not allow them to work on the labour market such as
youngsters, elderly or handicapped people, is estimated in a similar way as the
reservation wage of full-time homemakers as will be shown in the next
paragraphs.
Another approach to estimate the price of the time of people not working on the
labour market is to distinguish several categories in the population. Nordhaus
and Tobin (1972), for example, divide the population into five categories:
employed, unemployed, housewives, students and others. The average hourly
earnings in manufacturing are supposed to represent the nominal value of time
for the employed. Nordhaus and Tobin put the question whether the
unemployed should be treated as having zero wages. They debate that the wages
of frictionally or voluntarily unemployed should be close to the market wage
rate. On the other hand, during a great depression most unemployed people
cannot obtain work at anywhere near the prevailing wage. Their compromise
was to assign a zero wage to normal working hours of the unemployed, but to
value their nonmarket working hours at the going wage. To females they assign
the average hourly earnings for women, to students the wage for the age group
under 20 years of age, and for people over 65 years of age the wage for this age
group (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972 p.45/46).
Jorgensen and Fraumenie, as quoted by Eisner (1988) impute a wage of zero for
those under 15 and over 74, because they are presumed to fall outside the scope of
the labour market (Eisner 1988 p.1637). Bonke, as quoted by Brathaug (1991), put
the wage for non-employed people at zero in his calculations of the value of
unpaid work based on opportunity costs. He assumes: "that the non-employed
37who do not want or are unable to obtain employment are therefore without a
market wage alternative" (Brathaug 1991 p.18).
Assigning a price of zero or nearly zero to home production of people not
working on the market does not seem right regarding the welfare it produces. A
consumer who does not work on the labour market has the choice to produce a
consumption good at home or to buy the good on the market, assuming that the
two goods are perfect substitutes. Traditional economic theory assumes that the
ultimate economic goal is consumption. People maximize their welfare, the
utility they receive from consumption, by dividing their incomes between
different kinds of consumption goods in a way that marginal utility of the last
unit of money spent on different kinds of consumption is equal. People who are
outside the labour market can maximize their welfare by performing unpaid
work and saving expenditure. In the optimum situation the value of their
unpaid work is equal to the price of labour of the good or service bought on the
market. A consumer will only buy market goods if he values his leisure time
more than the market cost. At this point the marginal value of an hour of labour
bought on the market equals the marginal value of an hour of home work and
also equals the marginal value of an hour of leisure. This is the optimum for
youngsters, elderly, disabled and unemployed people. It is the point where the
indifference curve reaches the production curve (see point B in figure 2.2) at
which point this value will be rather low. Only very rich people who do not work
on the labour market will put a high value on their leisure time and have little
home production.
In my opinion the opportunity costs method is an appropriate method to decide
what time to spend on the labour market, but not useful to estimate the value of
home production. A first argument, Gronau's "home maker paradox", has been
mentioned earlier. A second argument to reject the method of opportunity costs
is that the average productivity on the labour market will be higher than in
home production, because functions on the labour market tend to become more
specialized. A third argument is that the opportunity costs method uses net wages
instead of gross wages plus employer's contribution in social security as is usual
in National Accounts. The contribution of government workers, for example, is
estimated at gross wages plus employer's contribution in social security (SN 1991
b p. 194). At the point where the marginal wage is equal to the marginal cost of a
good or service bought on the market, the household compares the net wages it
can obtain on the labour market with the (gross) cost of the good or service on the
market. Therefore market replacement cost is a better method to estimate the
price of home production for working as well as nonworking people.
Floro (1995) points out that "so far non of the present evaluation methods gives
an adequate measure of the economic importance of household production".
Women's primary social role has an impact on her earning capacity in the
market. The biases imposed by social norms on the market wage are reflected on
the imputed household wage. Floro concludes: "The vicious circle of
underestimation persists as women's economic contribution in the market isunderrated because of the prevailing notion that their "primary role" is in the
household; but their economic contribution in the household is undervalued
because their role in the market is considered to be only secondary. As such the
imputation of market-based opportunity costs to men's and women's output of
labor time is a questionable procedure" (Floro 1995 p 1927).
In my view the cost of a single market replacement of the homemaker, as
mentioned by Murphy (1982) and Chadeau (1985) is a better approach than the
replacement cost of a variety of market specialists, because the productivity of a
market specialist will be higher than the productivity of a non-specialist. So the
wages of these specialists overrate the value of home production. Another reason
not to use wages of market specialists is that wage scales and definitions of
functions change in the course of time, which makes it difficult to compare wages
of specialists in different years. For practical reasons I prefer this method over
Chadeau's and Goldschmidt's alternatives as has been mentioned earlier. In
chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 the costs of a single market replacement will be used for all
categories of people doing unpaid work.
2.6 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter several definitions and descriptions of economic science by a
number of well-known economists have been examined. These definitions have
in common that economic science studies human behaviour as a relationship
between objectives and scarce productive resources that have alternative uses. In
this view all human activities have an economic aspect. This economic
imperialism does no justice to non-economic motives which are often much
stronger. The primary objective of economic activity is the self-preservation of
the human species, including the survival of childhood. Nelson's definition of
economics reading: "the study of how humans in interaction with each other and
the environment provide for their own survival and health" seems more
appropriate than labelling all human activities as (partly) economic.
Using Juster and Stafford's classification of activities (1985) in paid and unpaid
work, personal care and leisure, only paid and unpaid work are economic
activities. Following Nelson's line of thought and applying the "third person
criterion", unpaid work is also an economic activity for people not working on
the labour market, because they have to buy less goods and services on the
market. By doing unpaid work they can extend their consumption. They divide
their time in a way that the marginal value of leisure time is equal to the
marginal value of home production. People working on the labour market
allocate their time between work at home, work on the market and leisure time.
In economic literature several prices are used to estimate the value of unpaid
work. The wages of a single market replacement of the homemaker seems to be
the best approach to me.3. METHODS TO VALUE UNPAID WORK
The lady of the house is the chief menial of the household"
(Thorstein Veblen in "The theory of the leisure class" 1899).
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 productive nonmarket activities (or unpaid work) have been defined
as activities which produce goods or services yielding utility, which could also be
performed by a third person. The cost of a single market replacement of the
homemaker has been proposed as the best method to assign a price to unpaid
work.
Much discussion in estimating the value of unpaid work is about the "input
method" versus the "output method". The input method ascribes money value
to labour inputs directly. The hours spent on household work or other unpaid
work activities are valued with the help of comparable wage rates. Hours
multiplied by comparable wages give an estimation of value added. Fixed capital
consumption, net indirect taxes and intermediate goods should then be added to
obtain a complete estimation of the value of household production. In practice
almost all computations stop after hours of input have been multiplied by wage
because no more data are available.
The output approach takes as a starting point gross output based on market prices:
for example the number of meals produced at a price in a restaurant. The value
added is computed as the residual after subtracting intermediate goods and
depreciation of fixed capital (Chadeau 1992 p.90).
The value of goods and services computed by the input approach can differ
considerably from the value of comparable products traded on the market. Liitzel
(1989) compares the output method to the computing method used within
National Accounts for the production accounts of non-financial enterprises. He
indicated that the input method seems easier to apply than the output method,
because more statistical data are available on time use than on the output of
unpaid work (Lutzel 1989 p.343).
This chapter has been organized as follows: section 2 describes the ins and outs of
the input method, section 3 describes the output method. As will be shown in the
overview of calculations in literature in section 4 most calculations are limited to
net value added. In section 5 summary and conclusion are given.
3.2 The input method
In most calculations of the value of unpaid work that have been published so far,
41the input method is chosen as a matter of course. In the first half of this century
demographic data, such as the number of (married) women, were chosen as the
basis for calculations, because data of time use surveys were not yet available. In
the second half of this century data of time use surveys became available as the
basis for empirical calculations. As there are many calculations on this basis, they
will not be discussed one by one, but some common problems will be dealt with.
One of the questions researchers had to face was:
Who are to be counted? Mitchell et al. (1921, as quoted by Goldschmidt 1982)
wanted to indicate the order of magnitude of housewives' contribution to
national income. They took the number of full-time housewives as the volume
component. As time use research was not available at that time, they assumed
that full-time housewives had a full-time working day. In research by Matolcsy
and Varga (1938, as quoted by Goldschmidt 1982) it was assumed that all married
women were full-time housewives. When time use data became available, it
became clear that besides housewives also other people are productive in the
household and that the amount of household work varies with the number and
the age of children, the amount of paid work by women, help by members of the
family, the health of the housewife and the members of the family (Hawrylyshyn
1976p.ll8).
A second problem is that time use studies apply different classifications of
activities. But even if the classifications of activities can be compared, researchers
have different opinions about which activities should be called unpaid work.
Should e.g. gardening or baking a cake be considered unpaid work or leisure
rime? The difficulties to classify activities as unpaid work will be elaborated on in
chapter 4.
A third problem is that time use studies are not standardized. Sometimes only
adults are taken in the sample, sometimes men and women between 15-64 years
of age, sometimes all children of 12 years and over as well as adults are included.
This problem is solved if the same method is used and the same questions are
asked in different time use studies, as is the case in the Netherlands.
A fourth problem is that the method of research is also different. Juster and
Stafford (1991) compare several ways of collecting time use data. They conclude
that some form of diary is the most valid instrument to measure time use.
Survey questions asking people to remember how much time they spent on a
certain activity on a certain day, tend to give over-estimated results. A detailed
description of activities during a randomly selected one-hour slice of time also
gives good results, but is dearer than the diary method (Juster and Stafford 1991
p.484). Floro (1995) mentions that there is a growing consensus among
researchers that the preferred method of data collection on time use involves a
chronological record of various activities over the day through the use of a diary
instrument (Floro 1995 p. 1919). The time use surveys used in this study are diary
based.A fifth problem is the joint or multiple activities or joint production of two goods
and/or services. For example peeling potatoes and watching children or watching
TV while ironing. To which good or service should the time input be accounted?
If the diary method is followed, respondents will write down the primary activity
and only mention the secondary activity if a special question is asked. If the diary
method is followed, primary activities may be overrated, secondary activities
underrated. If another method of time use research is used, secondary activities
can inflate the time estimates to more than 24 hours a day. Research by Hill (1985
a) showed that paying visits and listening to the radio or records are the most
dominant forms of secondary activities: they account for 60% of the time spent in
secondary activities (Hill 1985 a p.140). The time use studies used in chapter 4 are
based on the diary method so the problem of primary and secondary activities
does not arise.
A sixth problem is the difference in time use between working days and Sundays
and holidays, the seasonal and cyclical variations in time use. To be able to
estimate yearly activity patterns, surveys should have a certain length and be
spread over the year. In the time use studies used in this book respondents were
asked to fill in a diary during a whole week in autumn, so the data do not reflect a
annual activity pattern.
A seventh problem is the production of "collective services". Hill (1977) points
out that "the amounts or quality of collective services must be a function of the
number of economic units consuming the services, given that a service itself is a
change in the condition of an economic unit". She continues: "The more units
affected, the greater the output, irrespective of the activity of the producer. The
activity of the producer is not the service. Whenever the number of economic
units consuming a collective service is below capacity the producer is operating
inefficiently or inside his production possibility frontier" (Hill 1977 p.332/333).
This pleads against the input method: using the same time input the cleaning of
a house for a family of two persons consumes less time than the cleaning of a
house for a family of six persons. The number of persons benefiting from these
"collective" services in the home varies per household and varies in time. In my
opinion it is very difficult to relate these collective services inside the home to
the number of persons who benefit from it because of lack of data.
The eighth problem is whether there are scale economies in home production.
Gronau (1986) remarks that studies are unanimous in concluding that there are
substantial returns to scale in consumption: "three people do not need
proportionally more bathrooms or cars than two people; buying and cooking food
in bulk is cheaper; clothes can be handed down from older to younger children"
(Gronau 1986 p.289). As there is disagreement on the magnitude of scale
economies, Gronau concluded that this question was insoluble, so they are
neglected in this study.
In a Dutch time survey (Knulst and Van Beek 1990) it is concluded that each
person less in a household costs one hour of unpaid work less a week for
43preparing meals and half an hour less for house cleaning (Knulst and Van Beek
1990 p.97) If economies of scale exist and can be quantified, should it have
influence on estimations of the value of unpaid work? The answer is no. People
have clear preferences about living alone or in couples or in more people
households. I am of the opinion that if these preferences and the returns of scale
resulting from this decision lead to differences in household production and
consumption, these differences form an integral part of the way people want to
live. If a person prefers to live in an expensive apartment, he pays a high price in
money. If he prefers to live alone, he pays by spending more time on his
household production.
The ninth problem is the measurement of productivity of unpaid work. Nobody
supervises the unpaid worker. Nobody discharges the voluntary worker or
housewife if he or she is inefficient or a chatterbox. No calculation of the costs or
registration of the quality of household work takes place which resembles the
procedures of work on the market place (Broekman 1980 p.269). Does the
improvement of household technology, schooling, health and on-the-job
training influence productivity of unpaid work as it does influence paid work?
Hawrylyshyn (1976) thinks that differences in efficiency may be at the heart of the
difference between high and low time estimations. Working wives are
considered to be more efficient. Women not working on the labour market have
all day to fill up with housework, he concluded from research by Vanek
published in 1969. Whether this observation _stil' .hftld .fjv .th? (Jit»i.in* »hr
considered to be an unanswered question (Hawrylyshyn 1976 p.116).
Fitzgerald and Wicks (1990) compare the price of a certain household task in the
household (average time households needed for a certain household task
multiplied by an appropriate market wage) and the price commercial firms
charged for this task. In this way they compared for example the price of loads of
laundry and electrical repairs. Their report does not clearly show how this
comparison was done, but they concluded that commercial and household
productivity differed: for 15 activities commercial productivity was higher, for 2
activities household productivity was higher, for 25 activities no significant
difference could be found (Fitzgerald and Wicks 1990 p.132-141).
However, productivity also differs in paid work. A study by Stafford and Duncan
(1985) shows that 9% of time at paid work is spent on formal or informal work
breaks, so even paid workers do not work every minute of their paid time.
(Stafford and Duncan 1985 p.254). Research by Vanek (1980) shows that full-time
housewives spent 29 hours more on household production than employed wives
(Vanek 1980 p.87). Recent research of Dutch time use data confirm Vanek's
findings. In 1990 a full-time housewife with children spent nearly 21 hours a
week more on household duties and child care than a working mother (Van der
Lippe & Niphuis-Nell 1994 p.25). On the issue of productivity Chadeau and
Fouquet (1981) remark that women with an outside job do not have time to chat-
ter or do their home work inefficiently. Full-time housewives have more
children, so they have more homework (Chadeau et Fouquet 1981 p.33).
44Because relevant data are lacking, differences in productivity are not reflected in
the computations of chapter 4. On a macro level this does not seem a serious
problem because the inefficiency of some people will be compensated for by
overefficiency of others.
The tenth problem is a special one, put forward by Zienkowski (1991), concerning
productivity in former Communist countries. He thinks that time spent on
queuing for purchases should not be regarded as an activity that creates gross
domestic product, although it can certainly not be treated as free time but should
rather be considered unpleasant work. And what about time spent in lighting
fires, carrying coal, wood and water? About 10 to 15% of total unpaid working
time in Polish households is spent on these activities. Zienkowski is inclined to
accept the price of central heating and running water of houses having these
facilities to evaluate household production rather than to evaluate the time spent
on the activities mentioned above (Zienkowski 1991 p.4). I do not agree: waiting
time should be taken into account. The organization of society is one of the data
for an economist as is the inefficiency resulting from it.
The eleventh and last problem is the productivity of waiting time until an
uncertain event takes place. Waiting for the plumber to show up or for children
to come home does not show in time use studies. Waiting time is used either for
homework or for recreation, so it is often not counted as productive time in time
use research. Yet the waiting time of the fire brigade is paid for and thus
considered productive time, even if this waiting time is shortened by playing
cards. In the time use studies used in chapter 4 waiting time is not counted in the
diaries. I consider it a possible compensation for inefficiency as mentioned before.
I came to the conclusion that serious problems arise as a consequence of different
methods, different questions or different classifications of activities. These can be
solved if research institutes make (international) agreements. A diary to be used
by a sample group during a whole year seems ideal but is expensive. Differences
in productivity and economies of scale are also serious problems, so more
research is needed.
3.3 The output method
The output method as a basis for calculating the value of unpaid work is chosen
by only a few authors. Most of these calculations combine the output method
with the input method because of a lack of data. Some of the problems
encountered by this method will be discussed here.
The first problem is how to measure the physical quantities of goods and services
produced in the household. As a rule households do not register their output.
Empirical surveys of this output are very few because the number of products and
services which can be measured in physical quantities is limited. The number of
meals served to a certain number of people is one of the products that can becounted. The quality of the meal may differ from a ready-made one course meal
served on the kitchen table to a three course meal served on a meticulously laid
dinner table with candles and music. Counting cleaning services poses even
greater problems: should square meters of vacuum cleaning and dusting be
counted or square meters of window cleaning? Looking after children or sick
persons can best be measured in the amount of time it takes. This means a return
to the input method.
Colin Clark (1958) solves this problem by taking the costs of residents of nurseries,
children's homes, old people's homes and other residential homes for adults. He
deducted the estimated purchases for goods and services to find the value of
household services for children and adults (Clark 1958 p.207-209). A similar
method was followed by Chadeau and Fouquet (1981). They took the price of
meals and hotels, deducted Value Added Tax, expenses for food etc., interest on
medium and long term debts and wages of employees to find the value of
household services (Chadeau and Fouquet 1981 p.38/39).
In a later publication Chadeau suggests that it might be possible to extend time
use surveys in such a way that data on the nature and volume of household
output could also be gathered (Chadeau 1985 p.250-252).
In my view these methods reflect different qualities of goods and services, a
different way of life than life at home. Therefore I reject these methods.
Another solution is to combine the output method with the input method for
services which cannot be measured in physical quantities (Chadeau and Fouquet
1981; Suviranta 1986; Fitzgerald and Wicks 1990). For products they could not
measure in physical quantities Chadeau and Fouquet multiplied hours of time by
the wage of a specialized substitute such as a seamstress, a garage mechanic, a
nurse etc. (Chadeau and Fouquet 1981 p.39).
Suviranta (1986) split unpaid housework into different components and for each
component the value was determined using different methods. The value of
child care for example was determined by multiplying the hours of unpaid child
care of a time use research by the wages of a municipal home help. The calculated
value for the care of children under 7 years of age was estimated to be 5.1% of
GDP. Another volume component was found by subtracting the hours children
spent in day care institutions from the theoretical 24-hour-a-day care period.
The wages used for this calculation were equal to those of a municipal home
help. Calculated value for children under 7 was 5.7% of GDP. The value of
unpaid cooking work was determined using 4 different methods. Values
determined in this way ranged from 7.3% to 13.3% of GDP. In a similar way the
value of home cleaning, laundry, handicrafts etc. was determined. The value of
mending and care of clothing, maintenance of heating and water facilities,
vehicle repairs, gardening, shopping, repair of dwelling was determined using
the time input multiplied by different wages.According to the calculations based on the time use study and home help's wages,
the value of all unpaid housework was 41.7% of GDP. If the unpaid work was
calculated with yet another measure, namely the help of labour costs included in
corresponding market goods and services, for example in meals in restaurants,
the value of unpaid housework was about 25% lower, namely 30% of GDP
(Suviranta 1986). The results of this study seem to imply that producing goods
and services on the market is more efficient than producing them at home. I
doubt the validity of this conclusion because it is difficult to compare the quality
of home made products and market products. Moreover Suviranta made some
arbitrary decisions for example about stand-by time.
A different approach is the attempt of Chadeau and Roy (1986) to describe
household production functions as a starting point for quantification. They
assume an interdependency between household production and household final
consumption. They try to match household productive activities and the
products households buy as classified in the French National Accounting System
and the French Budget Survey. To this end household activities were classified in
productive and non-productive activities. A productive activity is any activity
which could be carried out with comparable results by any economic unit other
than the household according to the French Time Budget Survey (third person
criterion). Final consumption commodities are classified according to the role
they play in household nonmarket productive processes, and subdivided into
three categories: "substitute" products, which save households from producing
similar commodities; "complementary" products, which are not produced by
households because their production requires advanced technical know-how, but
serve to produce other goods and services and "pure final consumption"
products, which for the same reasons are not produced by households nor serve
any further productive process before being actually consumed. Household
activities are then "matched" to products purchased by the household. For
example "preparing and cooking food" takes 45 minutes a day, for which
substitute products are available; durable goods e.g. a stove are used, as well as
intermediate goods e.g. oil, flour etc. Time, durable and intermediate goods are
considered "indicators" upon which to build assumptions on modes of
household production product by product. Chadeau and Roy distinguish 7 groups
of household "services", including services which produce material goods,
services which transform goods, services which transform persons etc. The
authors remarked that their method shows some degree of abstraction from
reality, because the opportunities households have to resort to produce
themselves or to buy on the market are different for different groups of
households and change in time. No results of this methodological approach have
been published as yet.
Fitzgerald and Wicks (1990) split household products into 57 activities. They
questioned 480 households in Montana (Missoula) on their household activities
in the past week. They categorized these activities in 57 output units including:
garbage disposal per bag, vacuuming cleaning per room, snow shovelling per
side/driveway, defrosting per refrigerator etc. For each activity they collected
47information about its frequency, who performed it, the time spent and the
amount accomplished. If the respondents thought the time use of this week was
"typical" for their normal time use, the researchers multiplied the weekly time
use by the number of "typical" weeks in the past six months. For only 3 out of the
57 activities (15% of total household production time) the researchers could think
of no other output than hours. The three activities were: care of sick people, care
of elderly people and care of children. The value for all household activities was
calculated in two ways. The first one the researchers named the "labor value
approach": for each activity they found the market wage of a comparable activity.
Their second approach, which they named the "direct output approach", was to
search for a market price which companies charged for an item as similar as
possible to the household output unit mentioned before. To price loads of
laundry, they contacted local laundry services. In the case of electrical repairs they
took the minimum charges of repair firms. If a firm charged $ 40 to clean an
average house and defrosting a refrigerator required ten percent of the total
cleaning time, the indicated price for defrosting was $ 4. They concluded that the
direct output measure of household production exceeded the "labor value
approach" by 44%. I doubt whether the output units in households and firms as
defined by Fitzgerald and Wicks are comparable: is it possible to compare
defrosting a household refrigerator and defrosting a much bigger professional
one? Another objection to Fitzgerald' and Wicks' ideas is the fact that they took
the price which a company takes as output. For example it is an arbitrary decision
to take the minimum charge of an electrical repair shop as the price for a home
made repair.
The second problem is how to value the output if physical quantities are
measured. Colin Clark (1958 p.206) takes the minimum costs of the complete care
and maintenance of adults and children by local welfare authorities. Chadeau and
Fouquet (1981 p.39) takes the average price of a meal and a hotel room. Suviranta
(1986) took among others the labour costs of State cafeterias.
Fitzgerald and Wicks (1990) use market prices which firms charged for services as
similar as possible to the household output unit. For services which could only
be measured in hours of time the problems of evaluation were the same as those
met with the input method.
In my view the costs for looking after people in old people's homes or even in
jails (Colin Clark), or costs of meals in hotels or state cafeterias are not a good
measure, because, as has already been mentioned, they reflect another quality of
goods and services.
The third problem is how to account for differences in quality of products and
services produced in households and on the market (Liitzel 1989 p.344). Liitzel
puts the question like this: "What is really comparable? For prepared meals for
example, is it the fast food prices or those of high class restaurants?' This problem
has not been solved by any of the authors. Can the quality of activities in the
household be compared at all with the quality of activities done by a company?
48Life in a hotel room or in an old people's home is a different sort of life and
cannot be compared to life in a family. The quality of the same meal taken in a
cozy dining room with amiable talk and good music and the same meal taken in
the waiting room of a busy railway station is different even if the food were the
same. So far no one has been able to solve this problem.
The problem of comparing quality is the fourth problem related to comparing
productivity in households and in industry. By definition production processes
in industry are based on larger scales. More capital goods and more specialized
labour can be used in industry. It can be expected beforehand that productivity
will be higher in industry. If a housewife nurses a sick child this will take more
time than nursing the same child in a hospital. If a mother looks after one or two
children under 4 years of age, this will take more time per child than in a
children's day-care centre.
I came to the conclusion that it is not feasible to use the output method, because
of lack of data. Anyone using this method at all has to take many arbitrary
decisions concerning the measurement of physical output and market prices.
Using the input method is more practical.
3.4 Overview of calculations of the value of unpaid work
Many calculations of the value of unpaid household work have been made from
the beginning of this century. In 1976 Hawrylyshyn made an overview and
compared 9 different calculations. He made some adjustments so they could be
compared. His conclusion was that the value of household work is about a third
of Gross National Product if valued at net market wages (Hawrylyshyn 1976
p.110). Chadeau (1992) published a comparative study of calculations of
household work in the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Finland and
Norway. She concludes that the contribution of women to housework varies
between 2/3 and 3/4 of housework time of men and women combined, that the
money value is between 22 and 44% of GNP if calculated at net average wage
rates, between 32 and 60% if calculated at gross average wage rates and between 39
and 68% if calculated at gross average wage rates including employer's
contribution in social security. Another conclusion is that growth of real
disposable income was lower if unpaid housework had been included (see also
section 7.2.) (Chadeau 1992).
A very informative and extensive overview was published in 1982 by L.
Goldschmidt-Clermont. It contained over 70 calculations. Many of these
calculations link unpaid labour to Gross National Product or National Income. I
have put these calculations in table 3.1 together with other calculations taken
from economic literature.Table 3.1.







































































































































Sources: Goldschmidt (1982); Schettkat (1985); OECD (1991); UN (1995).
Table 3.1. shows that calculations differ very much: they range from 5.9 to 53% of
GNP. This is a consequence of the difficulties about different prices (opportunity
costs, market wages of a general or specialized substitute, net or gross wages)
elaborated upon in chapter 2.5 or different methods, data, prices and activities as
elaborated upon in chapters 3.2 and 33.
Another objection against some calculations mentioned before is that the same
time use study has been used for the evaluation of different years (Nordhaus and
Tobin).I cannot draw a general conclusion on the relationship between the value of
unpaid household work and GNP or Nl. Moreover I doubt whether GNP or NI is
a good standard to compare different calculations as will be elaborated upon in
chapter 4.
In some calculations it is not clear which activities have been taken into account.
Eisner (1988), for example, reports that Kendrick and he are the only researchers
to calculate the value of voluntary labour. In his overview, however, voluntary
labour has not been mentioned as a separate item (Eisner 1988 p.1650 and 1670).
Kendrick estimates the value of voluntary work at 0.6 to 2% of GNP in the period
1929-1973.
Many authors use more than one method and more than one price. Often it is
not clear which method is used or whether gross or net wages are taken. It is
inconsistent to express the value of unpaid work at net wages as a percentage of
GNP or GDP. GNP or GDP is the sum of wages inclusive of employer's
contribution in social security plus indirect taxes minus subsidies on production
plus depreciation plus profits. By definition net wages arc used in calculations
following the method of opportunity costs, as used by Kreps (1971, as quoted by
Goldschmidt 1982); Schettkat (1985); Brathaug (1991); Chadeau (1992); Statistics
Canada (1991).
3.5 Summary and conclusion
To estimate the value of household work and voluntary activities most authors
choose the input method. In the imput method the hours of unpaid work as they
emerge from time use studies, are used as volume component. As price
component in economic literature one finds net marginal wages (opportunity
costs), the market wages of a general or specific substitute for the home producer
or average wages of different age groups (see also section 2.5.). Sometimes net
wages are taken, sometimes gross wages, sometimes gross wages plus employer's
contribution in social security.
The value of calculations of unpaid word reviewed in this chapter varies between
5.9% and 53% of Gross National Product. The variation is due to different
methods, variations in the people concerned (age and sex), variations in the
activities which are counted as productive, variations in wages, different
countries and periods.
Theoretically the output method is attractive because it resembles the method
used in National Accounts. However by using this method it is much more
difficult to obtain data. A mixture of different methods is not surveyable and
lacks comparability. The attempt of Chadeau and Roy to base an estimation on
household production function is theoretically interesting, but technically very
difficult to carry out.
51I came to the conclusion that it is best to take the input method and as a price
component gross market wages plus employer's contribution in social security of
a general substitute, thereby following the method of the National Account as
close as possible. Time use surveys are available in many countries. It is a
relatively simple and clear method.
524. UNPAID WORK IN THE NETHERLANDS 1975-1990
"What is not counted, is usually not noticed" (Galbraith 1973).
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter calculations on the value of unpaid work in the Netherlands in
the years 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 are presented, based on Intomart time use
surveys published by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (Knulst and Van
Beek 1990) and micro data of the same surveys of the Steinmetz Archief in
Amsterdam.
Section 2 of this chapter gives an overview of time use studies in the
Netherlands. Section 3 gives information on the data I used for my calculations
of the value of unpaid work. Activities which are considered unpaid work in this
study are summed up in section 4. In section 5 my calculations of the value of
unpaid work in the Netherlands as a percentage of GNP turn out to be
considerably higher than in other countries. Its reason is being analysed.
Furthermore it is argued that in order to compare the value of paid and unpaid
work or the value of unpaid work in the course of time, the value of unpaid
work could better be expressed as a percentage of the macro wage sum than as a
percentage of GNP. In sections 6 to 8 data are presented on the total workload of
paid and unpaid work between sexes and per age group and on the division of
unpaid work between sexes and per household type. Summary and conclusion
are given in section 9.
4.2 Time use research in the Netherlands: an overview
In 1936 the first time use research in the Netherlands was carried out by studying
the use of leisure time of 621 Dutch workers (Knulst 1977 p.7). In 1955/1956 and
1962/1963 the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistics Netherlands -
SN) studied the use of leisure time of a representative sample of the Dutch
population. From that time until 1970 only a few smaller surveys had been
carried out. In 1970 the commercial market research bureau Intomart carried out
a time use survey of a representative sample of the Dutch population during a
week by order of the Dutch broadcasting corporations. Other organizations, e.g.
the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office and the University of
Wageningen, were also interested in time use studies. Together they participated
in an Intomart time use study in 1975, which was carried out based on the list of
activities of the cross international time use study as carried out in 1965/1966 by
Alexander Szalai (Knulst 1977 p.7). The 1975 study was repeated in 1980, 1985 and
1990.
In the publication of the 1980 time use study of the Dutch Social and Cultural
Planning Office special attention was given to unpaid work (Knulst and
S3Schoonderwoerd 1983). Comparison of the 1975 and 1980 studies shows that time
and energy had shifted from paid to unpaid activities. Unpaid work was defined
as activities in the household, caring for members of the family, do-it-yourself
activities and voluntary work. Household work, do-it-yourself activities and
voluntary work all shared in the increase. The main increase was to be ascribed to
among others married people aged 35-65 years. In 1980 unpaid work took nearly
twice as many hours of time than paid work. In 1980 paid and unpaid work was
quite unevenly divided between men and women. Of all the work performed by
men an average of 36% was unpaid work, for women 84% of working hours was
unpaid. Between 1975 and 1980 particularly fathers in young families considerably
increased their share in household and family work. Married women with young
children spent most of their time in the household. The amount of household
work performed by men is positively rather than negatively related to the
number of hours spent on it by women. For instance, in households where
neither of the partners have jobs, the man performs on average more household
work than in households where the wife has a job. The rules of the paid labour
system and education time tables do not only tie the time use of paid workers and
schoolgoers but also of the rest of the family. For instance the planning of
household activities of housewives is visibly influenced by the times of leaving
and home-coming of working or schoolgoing members of the family. Voluntary
work took 5% of all working hours in 1985 (Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983).
In 1987 Statistics Netherlands started a new survey on the time use considering
all activities of the Dutch population of 12 years and older among a sample of
nearly 7000 persons. A publication of Stoop and Oudhof (1989) forms part of this
study. Stoop and Oudhof compare the time use of men and women, united in
1684 couples, married or cohabitating. In this study women's share in unpaid
work depends upon the composition of the household, women's labour market
participation and opinions of both partners about sharing unpaid work. The
younger the youngest child, the larger the share of women in household work;
the more she participates in the labour market, the smaller her share in
household work; the stronger her opinion about sharing household work with
her husband, the smaller her share in household work (Stoop and Oudhof 1989
p.11-13).
Time use research by Van der Lippe (1993) shows that the division of unpaid
work between man and wife (married or cohabitating), unemployed, disabled and
retired people excluded, depends on the presence and number of (young)
children, the wage of the woman and the attitudes of the social environment
(Van der Lippe 1993 p.59 and 141).
Droogleever Fortuyn (1993) studied the household arrangements of 70
two-earner families. The division of unpaid work depended on the position of
the husband and wife on the labour market, the age of the youngest child, the
educational level of both partners and their attitude towards sharing paid and
unpaid work (Droogleever Fortuyn 1993 p.291-294).
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Office published a Workdocument on the development of the division of unpaid
labour between men and women in the period 1975-1990 based on the Intomart
time use data. For women in all age groups time for household tasks decreased
and it increased for men. Especially married women with a paid job of 30 hours
or more a week decreased their unpaid workload by 15 hours a week, whereas
their husbands increased their unpaid working week by 2.25 hours a week. This
was the only category in which unpaid work was almost evenly divided: women
took care of 52% of all household tasks and childcare in 1990 (Van der Lippe and
Niphuis-Nell 1994).
4.3 The data for this study
The time use data used in this chapter were collected by a commercial market
research bureau Intomart, on instruction of the Dutch Broadcasting Corporations,
the Social and Cultural Planning Office and other organizations which
participated in the time use surveys. Intomart gathered data in 1975, 1980, 1985
and 1990 following the same method, so the data of these years could be
compared. The number of respondents was enlarged from 1309 in 1975 to 3150 in
1990 to make analyses of subpopulations possible. The same questions were asked
and the same codes used for all activities in the years 1975-1990. Respondents
were asked to write down in a precoded diary their time use for every fifteen
minutes or more they spent on an activity during a whole week in autumn. They
were interviewed about all members of the household before and after recording
their time use in the diary. Because of non-response and over-representation of
small households the data were weighted according to number of people, sex, age
and urbanity. The Social and Cultural Planning Office published the macro data
of the 1975, 1980 and 1985 time use studies in a publication of 1990 (Knulst and
Van Beek 1990 pp.138-159). I have chosen these macro data as the basis for my
calculations in section 4.5-4.7, supplemented by the 1990 micro data of the
Steinmetz Archief. The micro data of the 1985 and 1990 time use studies, which I
used for section 4.8. of this chapter and for the income distribution of chapter 6, I
also thankfully received from the Steinmetz Archief in Amsterdam.
Using these data several problems as mentioned in section 3.2. did not crop up: a
standardized method was used; the question who had to be counted was
irrelevant because a representative sample was taken; the problem of joint or
multiple activities was solved by taking down in the diary only the primary
activity. However, the difference in time use between working days and Sundays
and holidays and the seasonal and cyclical variations in time use could not be
distinguished in the data, because the observations took place during one week in
autumn. The data did not allow to observe possible scale economies, differences
in productivity or waiting time. These disadvantages could have been avoided if
the calculation of the value of unpaid work had been the target of the time use
studies. As it is, I consider myself a privileged person to have been allowed to use
the existing data.The different types of unpaid work discussed in the next section.
4.4 Types of unpaid work
Household work, e.g. cooking, cleaning, washing and ironing, daily purchases,
mending clothes house repairs, is considered unpaid work by most researchers
(Hawrylyshyn 1976; Juster 1985 p.330; Gershuny and Robinson 1988; Schafer 1992).
Child care is also considered unpaid work, but some researchers see care of other
members of the family as non-productive personal care (Juster 1985 p.330).
Do-it-yourself activities, e.g. house repairs, are generally thought of as
productive unpaid work (Hawrylyshyn 1976; Juster 1985; Gershuny and Robinson
1988), but not all researchers consider knitting and sewing, or gardening
productive activities (Juster 1985 p.331). Floro argues that there is often an
intertwining of social activities with work. For instance when clothes are mended
while talking with friends, is it "work" or "leisure"? The leisure component may
disappear when the work activity pace quickens for some or other reason (Floro
1995 p. 1919). Opinions differ on voluntary activities for church, unions, political
and other organizations. Especially because voluntary work differs from the other
three categories of unpaid work, as these are not performed and consumed in the
own household. Hawrylyshyn thinks that voluntary activities for social
organizations were productive, Juster considers them to be leisure activities
(Hawrylyshyn 1977 p.80; Juster 1985 p.331). Others (Blau and Ferber 1986; Schafer
1992) thinks that these activities were unpaid work. Blau and Ferber defines
voluntary work as activities which form part of an organized programme, do not
give direct material reward whereas the chief beneficiaries must not be members
of the family (Blau and Ferber 1986 p.130).
In a study on Informal Care, published in 1994, the Social and Cultural Planning
Office made a distinction between informal care and voluntary work. Informal
care is given voluntarily, unpaid and unorganized to old and sick people who can
no longer take care of their household tasks or personal care. Voluntary work is
also unpaid, but forms part of an organization or institution outside the social
network of the recipient. Although not explicitly mentioned, these definitions
imply that the third person criterion is valid, because a hospital or an old people's
home, where they (or the social security) have to pay for formal care, is the
alternative for informal care to these sick and old people. The same applies to the
activities of volunteers (De Boer et al 1994 p.28).
A subjective approach to define household work is followed by Homan (1988). In
an interview he asked respondents: "How many hours do you and your partner
spend on household work per week?" (Homan 1988 p.77). My objection to this
subjective definition is that the same activities are sometimes classified as
productive, sometimes as non-productive, depending on the respondent. This
method is not suitable to extend the production boundary.
In the eyes of the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (1983) a clear-cut
56definition of unpaid work could not be given, it is arbitrary. Activities, e.g.
cooking, gardening, child care, taking minutes and cycle racing are done as a
profession and as a hobby, but some can also be considered unpaid work.
Consequently the borders between professional work, unpaid work and leisure
are not sharp. Scientific literature offers no clear-cut criteria or definitions. The
classification of activities as unpaid work is an arbitrary arrangement or to use the
words of economist Jan Pen in a reaction to my first article on unpaid work:
"Cooking is work. Making tea also. Is pouring tea work or stirring to dissolve the
sugar? Or bringing the teacup to one's mouth? If these questions are answered
with yes, only drinking tea remains as consumption" (Pen 1970 p.592) (Knulst
and Schoonderwoerd 1983 p.53-56).
I followed the 1983 classification of the Social and Cultural Planning Office for
two reasons. Using the data of SCP implies the acceptance of their classification of
activities. The other reason is that I consider the SCP-classification realistic, except
from time spent on shopping, which the Office did not consider unpaid work
then(H). So 1 added time for shopping to unpaid work. As mentioned before, the
activities in these Dutch time use studies are categorized with Szalai's
classification as a starting point (Knulst and van Beek 1990 p.127). In the
publication of the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the 1980 time use study,
the activities were classified in 5 subgroups: work, household work, personal care,
education and leisure activities (Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983 p.268/269).
The data have been subdivided into 5 age groups: 12-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64 and
65 years and over.
In these Dutch studies paid working hours are working hours for which one
receives wages, a salary or other renumeration. Time spent in transit to and from
work is considered working hours. The same applies to study or leisure during
working hours.
In my calculations the following categories of the Social and Cultural Planning
Office are considered unpaid work (Knulst and van Beek 1990 p.138-159):
Household work:
preparing meals, cleaning dishes, cleaning, dusting, scrubbing, waxing,
making beds, changing sheets, jobs outside, laundry, ironing, organizing and
transport (numbers 100, 110, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 130, 141, 142, 180, 191, 194,
195 and 350);
Care of family:
care of baby and other children, help with schoolwork, reading, playing,
walking with children, medical care of children, care of other members of the
family (numbers 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 291- 295 and 420)
Shopping:
daily needs in supermarket or market, shopping in department store,
shopping for clothes and shoes, shopping in do-it-yourself stores, shopping
for household articles and furniture, shopping for other articles, post-office,
Lippe and Niphuis-Nell also added shopping to unpaid work in the 1994 SCP publication
57bank, services, transport, waiting (numbers 301, 302, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315,
316,340, 351,360, 370,391,392,394,395);
Do-it-yourself activities:
do-it-yourself jobs, knitting, embroidery, taking care of garden and plants,
care of pets (numbers 151,160,171,172, 840);
Voluntary work:
managing political and social organizations, voluntary activities, family help,
transport (numbers 600, 610, 620, 630, 640, 660, 670, 691-695).
Although there are borderline cases, the difference between unpaid labour on the
one hand and leisure and personal care on the other hand can be shown by
looking at the third person criterion. If a healthy, adult individual is in principle
able to do activities himself and normally cannot hire a third person for these
activities, these activities are either a biological need or a leisure activity, if one
considers time spent on education a leisure activity. If he can delegate the activity
to a third person hired on the labour market or substitute the activity by market
goods the activity is considered unpaid work. Personal care, education and leisure
activities are not considered unpaid work.
Activities of children of 12 years and over, of people of 65 years and over and of
unemployed people have also been counted. The question whether activities of
these groups have any money value is dealt with in chapter 2 section 5. As it can
be doubted whether the productivity of children and older people is the same as
the productivity of people 25-64 years of age, the value of unpaid work of the
population of 25-64 of age is presented separately as well as included in the value
of unpaid work of the whole population of 12 years and over.
4.5 Empirical estimations of the value of unpaid work in the Netherlands
1975-1990
Earlier estimations of the value of unpaid work (Bruyn-Hundt 1970; 1983) were
based on the small-scale time use studies of the University of Wageningen, NIPO
and the time use studies of Knulst (1977) and Knulst and Schoonderwoerd (1983).
The calculations published in 1970 were based on volume components which
cannot be compared with the time use studies available now. The calculations
published in 1983 were based on the 1975 and 1980 Intomart time use studies
published by the Social and Cultural Planning Office in 1977 and 1983 (Knulst
1977; Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983). I decided to repeat the calculations for
the years 1975 and 1980 for several reasons. The first reason is that in 1990 the
Social and Cultural Planning Office published for the first time data which
compared the results of three time use studies (1975, 1980 and 1985) and showed
them simultaneously (Knulst and Van Beek 1990). The second reason is that in
the 1990 publication of the Social and Cultural Planning Office slight changes
were made in the subdivision of activities. The third reason is that the taxation
and social security systems have changed since 1983, which obliged me to make
small changes in the calculations of the gross plus wages.In chapter three I argue that the best method to evaluate unpaid work is the input
method using as a price component gross wages plus employer's contribution in
social security. The volume component consists of minutes per week of the four
time use studies mentioned earlier for every activity for the age groups: 12-24,
25-34, 35-49, 50-64 and 64 and over subdivided between sexes. I multiplied these
minutes with the number of persons in every age group and divided the result by
60 (minutes) to obtain working hours per week. A correction was made for
standard weekly working hours because standard working hours changed
between 1975 and 1990. After that the week volume was multiplied by one of the
price components mentioned below.
The price components used in the calculations are:
1. The legal minimum wages per week for adults plus employer's contribution
in social security. In years in which the minimum wages changed during the
year the weighted average was used.
2. The weekly wages of a home help (gezinsverzorgster), a professional help in
the household employed by specialized organizations for household help
subsidized by the authorities. I took the wages of a home help in scale 12 of
the existing 17 scales of the collective wage agreement (Collectieve
Arbeidsovereenkomst - CAO) on 1st January. A scale 12 home help is
supposed to be an independent substitute for the housewife. Gross wages plus
employer's contribution in social security have been used.
3. The average gross wages per week of employees in the age of 16-64 years
working full-time, exclusive overtime work, plus employer's contribution in
social security (Source: SN).
In table 4.1. the development of the volume of unpaid work is compared with the
volume of paid work, calculations of the value of unpaid work are presented as a
percentage of Gross National Product and as a percentage of the Macro Wage
sum. The left side of the table concerns the whole Dutch population of 12 years
and older and the right side concerns the population of 25-64 years of age. The
volume of unpaid work and paid work is the result of the participation rate and
of the time each respondent spent on unpaid and paid work.
The left half of the first part of table 4.1. shows that the number of hours of
unpaid work per year is between 1.5 and 1.9 times higher than paid work for the
whole population of 12 years and over. The right half of table 4.1. shows that
even in the active age groups 25-64 the average volume of unpaid work is higher
than the average volume of paid work, although it is lower than the volume of
unpaid work for the whole population. The main reason is that the participation
rate of younger and older people in unpaid work is much higher than the
participation rate in paid work. Unpaid work for all age groups is high because
unpaid work is not tied to a working timetable, whereas the stress to obtain a
high productivity is lower doing unpaid work (Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983
p.57).
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The left half of the first part of table 4.1. also shows that the volume of paid work
decreased in the period 1975-1985 and increased again in 1985-1990 for all men
aged 12 years and over. For all women aged 12 years and over paid work
increased over the whole period. The number of hours of unpaid work increased
for all men and until 1985 it also slightly increased for women. These increases
and decreases led to a growth of unpaid work and a decrease of paid work until
1985. After 1985 the reverse was true: unpaid work decreased whereas paid work
increased. Over the entire period paid work increased and unpaid work
decreased. To all probability the main reason of these developments was the
rising rate of unemployment, which reached a peak in 1984. After 1984
unemployment decreased (see also section 5.5.4.). The decreasing participation of
men in paid work until 1985 led to an increase in their unpaid working hours. It
is remarkable that the increasing participation of women in paid work did not
diminish their hours of unpaid work until after 1985.
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Source: Own calculations based on Knulst and Van Beek 1990; SN 1991 b, section II.
The right half of the first part of table 4.1. shows that for men aged 25-64 paid
working hours decreased between 1975-1985, whereas their unpaid working
hours increased. After 1985 their paid hours increased again and their unpaid
hours decreased. Women in their active life increased their paid working hours
during the whole period, whereas their unpaid working hours decreased. In
short: average hours of paid work for men aged 25-64 diminished less than 1%
and average hours of unpaid work were 9% higher in 1990 compared to 1975.
Average hours of paid work for women rose by 88%, whereas their hours of
unpaid work were 10% lower in 1990 compared to 1975.
The second part of table 4.1. shows that the value of unpaid work calculated at
gross minimum wages plus employer's contribution in social security is between
51 and 68% of Gross National Product (GNP) for the whole population and
between 36% and 46% of GNP for the population aged 25-64. Using the wages of a
home help as price component, these percentages are between 63 and 82% and
61between 45 and 56% respectively. Calculated at average earned wages these
percentages are much higher: between 91 and 110% and between 58 and 78%
respectively. When comparing the volume of unpaid work in relation to paid
work (first part of table 4.1.) to the value of unpaid work in relation to GNP
(second part of table 4.1.), it is remarkable to see the low percentages of value
compared to the much higher percentages of volume. One might expect the
value of unpaid labour to be higher than GNP. This is not true as is shown in the
second part of table 4.1. Although the number of unpaid hours of the active
population is about 38 to 74% higher than the number of paid hours, the value of
unpaid work does not even equal GNP.
There are reasons why the value of unpaid work is less than GNP:
1. GNP is the sum of wages, other income, indirect taxes, depreciation and net
income from abroad minus price subsidies. Paid work (sum of wages) forms a
fluctuating part of GNP of about 55 to 65% (SN 1986 p.274).
2. Unpaid work is calculated at minimum or low wages, because unpaid work is
supposed to have a low professional knowledge and a low productivity.
The percentages in table 4.1. are much higher than in calculations mentioned in
economic literature (see section 3.4.). The higher values of unpaid work in the
Netherlands can be ascribed to three causes:
1. Labour market participation of Dutch women was low until 1985 compared to
other EC-countries (OECD 1988 p.200). Dutch women are leaders in working
part-time in the OECD (OECD 1988 p.149; OECD 1990 p.200).
2. In the calculations of the left half of table 4.1. unpaid labour of children and
elderly people was taken into account; in other calculations only unpaid
labour of adults or unpaid work of people in active age groups was taken into
account.
3. In table 4.1. gross wages inclusive of employer's contribution in social security
were used. In most calculations in section 3.4 net wages have been used. In
the Netherlands the gap between net wages and gross wages is considerable. If
net wages are 100%, gross wages plus employer's contribution in social
security are 180 to 195% of net wages, in other words gross plus wages are
nearly twice as high as net wages. This implies that if the value of unpaid
work in table 4.1. is corrected for net wages, the percentages of the value of
unpaid work for the active population range from about 18 to 39%. These
percentages are more in accordance with the percentages found by others (see
section 3.4).
Looking at the value of unpaid work as a percentage of GNP in the calculations of
table 4.1., one has the impression that the value of unpaid work has diminished
during the whole period, if the minimum wages or the wages of a home help are
used as a price component. If average earned wages are used, unpaid work
increased very slightly until 1985 and decreased after 1985. In contrast to the
development of unpaid work calculated at minimum wages or the wages of a
home help, the first part of table 4.1. shows that the volume of unpaid work
increased significantly until 1985, to decrease sharply afterwards. This leads to thequestion whether expressing the value of unpaid work as a percentage of GNP is
a useful method to measure the development of paid and unpaid work in
relation to each other or to compare the development of unpaid work in time. As
mentioned before GNP is the sum of wages, other income, indirect taxes,
depreciation and net income from abroad minus price subsidies. If for example
other incomes change because of profits, or because indirect taxes, income from
abroad or depreciations change, the value of unpaid work as a percentage of GNP
changes too. If the value of unpaid work is related to GNP it does not tell much
about the development of unpaid work in relation to paid work. Yet most
researchers use GNP as a measuring instrument. Some used Net National
Income (NNI) or Net National Product (NNP) (Mitchell 1921; Andrews 1935;
Lindahl 1930; Statistike Department of Denmark 1948, as quoted by Goldschmidt
1982; Clark 1956) or used both GNP and NNP (Weinrobe 1974; Chadeau 1985) or
used Gross Internal Product (GIP) (Chadeau & Fouquet 1981). The difference
between GNP and NNP is that NNP does not count indirect taxes, depreciation
and price subsidies. The difference between GNP and GIP is that GIP does not
count income from abroad. In my opinion the macro wage sum inclusive of
employer's contribution in social security is a better measure to compare the
value of unpaid labour at different points of time or between different countries
than GNP, NNP or GIP. Therefore in the last part of table 4.1. the value of unpaid
work is related to the macro wage sum. The sum of wages in this table is the sum
of gross wages paid by trade and government inclusive of the employer's
contribution in social security as shown in National Accounts. One would expect
unpaid work as a percentage of paid work, to be identical to unpaid work at
average earned wages as a percentage of the macro wage sum. However, there are
statistical differences due to the fact that the macro wage sum comes from the
National Accounts and average earned wages from a monthly SN publication,
based on the wages of full-time employees. So average earned wages is not the
average of the macro wage sum.
If the value of unpaid work is related to the macro wage sum, more insight is
obtained in the relation between the value of paid and unpaid work and the
development of the value of unpaid labour. The left side of the lower part of table
4.1. shows that the value of unpaid work of the entire population of 12 years and
older is higher than the sum of wages. This is also true for half of the calculations
of the value of unpaid labour of the population 25-64 years of age, if calculated at
average earned wages or the wages of a home help as is shown on the right side
of the lower part of table 4.1.
4.6 Total workload per age group and between sexes
Data on the division of the total workload of paid and unpaid work over the
lifecycle and between sexes are presented in this section. The data used in this
section offer the opportunity to look at the division of paid and unpaid work at
macro level.
Table 4.2. shows that paid work is done mainly by men and unpaid work bywomen as is the case in most European countries (Council of Europe 1994
p.15-20). From 1975 to 1985 men's paid hours decreased, with the exception of
men aged 35-49 years. In 1990 men's paid hours increased in all age groups except
in the one of 50 years and over. Women's paid hours increased over the whole
period in all age groups except the youngest one.
Men's unpaid working hours increased until 1985, except for the youngest age
group. In 1990 unpaid hours decreased for men of all age groups except for the
group over 50. The number of women's unpaid hours increased slightly until
1985, after which a sharp decline is seen, except for older women. Consequently
1990 is an important year: paid work of men and women increased, unpaid work
decreased for men and women. The same developments of more equality
between men and women in sharing paid and unpaid work can be seen in other
European countries (Council of Europe 1994). Men's increase in unpaid hours
only compensates for half of women's decrease in unpaid hours.
Table 4.2. shows that women are working longer hours than men, if paid and
unpaid hours are taken together. This applies to all age groups, except for the age
group 35-49 in the years 1985 and 1990. There is a tendency for differences in
workload to become smaller in the course of time. According to the Council of
Europe (1994 p.21) this tendency should be ascribed to the growing labour market
participation of women. Sharing the total work load seems to be most equal in
countries with a high proportion of women in the labour force.
In 1975 women's workload counted 3 hours per week more than men's, in 1990
the difference had diminished to 1 hour a week. In 1975 the difference in
workload between men and women was most pronounced for the youngest and
oldest age groups: young and old women worked 7 hours more a week than men
of the same age. In 1990 this gap was still rather large for men and women over
50: older women worked 3 to 5 hours a week more than older men.
Furthermore table 4.2. shows that on average people spend 38 to 44 hours a week
on work. But behind this average an interesting development emerges: the
workload of younger and older people is not as high and decreased in the period
1975-1990. The workload of people between 25-50 exceeds 50 hours a week. It
even increased for the age group 35-49 in the period 1975-1990, especially for
men. The workload of the age group over 50 is much lower and diminishes with
age. The Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office also found that the workload
becomes less heavy with age and concluded "leisure comes with age" (Knulst and
Van Beek 1990 p.117).Table 4.2.















































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on time studies of SCP 1990 and Steinmetz Archief 1990
Conclusions: A first conclusion is that, although the difference is narrowing, paid
work is still mainly done by men, unpaid work by women. A second conclusion
is that unpaid work has decreased for women and has increased for men. A third
65conclusion is that paid and unpaid working hours are in competition. If paid
work decreases, unpaid work increases and vice versa, but the rate of substitution
is not 1:1. A fourth conclusion is that, although in all female age groups the total
workload in hours of paid plus unpaid work is higher than in all male age
groups, the differences between men and women in all age groups are narrowing.
In the next section the distribution of all unpaid activities will be analysed, as
well as men's share in paid and unpaid work.
4.7 The division of paid and unpaid work between sexes
The data in table 4.3. about paid as well as unpaid work come from the SCP-time
use studies. It shows that women's share in paid work is about 25% and in
unpaid work it is about 70%. Women's share in paid work in the age group 25-64
is even less than their share in the population of 12 years and over. The reason of
this smaller share probably lies in the high labour market participation of women
under 25, compared to older women.
Table 4.3.
Women's share in paid and unpaid work for the population of 12 years and over
(population 25-64 years)
Paid work Unpaid work
1975 21% (13%) 71% (73%)
1980 22% (15%) 70% (72%)
1985 24% (20%) 69% (69%)
1990 27% (22%) 67% (78%)
Women's share in paid work considering the population of 12 years and over,
has increased during the whole period, this also applies to the age group 25-64
years. Women's share in unpaid word considering the age group 25-64 has
decreased until the year 1985, but in 1990 it is even higher than in 1975.
Overlooking the whole period women's share in unpaid work has decreased for
the population of 12 years and over.
To analyse why and how the division of paid and unpaid work between men and
women has changed, the distribution of unpaid work over different unpaid
activities will be shown in table 4.4.
Household work consumes about nearly half of all unpaid time. Its share
declined a little bit in the period 1975-1990. Improved household technology can
explain the decreasing share of Household work. The share of Care of family did
not change much, nor did the share of Shopping.Table 4.4.



































































Source: Own calculations based on Knulst and Van Beek 1990.
Table 4.4. shows that the share of Do-it-yourself activities rose until 1985 and
declined in 1990. The high rate of unemployment with a peak in 1984 and the
rising costs of services may be explanations for this development. Voluntary
work consumed more time in 1990 compared to 1975. Less hours of paid work of
older men could explain the growing share of Voluntary work but this turned
out not to be true because men's share in Voluntary work has decreased as shown
in table 4.5. Another explanation for the growing share of Voluntary work is the
cuts in government spending for paid care and hospitalization and the growing
number of senior citizens.
In sections 5 and 6 it was shown that men performed more unpaid work in 1990
compared to 1975 and women more paid work. However, men's share in unpaid
work increased less than women's share in paid work. Men's share in unpaid
work increased about 1% per year, whereas women's share in paid work
increased about 2% per year, considering the whole population of 12 years and
over. If the population of 25-64 years is considered over a period of 15 years,
men's share in unpaid work increased by 19%, whereas women's share in paid
work increased by 77% (from 13 to 23%) as is shown in table 4.5.
What type of unpaid activities performed by men are responsible for their rising
share in unpaid work? To analyse whether men in the active period of their lives
do more or less than all men aged 12 years and over, men's share in the
population of 25-64 years has been put in brackets.
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Men's share in paid and unpaid work as percentage of all paid and unpaid work of the male and





































































Source: Own calculations based on Knulst and Van Beek 1990.
Table 4.5 shows that men take care of about one fifth of Household work. They
increased their share in this activity. The share of all men is higher than the
share of men in the age group of 25-64. This is clearly due to the traditional
division of paid work between men and women. All men take care of about one
quarter of Care of family. There is no marked development in their share over
the years, nor can a marked difference between all men and men in the age group
25-64 be distinguished. Shopping is men's work for about one third. Men have a
growing share in this activity. It applies to working as well as nonworking men. It
is remarkable to see men's decreasing share in Do-it-yourself activities until
1985. One would have expected them to increase their share in these activities in
a period of high unemployment. Their share in Do-it-yourself activities rose
again in 1990 notwithstanding their growing hours of paid work. The division of
Voluntary work between sexes did not change much over the whole period.
An explanation for men's rising share in unpaid work has been given by
Pott-Buter (1993 p.320). According to Pott-Buter home care and child care used to
be luxury goods. Rising wages of husbands made it possible for wives to stay at
home before World War II. Improved household technology and reduced family
size decreased the demand for home care after World War II. This decrease has
been stronger than the increase of rising income levels. So the substitution effect
of women's own wages has come to dominate the income effect of men's wages.
Married women have a greater preference to combine market work with caring
for home and children.
Employment opportunities obviously influence the amount of unpaid work for
men as well as for women. Paid hours for men in the age groups 12-50 years rose
after 1985 (see table 4.2.) That is probably the reason that their share in Shopping
and Voluntary work decreased in 1990.
684.8 Unpaid work per household type
In the 1985 and 1990 time use surveys several questions were asked which made
it possible to categorize households in one and two-earner households,
one-parent households and single people. One-earner households are
households where only one of the partners, male or female, is the breadwinner.
In two-earner households both partners are in the labour market, although the
division of paid work is not equal in most cases. Therefore a distinction is made
between the main and the second breadwinner. The subgroup "other members of
the family" are children or parents of the head of the family or other members of
the family within the same household. Because some subgroups were very
limited in number the 1985 and 1990 data were put together. Even after adding
the 1985 and 1990 data some subgroups are too limited to draw any conclusions.
The time use of all respondents was categorized to the household types
mentioned above. The time use of all one-earners, all two-earners who
answered that they were main or second breadwinner, of all partners of a certain
household type, as well as the time use of the head of one-parent families, of
single people and other members of the household was averaged between sexes.
Not all subgroups were big enough to allow a further subdivision.
Table 4.6.




















































Source: Micro data Steinmetz Archief
Table 4.6. shows that female main breadwinners are a rare phenomenon. Partners
of one-earners and second breadwinners in a two-earner situation are practically
always female.
Table 4.6. illustrates that in all household types women spend more hours on
unpaid work than men. Even if the female is the main breadwinner her average
69number of unpaid hours is higher than that of her male counterpart. On average
the single female spends more hours in her household than her male
counterpart. It is remarkable that even female children in the age group 12-18
spend more hours on unpaid work than male children of the same age group.
The difference between sexes becomes more significant the older the children get.
It is evident from table 4.6. that partners of one-earners are the leaders in unpaid
work followed by female heads of one-parent families and second breadwinners
in a two-earner situation. One would expect male one-earners to spend the least
hours on unpaid activities, because their wives do not do any paid work. This
turns out not to be true: it is the male main breadwinner in a two-earner
situation who averagely spends the least hours on unpaid activities. An
explanation is that one-earners are concentrated in families with young children
and in families of 50 years and over.
In families with young children the number of unpaid hours is higher (Knulst
and Van Beek 1990 p.59; Van der Lippe and Liphuis-Nell 1994 p.49). A growing
percentage of young mothers participate in the labour market. In 1991 it was 43 to
58% depending on the source of information (Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment 1994 annex 1; Maessen van den Brink et all 1995 p.38),
4.9 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter the basis for the calculations of the value of unpaid work are four
time use surveys carried out by a commercial market research bureau Intomart,
in the years 1975-1990 on instruction of, among others the Dutch Broadcasting
Corporations and the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office. The input of
time was multiplied by three different wages: the legal minimum wages per
week, the wages of a home help (gezinsverzorgster), a professional help in the
household employed by specialized organizations for household help subsidized
by the government, and the average gross wages of an adult employee working
full-time. All wages were gross wages plus employer's contribution in social
security.
Unpaid work has been defined as hours spent on household work, care of the
family, shopping, do-it-yourself activities and voluntary work. The Dutch
population of 12 years and older spent 1.5 to 1.9 hours more on unpaid work per
year than it did on paid work in the period 1975-1990. If unpaid work of the
active population of 25-64 years of age is considered, unpaid work ranges from
138 to 174% of paid work. Estimations of the value of unpaid work for the whole
population range from 51% of GNP to 110%, depending on the year and the
chosen wages. The value of unpaid work of the active population in the age
group 25-64 ranges from 36 to 78% of GNP.
The average workload of paid and unpaid work of the entire Dutch population
did not increase for men in the period 1975-1985, except for the age groups 35-49
70and 65+. For women the average workload remained the same in all age groups
except the youngest one. Behind this average it turned out that the workload of
people younger than 35 years and older than 50 years decreased or remained the
same, whereas the average workload of people between 35-50 years of age
increased. •*•.<-•<. J
Men's share in unpaid work has increased. Their share rose from 29 to 33%. This
increased share is mainly due to a decrease in the number of hours of unpaid
work by women. For both men and women household work is the most time
consuming unpaid activity.
In all household types women spend more hours on unpaid work than men.
Even if the female is the main breadwinner her average number of unpaid hours
is higher than that of her male counterpart.
715. THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
The Blue Book's borderline between subsistence output to be included in production and
consumption, and household activity to be excluded, reflects a sexist view that is gradually
changing" (Richard Ruggles in a 1982 UN report).
5.1 Introduction
Unpaid work is absent in National Accounts and other statistics. The debate
whether unpaid work should be taken into account in statistics is as old as
National Accounts. What would be the effects on the measurement of statistics
and economic phenomena if the value of unpaid work were implemented?
Section 2 of this chapter tells what is measured by the system of National
Accounts. Section 3 deals with the long-lasting debate about the imputation of
unpaid work in the National Accounts whereas in section 4 this imputation is
globally executed for the 1990 National Accounts of the Netherlands. The
imputation of unpaid work would lead to a change in the measurement of
welfare, economic growth and the business cycle if national income per head is
taken as a criterion. This is the subject of sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. In sections 5.5.3
and 5.5.4 it is argued that the measurement of employment and unemployment
would not change much if paid and unpaid work are measured separately.
Section 5.5.5 measures the size of consumption and investments if unpaid work
and depreciation of durable household goods is added. In section 5.5.6 it is argued
that Pareto optimal allocation does not have much meaning if unpaid work is
absent. The essence of section 5.5.7 is that economizing on government expenses
nearly always leads to an extra burden for unpaid workers. A summary and
conclusions follow in section 6.
5.2 What is measured by the System of National Accounts?
From the early days of the formulation of National Accounts by Sir William Petty
and Gregory King in seventeenth century England, there have been lively debates
as to what they should include, how items should be measured and how they are
to be put together. From the beginning on one of the points of the debate was
whether the value of unpaid household work should be counted as production.
Alfred Marshall (1890) said that services rendered by members of the family
should not be counted as part of the national incomeO*). One of the oldest
puzzles in the theory of national income statistics is the question whether
national income decreases if a man marries his housekeeper. The answer is yes,
12 Alfred Marshall:"Principles of Economics" (1979 p.434)
"But it is best here to follow the common practice, and not count as part of the national income or
dividend anything that is not commonly counted as part of the income of the individual. Thus,
unless anything is said to the contrary, the services which a person renders to himself, and those
which he renders gratuitously to members of his family or friends".
73because a marketed activity disappears, although the total flow of goods and
services remains the same (UN 1977 p.ll).
The question whether the value of unpaid work should be part of national
income crops up again and again in the discussion about improvement and
refinement of National Accounts. Many calculations of the value of household
labour have been made during this discussion. Unpaid household work however
is only one of the many items of this debate, although experts state that this
omission has long been recognized as the major one in the National Accounting
system (Gronau 1986 p.296; Eisner 1988 p.1667).
Although some aspects of society were measured before 1900, the System of
National Accounts was only developed in the twentieth century, in particular
after World War II. As society became more and more complex governments and
other policy makers were in great need of an overview of all the streams of
money, goods and services within a country and between countries. National
Accounts is an macro-economic overview of the whole economic process. In 1947
Stone published a system of National Accounts with five sectors: Productive
Enterprises, Financial Intermediaries, Insurance and Social Security Agencies,
Final Consumers and The rest of the world. Per sector four accounts were set up:
an operating account, an appropriation account, a capital account and a reserve
account (Stone 1947).
The first United Nations guidelines for the System of National Accounts were
published in 1952. The 1952 SNA established the National Accounts as the
primary body of economic data that countries should develop as the basis for
reporting on the growth and development of their economic systems and as a
major tool for the formulation of economic policy (Ruggles 1982 p.3). Elements of
the economic process are: production, income distribution, consumption and
finances (Statistics Netherlands (SN) 1991 b, p.189).
This system has permanently been improved and refined by the United Nations,
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
European Economic Community (EEC). It now contains 7 sectors: Productive
Enterprises, Banking, Insurance Companies, Government, Social Security funds,
Households and The rest of the world. Between these sectors and subsectors all
economic relations or transactions are registered as well as the transactions with
other countries. Macroeconomic data such as national income and national
product, consumer expenditures, savings and investments, import and export are
measured in the National Accounts (SN 1991 b p.104-168).
5.3 The debate about imputing the value of household services in
National Accounts
In some countries the value of household work was accounted in the National
Accounts during a (short) period. Studenski (1958) reports that Hungary, Italy and
74Sweden imputed the value of unpaid domestic services in their national incomes
in the nineteen thirties (Studensky 1958 p.177). In a study for the OECD Brathaug
(1991) mentions that Norway imputed the value of housewives work in the
National Accounts between 1935 and 1949. This imputation was made with the
help of population census data, since time use studies were not available then.
The value of unpaid work was determined on the basis of annual wages and the
value of room and board for maid servants in the country and for domestic staff
in towns. In 1949 Norway stopped these imputations because internationally
comparable figures were needed (Brathaug 1991 p.3 and 12).
The debate about imputing unpaid household labour into National Accounts and
proposals how this has to be done, has been going on since.
Arguments against imputation in the National Accounts are:
Doubt about the question whether the productive activities of household work
can be characterized as economic processes, the net product of which should be
evaluated and included in the national income. "The conditions under which
they are carried on and the factors that affect the amount of income from them
are so vastly different from those that bear upon activities whose products
usually appear on the market place that it seems best to exclude them" (Kuznetz
1941 p.431). In a report for the Statistical Commission and Economic Commission
for Europe prepared by the United Nations Statistical Office it is doubted that
evening and night care of children is an economic activity because it is not
performed as a separate identifiable service (UN 1979 p.ll).
A second argument against imputation of unpaid work is that it would lead to big
changes in Domestic Product which would damage its usefulness as an indicator
for the development of the market economy (UN 1977 p.2). This is also one of the
arguments why the 1993 revised System of National Accounts, the new Blue
Book, again excluded household services. They are excluded because "the relative
isolation and independence of these activities from markets, the extreme
difficulty of making economically meaningful estimates of their values, and the
adverse effects it would have on the usefulness of the accounts for policy
purposes and the analysis of markets and market disequilibria-the analysis of
inflation, unemployment etc.". However, housing services are included in the
SNA "so as to avoid distorting estimates of the production and consumption of
housing services when the ratio of owner-occupied to rented dwellings varies
over time and space" (Chadeau 1992 p.87). Chadeau argues that the same kind of
distortions may arise with other domestic and personal services produced for
own consumption. For example, the substitution of hired cooks, restaurant meals
or prepared food instead of home cooking (Chadeau 1992 p.87). Chadeau argues
that there are various other areas in National Accounts where the quality of data
is less than satisfactory. "If enough thought and resources are devoted to the
problem, measures of household production are not necessarily more difficult or
more dubious than measures of financial services or public administration"
(Chadeau 1992 p.88). In the end Chadeau agrees with Harrison and other
statisticians (Liitzel 1989 p.338; Brathaug 1991 p.4; Schafer 1992 p.3; Kazemier and
75Exel 1992) that a household satellite account in which the value of this
production and its use would be described in detail alongside the conventional
SNA statistics, would be a solution to this problem (Chadeau 1992 p.89).
A third argument against imputation is that income generated from household
production must be consumed in the household and cannot be saved or used to
purchase other goods and services. Brathaug (1991 p.3) argues that imputed
income does not have the same significance as monetary income: monetary
income leaves the consumer free to choose among the goods and services
available on the market, whereas imputed income from household production
can only be used to purchase the output from that production (Brathaug 1991 p.3;
see also Homan 1991 p.9). This subject will be dealt with again in chapter 8.
Argumanta in favour of imputing are:
The general welfare of a nation over time or the rate of growth of real output in
the economy as a whole can better be measured if nonmarket activities are taken
into account. The growth of real output or the degree of economic well-being
should not be influenced simply by variation through time in the share of
economic activity conducted through markets (Ruggles 1982 p.24; Eisner 1988;
Chadeau 1985 p.238). Eisner's view is a very clear one: "International and
intertemporal comparisons that ignore nonmarket activity risk domination by
particular and changing international arrangements and are for many purposes
seriously misleading. Exclusion of nonmarket output will result in incomplete
and possibly misleading measures of product. This point acquires particular force
where production has in fact been undertaken with and without market
transactions at different periods of time"(Eisner 1988 p.1621).
Especially when comparing welfare or growth rates between developed and
developing countries the omission of nonmarket work distorts the view.
Subsistence activities are widespread in developing countries. As economic
development proceeds, the organized market sector in developing countries is
likely to grow whereas the informal household sector is likely to shrink. Part of
what is taking place on the market sector is absorbing resources formerly used in
de household sector. In developed economies some of the changes between
market and household sectors take the reverse form: public transport yields to
private cars, the local laundry yields to individual washing machines or to
wash-and-wear clothing, the carpenter or garage mechanic yields to
do-it-yourself activities (Blades 1975; UN 1977 p.7 and 9; UN 1979 p.3; Peskin and
Peskin 1978; Chadeau 1985 p.238, Eisner 1988; Juster and Stafford 1991; Kazemier
and Exel 1992).
Nordhaus and Tobin attracted much attention by their 1972 presentation of two
new measures for economic welfare: Actual and Sustainable Measure of
Economic Welfare (MEW). Actual MEW is a comprehensive measure of annual
real consumption of households. Sustainable MEW is the amount of
consumption that is consistent with sustained growth per capita in consumption
at the trend rate of technological progress. Imputation of unpaid work is one of
76the main components of their MEW (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972 p.10). Similar
attempts were made by Zolotas, as quoted by Eisner (1988), who constructed a
measure of "Economic Aspects of Welfare" (EAW) for the United States for the
years 1950 to 1977 (Eisner 1988 p.1633). Another attempt was made by Dale
Jbrgensen together with Fraumenie, Christensen and Pachon (Eisner 1988 p.1636).
A second argument in favour of imputing unpaid work in National Accounts is
that conventional National Accounts do not measure cyclical fluctuations in
income and production accurately enough, nor their allocation to current
consumption and accumulation of capital for the future. Fluctuations in
household activities, transport by family car, subsistence activities in less
developed countries are not measured (Eisner 1988 p.1613-1614; Kuznets 1941
p.432). Current consumption is distorted because household and government
purchases are identified as "final products" and goods and services bought by
business as "intermediate product", unless they are deemed "capital" (Eisner 1988
p.1612-1614). Expenses on durable commodities other than houses are taken as
consumption instead of imputed income from these durable commodities
(Kuznetz 1941 p.420).
A third argument is that in the comparison of welfare of individuals or
households within a nation not only money income should be taken, but the
whole package of goods and services an individual or household has available
(Peskin and Peskin 1978 p.72). Real household incomes of households with a
housewife are higher if household services were included. Households where
more than one member of the family has a (labour) income, but where unpaid
household services are smaller, are upgraded (Hagenaars, Homan and Van Praag
1984; Homan 1988 and 1992).
A fourth argument is that the vast increase in the numbers and size of in-kind
governmental programmes is a reason to pay more attention to nonmarket
activities (Peskin and Peskin 1978 p.72). The reverse is also true: if the
government economizes on health care or education, informal care or informal
help is considered a substitution. In the Netherlands for example the number of
days in hospital after an operation has been curtailed. The government expects
the family to take over nursing the patient. Old people's homes have waiting
lists. The government expects neighbours, friends or family to care for elderly
people who can no longer look after themselves. The government expects so-
called "reading-mothers" to help in school with pupils who stay behind.
A fifth argument was put forward by the International Women's Conferences
organized by the United nations. The 1975 International Conference in
Mexico-City recommended measurement of household and other work at home
(UN 1974 no.46 j.) In 1980 the International Conference in Copenhagen asked for
a system to calculate the value of unpaid work (UN 1980 no.95). The 1985
International Conference in Nairobi wanted "a thorough review and extensive
development of improved statistics and indicators on the situation of women
compared with men, over time and in all fields" (UN 1986 par. 120 and 122). The
77arguments were that the current contribution of women-farmers is not recorded.
As a result it is difficult to obtain the training, credit facilities and appropriate
technology needed by these women-farmers. Another argument was that the
unrecorded contribution of women to society in terms of child care frequently
means a break in paid employment with lower aggregate earnings and lower
social benefits over life. The major increase in the number of women caring for
one-parent families makes that more women face poverty not only in middle
and old age but also in the struggle to maintain their children.
The United Nations Human Development Report 1995 puts it like this: "The
monetization of the nonmarket work of women is more than a question of
justice. It concerns the economic status of women in society. If national statistics
fully reflect the "invisible" contribution of women, it will become impossible for
policy-makers to ignore them in national decisions" (UN 1995 p.6/7).
Not only the United Nations but also the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and the European Economic Community (UN 1986; OECD
1992; EEC 1992) have pleaded for imputation time and again because, as Galbraith
once remarked, "What is not counted, is usually not noticed" (Galbraith 1973
p.79).
Already in 1982 Ruggles expressed the view that the guidelines of the SNA reflect
d sexist view, /n his report /or (he Economic and Socia/ Council of the l/nited
Nations he pointed out that subsistence activities, which had been included, were
male activities for the greater part, whereas household activities, which had been
excluded, were female ones. "Thus winemaking is included, cooking is not;
caring for animals is, caring for children is not and communal voluntary projects
like road building and similar activities are, but those of women's groups
running voluntary community service programs like libraries, health services
and school services are not" (Ruggles 1982 p.24).
Waring (1990) has written down a flaming analysis of the way in which women
are rendered powerless by National Accounts as they refuse to value women's
productive but unpaid work within the home. She argues that unpaid work as
well as environmental pollution should be part of the United Nations System of
National Accounts. Waring's analysis and arguments will be returned to in
chapter 8.
Eisner (1988) describes, analyses and compares the attempts of six American
economists to improve the System of National Accounts. The major extension
common to all of the attempts, except one, is the imputation of nonmarket
household work. Other items are the inclusion of all government production,
nonmarket production of the nonprofit sector, imputations for the value of
leisure, the development of better measures of investment like the acquisition of
consumer durables and government expenditures for structures and equipment
and the inclusion of expenditures for education and health (investment in
human capital), adjustments for changes in the environment, subtraction of
78government expenditures for police, defence etc.
Eisner (1988) himself proposes a "Total Incomes System of Accounts" (TISA),
designed to include the income corresponding to all consumption and capital
accumulation, market and nonmarket. In production he included the nonmarket
services of government and household capital plus unpaid household labour and
the opportunity costs of students' time. TISA consumption was 53.8% greater
than conventional consumption in the National Accounts, because Eisner added
nonmarket services from tangible capital in the household as well as unpaid
household work (Eisner 1988).
Hicks (1940, as quoted by Eisner 1988) already poses the possibility that the
measurement of goods and services in a social accounting system may require the
use of more than a single set of value weights. "As national income calculations
are used for all sorts of purposes, we may have to be prepared to use more than
one system of weights. It is not at all obvious without examination that the same
system of weights which is appropriate for comparing real income over time is
also appropriate for studying questions of distribution. There may be more than
one Money Value of the Social Income, each corresponding to a different purpose
of calculation" (Hicks 1940 p.106). Peskin and Peskin (1978) also plead for the
simultaneous adoption of more than one valuation. "If the objective of National
Accounts is to provide an "information framework", this framework embodies
more than the final set of accounts. Developing these data with the National
Accounting structure in mind can serve to strengthen these data in two respects:
- it helps assure completeness in coverage;
- it helps assure definitional consistency with other economic data", they
argued (Peskin and Peskin 1978 p.89).
Statisticians plead for more than one set of accounts as a more flexible and useful
way (Begeer and van Tuinen 1984 p.44). They state that the aim of imputing
unpaid work is not to reshape the National Accounts, but to consider
supplementary measurements. National Accounts would be unsuitable for
analytical purposes, particularly business cycle analysis, because household
production was an estimated imputation (UN 1977 p.66; SN 1991 b p. 190;
Brathaug 1991 p.3; Kazemier and Exel 1992 p.l) (Note that the argument against
business cycle analysis is used in the reverse sense by Kuznetz (1941; Eisner 1988).
On this subject Harrison (1990) remarks that: "despite this preservation of the
production boundary in more or less the same place as at present it is recognised
that for other purposes and, in particular for the study of welfare, it will be
appropriate for separate analyses to be undertaken with production boundaries
defined more widely. It is expected that such analyses would also be undertaken
in the form of specialised satellite accounts which will be described in the
handbook on the household sector".
An attempt to incorporate informal production into the concepts of the SNA was
made by Kazemier and Exel (1992) of Statistics Netherlands. They added the
79informal sector to a social accounting matrix (SAM) of the formal economy. In
their opinion this extended SAM could be considered a prototype for a
SNA-module on total production. They extended the production boundary by
including all productive activities, which did not contribute to the national
income as currently defined, in which unpaid labour was involved and which
could also be done by others to obtain the same results. They argue that such a
module could serve to study the effects of increased female labour force
participation on consumption and national income. The quantification of
informal production was based on time use surveys conducted by Statistics
Netherlands in 1987. The magnitude of informal production is, according to the
time use studies of SN, expressed in working years, 1.5 times the size of formal
production (Kazemier and Exel 1992).
Beneria (1995) concludes that the implementation of these efforts is now
primarily a matter of political will (p.1844). I agree that if enough thought and
resources are devoted to the problem, the practical problems of estimating the
value of unpaid work could be solved. In my view the only valid argument
against imputation is the major breach in National Accounts, because the
magnitude of the value of unpaid work will have a major influence. It would
harm the usefulness of the accounts for policy purposes. A satellite account seems
to be a reasonable improvement. However, another solution could be to
incorporate unpaid work into National Accounts and use the old and the new
National Accounts during a certain transition period. There/ore in the next
section I will try to implement unpaid work in the Dutch National Accounts as
well as in a Social Accounting Matrix.
5.4. Unpaid work in the Dutch National Accounts
Dutch National Accounts follow the recommendations of the United Nations
and European Community about the system of National Accounts with a few
exceptions. In 1998 or 1999 all members of the European Community are obliged
to follow the revised system of the European Community (ESA). The Dutch
National Accounts register transactions between 7 sectors: Nonfinancial
enterprises, Credit Institutions, Insurance companies and Pension funds, Central
and local government, Social security funds, Households and Rest of the world.
In each sector a distinction is made between five different accounts: Goods and
services transactions, Primary and secondary income distribution, Consumption
and savings, Capital formation and Capital transfers. Each transaction is
registered twice: on the debit side and on the credit side. A code is used to indicate
the giving post and the receiving post.
In the Goods and services account the deliverance of goods and services between
sectors and within a sector has been registered. Net added value of each sector can
be defined in this account. In the Income distribution account the payment of the
factors of production as well as indirect taxes and subsidies can be found in the
80Primary income distribution. Income transfers, being direct taxes and social
security benefits, have been registered in the Secondary income distribution. The
outcome is the Disposable income, which can be used for consumption and
savings in the Consumption and savings account. The destination of savings has
been registered in the Capital formation account. The surplus of income can be
found in this account, the destination of which has been registered in the Capital
transfer account.
Although several arguments have been mentioned in section 5.3 against taking
the value of unpaid work into the National Accounts, these difficulties can be
overcome, as is shown in table 5.1. If the value of unpaid work is put into the
National Accounts only the sector Households would have to change. This is
shown in table 5.1. New transactions or transactions which change in size are
printed in bold. If necessary new codes were added, (see for the calculation of the
value of unpaid work at minimum wages chapter 4, table 4.5.1.).
Unpaid work can be divided into household production and voluntary work.
Because the time use data do not allow to make a distinction between voluntary
services rendered directly to other households and voluntary services rendered
via nonfinancial organizations such as homes for the elderly, hospitals and
schools, all voluntary services are supposed to be rendered via nonfinancial
enterprises.
It was pointed out by several experts (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972, p.9; Kendrick
1979 p.357, Eisner 1988 p.1672; Chadeau 1985 p.250; Lutzel 1989 p.342; Brathaug
1991) that, besides the value of unpaid work, calculations of home production
should comprise the services of capital goods used in the household. Personal
consumption expenditures for durables and semi-durables should be reclassified
as investments. Estimates of the services of these goods would then be put back
into consumption. Nordhaus and Tobin evaluated the household capital services
at 10.1% of GNP, Kendrick at 10.2%, Eisner at 11.9% (see Eisner 1988 p.1672).
Following these footsteps I took all 1985 expenses for furniture, heaters, washing
machines, TV sets, cars etc. as Investments of the sector Households (see table
S.80.5 of NA 1990).
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In the sector Households the following changes have been made
(amounts are in bn Dfl):
Consumption expenditure was
I subtracted : - Expenses for Consumer Durables 1985
I added : - Household production
- Voluntary work
- Interest on Capital invested in Consumer DurablesO3)
Gross Investments in Consumer Durables can be found on the
credit side under the new post 1410 80-80:











Deliverance by enterprises (1000 80-10) was
I added : - Voluntary work





13 Total expenses for Consumer Durables in the period 1976-1985 were bn Dfl. 310,730 in prices of
1985. (SN 1991 b table S 80.5 posts 3400 + 3500 + 3600 + 3700). Depreciation is 31,000. Interest is 0.04 x
0.5 x 310,730 - 6,300



















Balance pension and insurance funds:
insurance companies
















The value of Household production (245,034) has been registered on the debit side
(post 1000 80-80) of the Goods and Services Account as well as Depreciation (post
1200 80-80). Household production, Voluntary work and Interest on Consumer
Durables create Primary Income (6210 80-80) on the debit side. Interest on capital
invested in consumer durables is 4% and is added to Income from enterprises
(2110 10-80). Voluntary work and Household production can be found as Income
in kind on the credit side of the Primary Income Distribution as new posts (2500
80-100 and 2500 80-80). Savings (6410 80-80) was 37,990 and is augmented with
Consumer durables bought in 1985 to 66,980.
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b. Secondary income distribution
Direct taxes

















F transactions (capital transfers^
4200 10-61 General government
4300 10-00+6510 10-10 Surplus land sales + financial funds
1090
-8 380
-7290Table 5.1. - continued: Accounts for the sector non-financial enterprises












































Rest of the world
Subsidies
b. Secundary income distribution
Primary income
Social premiums























87In the sector Non-financial enterprises following changes have been made:
Deliverance to Households was: 199,000
- is increased by Voluntary work 21,310
- and is increased by Interest on Capital Consumer Durables 6,300
226,610
Value added was




Voluntary work figures on the debit side under the new post 2500 80-10.
Interest on Capital in Consumer durables has been added to post 2110 10-80.
The other five sectors of the National Accounts do not change if unpaid work is
imputed. The view of the whole economy of all seven sectors changes of course
with the changes in the sector households. To illustrate the size of these changes
a macro view is given in table 5.2. of all seven sectors, exclusive and inclusive of
the value of unpaid work
Tabk 5.2.


















Primary income rest of the world
(1+2) National income
(gross, market prices)
Capital transfers rest of the world
(3+4) Gross disposable income
Consumption
(5-6) Gross national saving
Fixed capital formation
Increase in stocks
National income surplus (14)
Capital transfers rest of the world
(10+11) Increase (+) or decrease (-)
of finances
- Increase of official reserves
- Investments and credit
to the rest of the world












































1* Statistical difference 520
88If the value of unpaid work and the services of consumer durables are added
domestic product and gross national income increase by 73%, gross national
income by 72%, consumption by 77%, savings by 60%, and capital formation by
75%.
5.5 Other economic phenomena and unpaid work
5.5.1 Welfare and economic growth
In the preceding sections criticism of National Account experts on national
income as an inadequate and misleading measure of welfare and economic
growth has already been expressed. In this section the differences in economic
growth exclusive and inclusive of unpaid work will be shown.
Weinrobe (1974) calculated that the growth rate of real national product inclusive
of household production was 6% less than that of real GNP in the period
1960-1970: real GNP grew at an annual rate of 4%, real GNP inclusive of
household work at an annual rate of 3.76%. If growth which can be attributed to
changes in the population, is eliminated the annual difference between the two
growth rates was even 10.5% (Weinrobe 1974 p.89-102).
Total Actual Output
Total Measured Output
j— Nonmeasured Output-The H-gap
• Time
Figure 5.1. (Weinrobe 1974)
Economic growth as shown in the official statistics was higher because American
women decided massively to enter the labour market. As a consequence national
product as officially measured, grew more than output inclusive of unpaid work.
Chadeau (1992) compares growth rates of gross disposable income exclusive and
inclusive of the value of housework for three countries: the United States,
Germany and Canada. In her calculations growth rates of Gross Disposable
Income (GDI) are lower when housework has been included. Germany is the only
exception where the growth rate is higher if the value of unpaid work had been
89included in the period 1964-1970 and remained the same in the period 1970-1974.
Chadeau does not explain the differences for Germany.
Devereux and Locay (1992) estimate growth rates in the USA over the period
1930-1985 inclusive of household production and the use of household capital.
They find that real growth rates of NNP per capita in the USA in that period
would have been 1.3 to 1.4 per annum instead of 1.8 if household production and
the use of household capital had been included. Depending on a supposed rate of
technological progress in the household sector of 0% the annual growth rate was
1.3; at a supposed rate of 0.5% per year the annual growth rate was 1.4. This means
that the offical growth rate had been upwardly biased by 22 to 28% a year
(Devereux and Locay 1992).
Table 5.3. shows the growth of Dutch national income per head in the period
1975-1990 as registered in the National Accounts and the growth inclusive of the
value of unpaid work. Because time use data are only available once every 5 year,
GNP exclusive and inclusive of unpaid work has been compared in those years.
In 7 out of 9 calculations growth of registered GNP was higher than growth
inclusive of unpaid labour, depending on the wage which was used for the
estimation of the value of unpaid work. Exceptions are growth at minimum
wage in the period 1975-1980 and growth at average earned wages in the period
1980-1985 when growth rates inclusive of unpaid work were higher.
In the period 1975-1990 the labour market participation of women of 15 years and
older increased from 20% to 36% (Pott-Buter 1993 pp.21). The increased labour
market participation of women explained, like it did in the USA, why growth rate
of national income inclusive of unpaid work was lower than growth rate
exclusive of unpaid work.
The exceptions as shown in table 5.3. where growth inclusive of unpaid work is
higher than official growth, can be explained if one looks at the development of
the different wages. In the period 1975-1980 minimum wages made a jump of
45.5% against average earned wages 38%. In the period 1980-1985 average wage
rose 23% against minimum wage only 9% (SN Yearbooks 1981.p.329; 1983 p.318;
1990 p.90).
90Table 5.3.
Growth of Gross National Product and growth of GNP plus unpaid work per head of the population
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Source: SN and own calculations
Household production influences the magnitude and distribution of welfare
between individuals, households and countries. If household production would
not exist, if everybody would have to buy all their consumption goods on the
market, people with low money incomes, who now are now not considered to be
poor, would fall below the poverty line. This does in fact happen to handicapped
people and elderly people who can no longer manage their own household
production. The costs for producing their meals, cleaning their clothes and their
houses are so high that money income is insufficient for part of these groups. The
reverse is also true: the magnitude and distribution of money incomes influences
the amount and distribution of unpaid labour between individuals, households
and countries. Boserup (1971) for example mentioned that in Upper Volta in the
sixties money income accounted for about one third of total income as against
75% in Kenya (Boserup 1971 p.161). Blades (1975 p.53) also mentioned that the
amount of subsistence activities in developing countries is very high.
Boserup (1971) does not think it wise that African national income experts
recommended not to include in National Income Accounts estimates of
subsistence activities other than food and rent for dwellings. "The present system
of under reporting subsistence activities not only makes the underdeveloped
countries seem poorer than they really are, but also makes their rate of economic
growth appear in a more favourable light than the facts warrant, since economic
development entails a gradual replacement of the omitted subsistence activities
by the creation of income in the non-subsistence sector which is recorded more
correctly" (Boserup 1971 p.163).
915.5.2 Economic fluctuations and unpaid work
If unpaid work were registered in National Accounts, the business cycle would
not be as severe as it now is. Already in 1941 Kuznetz remarked: "It is especially
noted that during severe depressions a drastic contraction in employment and
incomes is accompanied by a significant expansion of activities within the
household" (Kuznetz 1941 p.431-432). Unpaid work softens the consequences of
the business cycle for individual welfare: in depressions when paid work and
income decreases, the dip in welfare is partly levelled off by more home
production. In times of prosperity, when paid work and income increase, welfare
does not increase as much as real money income, because home productions
decreases.(15).
Studies of household survival strategies suggest that when under economic
distress females in low income households respond by increasing their hours and
intensity of household production as well as increasing their labour market
participation (Ertiirk and Qagatay 1995). In literature this latter effect is introduced
as the "added worker effect". It predicts that during economic downturns, if the
primary earner becomes unemployed, other family members will enter the
labour market to increase family income.
Zienkowski (1991) mentioned that the dramatic decline in production and
consumption in Poland between 1976 and 1984 was fully compensated for by an
increase in household production (Zienskowski 1991 p.6). Female labour
participation did not increase. So the above-mentioned assumption of Ertiirk and
Cagatay that in a depression female labour market participation as well as
(female) household production increased, was not confirmed in the case of
Poland. The "discouraged worker effect" holds that during times of high
unemployment, when individuals become unempoyed, they may become
discouraged and postpone labour force entry or drop out of the labour market and
to more unpaid work. Unemployed people try to augment their welfare by doing
more houshold work, e.g. repairing clothes and durable household goods and by
buying less ready-made products and services and producing them in the
household.
Research suggests that the "discouraged worker effect" is dominant over the
"added worker effect" (Blau and Ferber 1986 p.92). Moreover, family members
entering the labour market may not decrease their unpaid work (the famous
"double burden" of women). After examining empirical research of labour
market participation of women, Killingsworth and Heckman (1986 p.122)
concluded that the participation of teenage and prime-age women is relatively
sensitive to cyclical variation, that is to say procyclical.
IS Juster and Stafford (1991 p.509) quote work of Ironmonger in which Ironmonger explores the
arguments that cyclical sensitivity is a good deal less than is commonly thought because part of the
decline in market output during contractions is offset by a rise in nonmarket output. Juster and
Stafford regret that because data are not adequate there has been little or no specific quantification
of this effect.
92In times of prosperity, when employment and income are high and jobs are
plenty, teenagers, students, housewives and older people enter the labour market.
They try to combine paid and unpaid work by using more market goods and
services, like eating out, using the services of a commercial laundry,
window-cleaner etc. So in times of prosperity unpaid work is substituted by paid
work.
In short unpaid work softens and thereby influences the consequences of
economic fluctuations. The reverse is also true: economic fluctuations influence
the magnitude of unpaid work.
5.5.3 Employment and unpaid labour
In this section two questions are discussed:
1. should unpaid work be implemented in labour force statistics?
2. what is the influence for individuals of paid and unpaid work upon each
other?
1. Housewives are not considered to be part of the economically active
population, nor are they thought to be unemployed. Yet statisticians label them as
part of the "inactive" population. The professional population in most Western
countries would be much bigger, if unpaid work would be counted as "active"
work. Chadeau does not approve of the idea to include unpaid workers in
economically active people. "According to ILO guidelines, economically active
persons are persons engaged in production included within the boundary of
production of the System. If that boundary were to be extended to include the
production for own-account household services, virtually the whole adult
population would be economically active and unemployment eliminated"
(Chadeau 1992 p.87).
The UN Development Report 1995 states that incorporation of all economic time
use (unpaid work MBH) is an essential first step to develop policies which
liberate men and women from artificial and restrictive roles (UN 1995 p.98). This
suggestion has not further been elaborated upon.
Data of the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs show that in the year 1986 the
Dutch population aged 15-64 years could be classified as follows:











100%These data show that 19% of the population would remain "inactive" if
housewives were considered part of the active population. These data also
indicate that in the period 1983-1986 the number of economically active people
would have been 43 to 45% higher if housewives would have been counted as
economically active (Ministry of Social Affairs 1986 p.17-19). Consequently all
statistical measures based on "professional population" would change, including
the participation rate, the unemployment rate, the vacancy rate, absenteeism
because of sickness and invalidity as a percentage of professional people,
unionism. This problem could partly be solved by making a distinction between
people doing paid work and those exclusively doing unpaid work. It remains a
problem to register people who work part-time on the labour market, but this
problem has already been solved in the existing statistics.
2. Unpaid activities exert great influence upon paid activities, among others
because unpaid activities are unequally divided over the sexes and between age
groups. Women's share in unpaid labour is about 70% of all unpaid labour. Often
younger and older people are legally not allowed to do paid labour or do not wish
to do any paid labour. Unpaid labour can be done by practically everybody. There
are no legal or cultural hindrances to do unpaid labour. So unless one is too
young, too old or too handicapped unpaid labour is the alternative for paid
labour. To do paid work in Western countries one must have reached a certain
age, have a certain vocational training and suitable jobs must be available.
The reverse is also true: paid activities exert great influence upon unpaid work,
because paid and unpaid activities are in competition. People doing much unpaid
labour cannot do any paid labour at the same time and people doing much paid
labour cannot do much unpaid labour at the same time. Unpaid and paid labour
also influence each other: if persons or groups who have done or do much
unpaid labour wish to do paid labour, their position on the labour market is
hampered by their lack of experience in paid labour. Sometimes persons or
groups who have done or do much paid labour are hindered to do unpaid work
by their lack of experience in unpaid labour. There are numerous jokes about the
helpless widower who cannot cook his own meal or sew a button on his shirt.
This hindrance can nearly always be overcome by buying household services on
the market.
The dynamic interaction between paid and unpaid work is especially important
for women, because women must allocate their time between these two sets of
economic activities. Sometimes they overlap each other and lead to greater work
intensity. Overlapping activities turn out to be gender specific: women more
often than men perform more than one task at the same time. Overlapping takes
place when more than one task is done at the same time, for example the
combination of "outworking" of industrial homework and the supervision of
children (Floro 1995). It is not clear in what way these overlapping activities affect
the well-being of women and their children. Overlapping activities can
potentially increase the level of efficiency, but they may also lead to increased
stress and deterioration in the quality of outputs. Time use surveys which study
94this aspect are scarce. A study by Roldan under 140 poor rural women in Mexico
shows strong evidence of emotional and psychological disorders. A study by
Wolfe and Haveman under 2.325 women in Michigan indicates health
deterioration as a consequence of a combination of child care, market work and
housework. A survey by Mingione under 299 self-employed households in
southern Italy shows that long hours of market work coupled with long hours of
domestic work led to shorter resting hours and to considerable stress (Floro 1995
pp.1920-1925). Women doing "outwork" are often paid by piece, which can lead to
rushing and stress. They do not enjoy any legal protection such as minimum
wages, they can be dismissed immediately, they have no rights in social security
or pensions etc. Often these women are assisted by their children (Bruyn-Hundt
1981; Ministry of Social Affairs 1984; 1988; Steunpunt Thuiswerk 1987, 1988, 1990;
Allen and Wolkowitz 1986).
Schafer (1992) points out that although paid and unpaid work have a number of
common features, such as the activities to be performed, they also have specific
features which makes it somewhat difficult to compare them. Household
activities often require a permanent availability of the individuals concerned,
frequent interruptions of the activities, tensions between internal and external
factors determine the work. Household work has another emotional and social
context than gainful employment. Schafer considers it to be impossible to fully
take into account these aspects of household work in the National Accounts or in
a satellite system of the National Accounts.
Characteristics of the labour market position of people doing much unpaid labour
(mostly women) are:
- they work only part of their adult life on the labour market and if they work
on the labour market they work part-time, in temporary jobs or other forms
of atypical employment (European Commission 1993 pp.34-44);
- their hourly wage is lower than the hourly wage of people doing the same job
(EC 1993 pp.45-51);
- they are concentrated in fewer professions and sectors of industry than people
working full-time (EC 1993 pp.13-23);
- in most countries they are more often and longer unemployed than people
working full-time during their adult life (EC pp.24-33);
- they have less rights in social security and pension schemes than people
working full-time during their adult life (EC p.32);
- consequently: people who spend a considerable part of their lifetime in
unpaid labour have a different position on the labour market than people
who work full-time in the productive phase of their life. Their lifetime
income is much lower, because they work fewer years, fewer hours per year,
earn less per hour, have fewer rights in social security and pensions (see for
instance OECD 1988).
Oakly (1980) analysed women's position on the labour market as follows: "In
relation to male labor, female labor is characterized as unproductive, marginal,
trivial, temporary, intermittent, dispensable, less valuable, less skilled and less
95physically demanding. These stereotypes apply both to female household labor
and to women's labor in paid occupations. Thus, it is normative to regard the
employment work of women as intermittent (and interruptible) rather than
continuous activity; to reinforce the poverty (in relation to the male norm) of
women's monetary rewards for paid work by the total lack of renumeration
attached to housework; to see both housework and women's paid work as
marginal contributions to the national economy" (Oakley 1980 p.8).
In short: employment data would be much higher if household work would be
counted as "work". Unpaid labourers work, but they do not receive any money,
undifferentiated purchasing power, for their work. Their renumeration consists
of purchasing power differentiated in food, clothing and housing. If these unpaid
labourers spend part of their life on the labour market, their position is different
of those who spent their whole adult life on the labour market working full-time.
If paid labourers wish to do unpaid labour, they are hindered by their lack of
experience in unpaid labour. This latter hindrance however is not as troublesome
as the former, because the renumeration of paid labourer consists of
undifferentiated purchasing power, namely money, with which one can nearly
always buy substitutes of household services on the market.
5.5.4 Unemployment and unpaid labour
Using OECD "standardized unemployment rates" the female unemployment rate
has been higher than the male one in all OECD countries except Finland, Japan
and the United Kingdom since 1983. The OECD defines Involuntary
unemployment as: "those who are not working, who are available to begin to
work and who have taken active steps to find work in a recent period (normally
taken to be the previous month) (OECD 1988 p.142). Even one hour of paid
employment produced a categorization as employed.
The OECD remarks that "a strict application of the definition of unemployment,
implies that people who are excluded from employment opportunities for any
length of time, may also be excluded from the unemployment statistics" (OECD
1988 p.143).
Unemployment statistics omit people who work part-time or do occasional work
while looking for work for longer duration. People who want to work but did not
actively search during the last four weeks are also omitted as well as people who
want to work but are not available in the next two weeks.
The OECD relaxed these three criterions and found that for all countries
considered the effect of relaxing was bigger for women than for men.
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Source: OECD: Employment Outlook 1988 p.146
A similar revision was executed by Statistics Netherlands in 1986. The percentage
of unemployed people as defined in the Dutch Labour Force Statistics was 12.8%,
the percentage of people who were willing to work was 18.0%. In the latter
percentage people who were willing to work, but did not fulfil the criteria for the
definition of unemployment, had also been counted. For women the
unemployment percentage was 15.7%, the percentage willing to work was 26.0%.
(Einerhand, van den Elshout and Hoogteijling 1986 p.ll). These exercises showed
that unemployment statistics rose when the criterions were relaxed.
The OECD "Employment Outlook 1994" mentions that if discouraged workers
(3.7 million or 1% of the 1991 labour force) and involuntary part-time workers
(9 million or 2.5% of the labour force) were added to the labour force as
unemployed, the unemployment rate would rise sharply in countries with a
relatively low unemployment rate. Women outnumber men in discouraged and
involuntary part-time workers. It is not clear whether temporary work (18
million or 5% of the labour force) increases employment opportunities for the
unemployed.
In another publication the OECD concludes that inclusion of household work in
the National Accounts would mean that "unemployment would virtually
disappear, thus rendering labour force statistics meaningless for employment
purposes" (OECD 1991 p.3).
Another suggestion of the OECD as quoted by Bakker (1993) is the concept of a
"non-employment rate". This rate is the sum of the inactive (defined as the total
working age population minus the labour force) and the unemployed divided by
the working age population. This measure is in a sense superior to the
97unemployment rate as it can capture labour market discouragement (Bakker 1993
p.18).
In my eyes a good solution would be if the employment statistics would make a
distinction between paid and unpaid employment rates. The unemployment rate
could stay as it is now, that is limited to people who seek paid employment.
5.5.5 Consumption and investments
Consumption is usually defined as expenses by the household for consumption
goods, that is expenses for non-productive purposes. Expenses for buying a house,
paying taxes and social premiums are not regarded as consumption. The part of
the household income which remains after the paying of these expenses is
regarded as savings. Expenses by households for consumer durables such as cars,
TV sets, washing machines etc. are regarded as consumption.
If household production would be seen as part of national production, the
magnitude of consumption in National Accounts and other statistics would be
augmented by the same amount as the value of home production. In Kendrick's
1966 calculations for the USA, consumption of households would have been 28%
higher if household production had been included (Eisner 1988 p.1648). If the
value of unpaid work in the Netherlands, as estimated in chapter 4 at minimum
wages, would be added to consumptive expenses in the National Accounts total
consumption in the Netherlands would have been 89% higher in 1975, 85%
higher in 1980, 75% higher in 1985 and 69% higher in 1990.
Unpaid work influences the structure and direction of consumption as well as
the level of consumption. Research shows that families with working wives
spend a larger part of family incomes on consumption than families with
nonworking wives, total family income held constant. Families with working
wives have more cars and spend more money on cars than families with
nonworking wives (Strober 1977 p.394-398). Strober remarks that "the effects on
employment and prices depend upon exactly which goods and services are
demanded and on the relative degree of tightness and monopoly and monopsony
power in the relevant goods and labor markets. For example if highly labor
intensive child care services are demanded and the labor and product markets
associated with these services are rather loose and competitive, then at least in
the "first round", an increased demand for child care is likely to have substantial
employment effects and few price effects. To the extent, on the other hand, that
increased motorcar-associated goods (e.g. gasoline) are demanded, there may be
substantial price effects but few employment effects" (Strober 1977 p.398). Strober
found no differences in the ratio families with working wives and nonworking
wives spend on durable consumer goods. Research in the eighties and nineties
confirmed that a working wife has no influence on the ownership of household
durables but household income is a significant determinant (Strober and
Weinberg 1980; Schor 1991 as quoted by Floro 1995).Dutch research by Homan (1992) shows that in the Netherlands families with
working wives possess more durable consumer goods such as dishwashers,
microwaves, freezers and tumble dryers than families with nonworking wives.
These two-earner families spend more money on child care, household help and
eating out than one-earner families (Homan 1992. p.38) Contradictory results
have been found by Tijdens et al. about strategies of working wives to substitute
household labour by capital goods (such as deepfreezers, dryers, microwaves), by
having meals in a restaurant, by buying ready made food, by engaging paid
household help or by shopping by mail. They found that only paid household
help is more used by working than by nonworking wives (Tijdens et al. 1994
chapter 7). Their findings that working wives more often use paid household
help are confirmed by research of Van der Lippe and Niphuis-Nell (1994 p.39).
If household production would be seen as part of national production, expenses
for capital goods such as dishwashers, motorcars, television sets etc. would be
regarded as investments instead of consumption, whereas interest and
depreciation on these investments would be viewed as part of consumption (see
also section 5.4). Such purchases would then be excluded from consumers'
expenditure and replaced by an imputation for the services annually provided by
the durable goods (a kind of "rate of return", analogous to the imputed rental
value of owner-occupied dwellings used in the National Accounts). The United
Nations Statistical Bureau (1977) mentioned two advantages of this treatment of
durable consumer goods. The first was that the apparent inconsistency between
the treatment of owner-occupied dwellings and that of other durable consumer
goods would be removed. The second more important advantage was the better
understanding of trends and fluctuations in consumers' expenditures and saving
patterns. For this alternative treatment first an estimate of the stock of consumer
durables is needed and secondly a reasonable method to impute the annual value
of the services they render. The UN Statistical Bureau considered that these
advantages did not justify the amount of rather dubious imputations required by
the alternative treatment (UN 1977 p.28).
Despite the practical difficulties, several attempts have been made. The UN
Statistical Bureau mentioned two estimates of the total value of consumer
durables in the United States and one in Japan. The National Bureau of
Economic Research estimated a rental for consumer durables in 1969 which did
not differ much from the actual purchases in that year (UN 1977 p.30).
Eisner (1988) mentions several attempts to estimate the services of household
capital, ranging from 3.7% to 12.6% of GNP (Eisner 1988 p.1672). Zolotas (as
mentioned by Eisner 1988 p.1634) based the imputed value of services from
consumer durables on a variety of depreciation rates and adjustments for rapid
obsolescence. The Ruggleses subtracted from consumption the expenses for
durables and added practically the same amount to GNP (Eisner 1988 p.1649).
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) subtracted "Purchases of durable goods" and added
"Services of consumer capital imputation" They concluded: "that proper
treatment of consumer durables has little quantitative effect" (Nordhaus and
99Tobin 1972 p.6).
I do not agree with this conclusion and the one reached by the UN Statistical
Bureau in 1977 "that the arguments for changing the present system of recording
actual expenditures on consumer durables do not seem persuasive" (UN 1977
p.31). Therefore I calculated investments in durable household goods and its
depreciation in section 5.3. From this calculation the difference between expenses
for household durables (Dfl. 29,990) and depreciation (Dfl. 31,000) turned out to be
7%.
5.5.6 Optimal allocation of production factors
Economists have always asked themselves how optimal welfare could be reached.
Production and distribution play an important role in finding an answer how to
reach optimal welfare. How to handle interpersonal comparisons of utility?
Pareto's answer to these questions is much discussed in economic literature.
Welfare of a household and of society as a whole is Pareto- optimal, if production
factors are divided in such a way that nobody's welfare can be increased unless
someone else's welfare is decreased (Blaug 1981 p.621). Given a certain income
distribution the price mechanism causes a state in which no one could achieve a
higher level of satisfaction without lowering someone else's satisfaction,
provided there is perfect competition on all markets and that production has no
"external effects" such as detoriation of the environment and that no collective
goods and services are produced. Under these constraints consumers will
maximize their utility and producers will have a maximum profit (Hennipman
1977,p.ll7).
The theorem of Pareto-optimality has been discussed and criticised by many
authors (Hennipman 1976; Bergmann 1986; Blau and Ferber 1986; Sen 1982;
Hennipman 1992; Woolley 1993; Barker 1993). Some of the topics of this
discussion are: Is it possible to increase total welfare by distributing goods in
another way if the winners pay the losers a compensating payment? Is it possible
to increase total welfare by increasing production (efficiency) and/or changing
income distribution (equity)? Sen (1982) criticises the fact that the income
distribution can be very unequal without altering the Pareto-optimality: "A state
can be Pareto-optimal with some people in extreme misery and others rolling in
luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off without cutting into
the luxury of the rich; Pareto optimality can, like Caesar's spirit, come hot from
hell" (Sen as quoted by Barker 1993).
Another point of discussion is whether total welfare could be increased if income
distribution would be changed before the increase in production (Blaug 1978
p.623). Blaug (1978 p.625) concludes that: "efficiency cannot be separated from
equity": discussion about the size and distribution of income cannot be separated.
Is welfare economics a positive or a normative subject? Blaug (1978) argues that
100welfare-economics is normative: "there is no such thing as "value-free welfare
economics" (Blaug 1978 p.626). Hennipman did not agree and had many
arguments why allocation theory belonged to positive economics (Hennipman
1992 p.445).
Woolley (1993) questions the exogenity of the individual utility functions. She
argued that some preferences are part of institutional structures. As an example
she mentions men's refusal to share household tasks. Bruegel (1993) questions
whether the household has a single (joint) utility function or whether the
household could be considered as a coalition or collectivity with conflicting
interests.
In this discussion the subject of unpaid labour does hardly play a role. The price
mechanism which brings about the allocation of production factors does not
work for unpaid labour, because unpaid labour (like the environment) does not
pass a market. Unpaid work is not divided over people by means of a price
mechanism, but is as a matter of course mainly done by women. Economists try
to explain the fact that women do most unpaid work and men most paid work as
a gainful specialization between the sexes. Following Becker's analysis (1981) the
division of labour between the sexes is partly determined by biological differences
and partly by different experiences and different investments in human capital
(Becker 1981 p.14). "Since the biological natures of men and women differ, the
assumption that the time of men and women are perfect substitutes even at a rate
different from unity is not realistic. Indeed, their times are complements in
sexual enjoyment, the production of children, and possibly other commodities
produced by the household. Complementarity implies that households with men
and women are more efficient than households with only one sex, but because
both sexes are required to produce certain commodities complementarity reduces
the sexual division of labor in the allocation of time and investments.
Apparently, differences in comparative advantage and in investment have been
more important than complementarities because women traditionally have
allocated much more time to the household than men have" (Becker 1981
p.23-24).
Becker supposes that the fact that women do more unpaid work than men
revealed their preference for unpaid work. The theorem of revealed preference
was criticised by Sen (1982). He pointed out that other incentives than economic
influence human behaviour, for example "sympathy" and "commitment" (Sen
1982 p.92). Nelson (as quoted by Woolley 1993) added another influence on
human behaviour, namely "altruism". "If you get up in the middle of the night
to feed a baby because you feel sorry for it, you are acting "altruistically"; if you get
up when you feel personally better off just putting your pillow over your head,
you are acting responsibly. Since after the hundredth or so such occasion one is
likely to feel more sorry for oneself than for the child. It is a good thing for
children that most parents treat children as a commitment." Sen doubts whether
people always have a gains-maximizing answer and argues that admitting
behaviour based on other grounds would have far-reaching consequences on the
101nature of many economic models (Sen 1982 p.96 and 104).
In my opinion optimal allocation cannot be discussed without adding unpaid
work: unpaid work does not only increase total production and total
consumption, it also changes the income distribution as has been shown in
chapters 4, 5 and will be shown in chapter 6.
Following the neo-classical explanation that women are not on the labour
market or work for less hours on the labour market than men because the
shadow wage of women doing unpaid work is higher than their market wage, is
no longer a satisfactory one. Now that in the industrialized world women have
reached nearly the same level of education, there must be another explanation.
Given their almost equal level of education, one could suppose that women are
more fit for and prefer doing household work. This is very unlikely. It is as
unlikely as stating that all females are equally fit to do household work and that
all males are fit to be, let us say, a plumber or a teacher. Nor is it likely that nearly
all women prefer unpaid work over paid work. So it follows that the capacities
and talents of women are probably not fully used if women are predestined for
one type of profession. In short: optimal allocation of labour is not guaranteed
unless unpaid labour is part of the economic analysis.
5.5.7. Public finance
After the second world war macroeconomic policy was demand oriented by
aggregate measures of economic change such as output levels, rates of growth,
unemployment and inflation, government surplus/deficit. The nineteen eighties
and nineteen nineties are characterised by a discourse in all industrial countries
about restructuring global economics in terms of the international division of
labour, the global distribution of economic and political power, global finance, the
functioning of the Welfare State. In the discussion about government
expenditures the accent is put on lowering government and collective spending.
More emphasis is put on efficiency and competitiveness, whereas the role of
equity has decreased. Although unpaid labour is hardly mentioned explicitly in
this discourse, implicitly it plays an important role. Policies concerning taxation,
government expenditures, subsidies, social security, exchange rates and monetary
policy influence the division of paid and unpaid labour (Bakker 1993).
Macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment policies implemented in
developing countries over the last 15 years have been neither class-neutral nor
gender-neutral. Boserup (1970) was the first to point out that the absence of
women in development policies made them inefficient. Conceptions and policies
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were criticised (Cagatay,
Elson and Grown 1995).
Research suggests that women have suffered more than men from the adverse
impact of adjustment policies in many countries of Latin America and Africa
(Palmer 1995). For example the removal food price subsidies has been analysed in
102terms of changes in monetary income and consumption. However, they fail to
analyse changes in the quantity and quality of nonmarket goods and services and
the well-being of the family. The efforts to maintain the family consumption
level by enlarging household production are not taken into account (Floro 1995
p.1914). ...,.,..^
Increasing international division of labour will have different impacts on the
structure of employment of countries. The transfer for example of employment
from high wage countries to low wage countries will have a different effect on
the employment of men and women as more women than men work in low
wage jobs. The employment or unemployment of women will have a greater
effect on unpaid work than the employment or unemployment of men as long as
women are more inclined to do unpaid work. The result of privatization and
public sector reforms and cuts in public expenditure and health care is that
activities are shifted from the public sphere to the private household, thereby
increasing women's burden. Macroeconomic policy takes unpaid work for
granted, assuming an unlimited supply of unpaid labour. The hidden
equilibrating factor is women's ability to absorb the shocks of stabilization
programmes, through more work and less income. Macroeconomic policy is
gender blind (Cagatay, Elson and Grown 1995; Beneria 1995).
Decreasing the public sector has a threefold impact, which is greater for women
than for men. Firstly: more women than men are dependent on the public sector.
There are more female headed one-parent families who live of social assistance.
There are more older women than men who are exclusively dependent on a
State pension. Secondly: relatively more women than men work in the public
sector. Cuts in jobs in the public sector have effects in terms of disappearance of
jobs, a way to substitute paid jobs by unpaid work, because elderly or handicapped
people become dependent on unpaid care. Women are more apt than men to do
unpaid work if they lose their jobs. Thirdly: cuts in subsidies for food,
accommodation, fuel, public transportation etc. will put a financial strain
especially on people with low money incomes. They will try to maintain their
standard of living by doing more unpaid work.
Interest as well as monetary policies will influence the rate of inflation. The
higher the rate of inflation the greater the pressure to maintain the standard of
living by substituting market products and services by home production.
5.6 Summary and conclusion
The System of National Accounts measures all the streams of money, goods and
services in a country and between countries. It is a macro-economic overview of
the entire economic process. Unpaid work is no part of this system, although this
has been a point for discussion from the beginning of the existence of National
Accounts.
103Estimation of the value of unpaid work is arbitrary, but can be done and
registered in the National Accounts as is shown is section 5.3. One of the
arguments against including the value of unpaid work in the National Accounts
is that this could have adverse effects on the usefulness of the Accounts for policy
purposes. Imputation would signify a major change of the magnitude of
production, income and consumption. This difficulty could be overcome by
presenting the old accounts and the new version during a transition period. A
satellite account or an addendum to National Accounts, in which unpaid work is
to be registered, could be a first step towards implementing the value of unpaid
work.
In my opinion international agreements and conventions on the procedures and
the methods of this addendum are more important and fruitful than endless
discussions on the question whether the evaluation of unpaid work should be
put into the SNA or put into an addendum. The important thing is that unpaid
work becomes visible in National Statistics.6. UNPAID WORK IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
"If women's work were accurately reflected in national statistics, it would shatter the myth
that men are the main breadwinners of the world" (UN Human Development Report, 1995).
6.1 Introduction
Size distributions of income (Statistics Netherlands - SN uses the term: personal
income distribution) are constructed by assigning incomes to income units and
then arraying the units by size of income. Measures of income inequality based
on such constructions are then taken to be rough indicators of inequality in
economic welfare. Economists are well aware of the fact that such measures are
imperfect. One of the refinements in constructing income distributions is to
extend the personal income concept to a statistic which includes the monetary
value of household production and to investigate the influence of this extended
income concept on the personal income distribution. This extended income
concept is used, because researchers think it is a better indicator of welfare and
well-being than traditional money incomes as used in income statistics.
This chapter has been organized as follows. Section 2 deals with several problems
arising from measuring income inequality. Section 3 presents a few instruments
to measure income inequality. Section 4 gives an overview of attempts in
economic literature to include the value of unpaid work in personal income
distributions. Section 5 presents calculations of income distribution in the
Netherlands in 1985 and 1990, which include the value of unpaid work calculated
at net minimum wages plus employer's contribution in social security. Summary
and conclusion can be found in section 6.
6.2 What is measured by traditional income statistics?
Several problems arise when constructing traditional income statistics, because
the choice of the income unit, the income accounting period and the income
concept differ from country to country and in the course of time. Income data
limit the possibilities to allow for all these differences.
The first problem is the choice of the income unit. The income unit in
conventional size distributions is the household. According to the definition of
Statistics Netherlands (SN) a household is a group of two or more persons living
together in the same domestic household, keeping house together, or a single
person, living alone in an independent household (SN 1989 p.12). It is also
possible to use the individual income recipient, single or in a household with
other individuals, as the basis for income distribution (SN 1993 p.299). The choice
of the household as income unit is based on the fact that individual income
recipients in households generally pool their incomes and share, more or less
105equally, a common standard of living. The aggregate nature of the household as
income unit has been criticised and cited as a source of bias in the measurement
of inequality (Danziger and Taussig 1979). On the one hand the pooling of income
by household members does not mean that each household should be given an
equal weight in the construction of the size distribution. On the other hand, if the
individual income is the basis of the construction, children, dependent women
and foreigners or residents who for whatever reason have no labour income or
are not entitled to social benefits, have an income of zero. This is not
representative for their welfare. Generally speaking they are supported by their
fathers, husbands or other relatives or charitable organizations. Therefore
household income is a better measure of welfare than individual income
(Berkman and Den Dulk 1978 p.54-67).
If measuring welfare is the aim of the construction of a personal income
distribution, several problems arise. The first one is that the size of households
differs. A crude method to correct household income for the number of persons
living in a household is to divide household income by the number of persons in
the household. However, the needs of adults differ from the needs of children.
Households of more than one person have the advantage of economies of scale:
shopping for more people is relatively less expensive, more persons use the same
bathroom, they watch the same TV. Equivalence scales have been developed to
correct for these differences (Schiepers et al. 1993). According to Schiepers et al. an
equivalence factor is the quotient of the income a household needs to reach a
certain level of welfare and of the income a standard household needs to reach
the same level of welfare (Schiepers et al. 1993 p.7). Schiepers et al. distinguish
empirical objective, empirical subjective and normative scales.
A second problem is the period of measurement of income. The income period
in conventional income statistics is nearly always a year, because data come from
the Treasury. A distinction is made between incomes lasting a full year and
incomes lasting only part of the year. Income inequality between incomes over a
full year and part of the year can differ as well as income inequality between
incomes over a year and over a lifetime. These differences disappear in most
calculations, because data are not available.
The definition of income is the third problem if income is considered a measure
for welfare. Statistics Netherlands distinguished three different definitions of
personal income:
- Primary income = labour income, capital income, profits;
- Gross income = primary income and income transfers;
- Disposable income = gross income minus tax and social premiums
(SN 1993 a p.39).
A fourth problem is the person to whom the income is accounted. This is
especially important to married women, because in most countries the wife's
income used to be or still is (partly) accounted to the husband's income (OECD
1985; OECD 1989). Labour income of married women in the Netherlands is
106accounted as personal income. To estimate household income the incomes of
members of the household should be taken together.
In conventional statistics only money income is counted. Income in kind is
(partly) counted for some groups of economically active people. Income in kind
formed by household production and voluntary work is neglected in income
statistics.
63 Measuring income inequality
The measurement of income inequality is a much disputed subject in science
(Sen 1973 chapter 2; Odink 1985 p.22). It can be measured in several ways.
Normative measures are based on (subjective) value judgments. Positive or
conventional measures are based on (objective) methods of calculation. Of the
latter the Variance of the logarithm of incomes, the Theil coefficient and the Gini
coefficient are used in the next sections (Odink 1985; SN 1989). All three
coefficients indicate the level in which the income distribution differs from total
equality. All three measure differences in income ratios and not in absolute
differences. All three are symmetrical, that is insensitive to an accidental change
of two incomes Xi and Xj.
Disadvantage of the Variance of logarithm is that it presupposes a lognormal
distribution of incomes. Disadvantage of the Gini coefficient is that, in case the
distribution consists of a small number of incomes, the maximum inequality is
not the same as when the distribution consists of a large number of incomes,
because N is in the denominator. Advantage of the Theil coefficient is that it is
decomposable which means that income differences and changes in income
differences can be analysed and accounted to those who cause them. The Theil
coefficient is less specifically sensitive to the fact whether income redistribution
takes place at low, middle or high incomes (Odink 1985 chapter 2.1).
The formula of the Theil coefficient is:
T = Ii (Xi/Y) In (XiN/Y)
and Y is the sum of all incomes.
T=0 if all incomes are the same (absolute equality);
if one individual earns all the income T= In N (maximum inequality).
The higher the T, the more unequal the income distribution.
T can be dissolved in two components: the weighted inequality inside income
subgroups and the inequality between income subgroups (Odink 1985 p.32). The
two components will further be analysed and explained in section 6.5.2.
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of the household (economies of scale) have already been mentioned. Schiepers et
al. (1993) of Statistics Netherlands (SN) developed an empirical objective scale
especially for one- and two-earner families, single people and one-parent
families. The Schiepers-scale corrects family income for the number of persons,
scale economies and the higher costs of living of two-earners compared to one-
earners. Total consumption of the family is divided into a collective part, a part
consumed by adults and a part consumed by children. A single person household
is the standard (equivalence = 1). The difference in equivalence scale is decided on
the basis of a regression analysis of the division of income over adults and
children in one- and two-earner families. For example the equivalence scale for a
one-earner without children is 1.38, for a two-earner it is 1.42. This means that a
one-earner needs an income which is 1.38 higher than the income of a single
person household to reach the same welfare, whereas a two-earner needs an
income which is 1.42 higher than that of a single person household. A one-earner
with one child in the age of 0-5 years has an equivalence scale of 1.65 compared to
1.69 for a two-earner with one child of the same age etc. The difference between
one- and two-earners without children is 0.04 and the difference between one-
and two-earners with children is 0.05. In the Schiepers-scale a distinction is made
between families with one to three children and a subdivision according to the
age of the oldest child.
In section 6.5.2 the OECD-scale is used. The OECD-scale has been chosen because it
has internationally been accepted, it is simple and easy to understand (O'Higgins
and Jenkins 1989; De Kruijk 1993). The weight of the first adult is 1, other adults
count for 0.7, children under 17 years of age count for 0.5. The income of a single
person is divided by 1.0, the income of a household of two adults is divided by 1.7
to obtain the income per family equivalence. In the OECD-scale no distinction is
made between children of different ages.
Table 6.1. shows the differences between the SN (Schiepers)-scale and the OECD-
scale.
Table 6.1.




One-earner: - one child
- two children
- three children
Two-earner: - one child
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108In the Schiepers-scale the correction factor is 0.17 to 0.86 lower than in the OECD-
scale. Therefore using the Schiepers-scale leads to smaller differences of corrected
net money income per family equivalence as is shown in table 6.5.
6.4 The combination of paid and unpaid work in income distribution:
an overview
In economic literature one can find a few attempts to extend the personal money
income concept to a statistic which includes the monetary value of household
production and to investigate the influence of this extended income concept on
the personal income distribution. Researchers used this extended income
concept, because they considered it a better indicator of welfare and well-being
than money income as used in income statistics.
Bryant and Zick (1985) are the first to incorporate the value of household
production in income distribution. They use time data of the 1975-1976 and
1979-1980 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) of the United States to analyse
the differences between money and extended incomes of urban and rural white,
married-couple households, husband employed. They use the opportunity cost
approach. Their findings included:
1. Household production raised the family's average access to goods and services
in aftertax figures by a range of 76-101% of the average family's money
income.
2. Gini ratios based on money incomes only indicated that income distribution
showed higher inequality than income distribution based on extended
incomes, so after having added the value of household production. In rural
households distribution of money income turned out to be more unequal
than in urban households. If the value of household production had been
added, the inequality in income distribution was more substantial in urban
households. Bryant and Zick remarked that this suggested that poor rural
households made greater use of household production to increase their access
to goods and services than their urban counterparts.
3. The market earnings of married women made crucial contributions to money
income and had an equalizing effect on income distribution. But the value of
household production turned out to have an even greater equalizing effect,
especially in rural households.
In a study of Hagenaars, Homan and Van Praag (1984) the subjective evaluation
of one- and two-earners with the same net money incomes has been compared.
Their research shows that the main breadwinner does 6 hours per week
household work, the wives in one-earner families do 51 hours and the wives in
two-earner families 38 hours. The net incomes of one-earners were evaluated
30% higher than the same net incomes of two-earners. In other words the higher
household production of one-earners was estimated at 30% of net money
incomes of one-earners (Hagenaars, Homan and Van Praag 1984).
109The main objective of a study by Homan (Homan 1988) was to quantify the
amount of home production disaggregated to the micro level of households.
Homan particularly focussed on differences between one-earner and two-earner
families.
He estimated the value of household production by using the time data of one-
and two-earner families, which he selected from a sample of 12000 households in
1983. He estimated the market cost of a substitute for household production at
Dfl.10 per hour. Homan found that the monetary value of household production
varies with the number and age of children and the hours the wife spends on the
labour market. He corrected household incomes by using family equivalence
scales of the Van Praag method (Van Praag 1968, 1971). This method compares
household incomes which give households levels of subjective well-being. After
this correction, inclusion of household production increased the average
one-earner's income by a factor 1.8 and the average two-earners' income by a
factor 1.3 (Homan 1988 p.183 and 185). He used the Variance of the logarithm of
incomes as a measure of income inequality. He found that income inequality
between one- and two-earners had been reduced by 71% if household production
was added to net money income, corrected for family size. In this way the
difference in money income between one- and two-earner families had nearly
been compensated for by the difference in household production (Homan 1988
p.187).
The same author repeated his study in 1991. In the 1991 study two waves of the
same panel of households were asked to mention net money income of the main
breadwinner and his partner, and the number of paid and unpaid hours per week
of both partners. The sample included households of single people, single
parents, one-earners and two-earners. Homan used a market cost method and
made corrections for family size by using equivalence scales. His conclusions
from this study were following:
1. Extended incomes for all households were 42% higher than money incomes
after a correction for household size.
2. Single people with a job, two-earners without children and self-employed
people had relatively little household production. Single parents without a
job and one-earners increased their welfare most by household production.
3. Differences in money incomes were bigger than differences in extended
incomes: the highest money income was 2.55 times higher than the lowest
money income (money income of two-earners with two jobs and that of a
single parent without a job); the highest extended income was 2.16 times
higher than the lowest extended income (two-earners with two jobs and
single people without a job).
4. Household production was a compensation for the differences in money
income between one-earner and two-earner families. The money income of
two-earners without children was 38% higher than the money income of the
ditto one-earner, but the difference between their extended incomes was only
16%. The money income of two-earners with children was 32% higher than
the money income of the ditto one-earner, but the difference between their
110extended incomes was only 5% (Homan 1991 p.46).
Bonke (1992) included household production into extended incomes for couples
out of a sample 5000 Danish adults in a 1987 time use survey. For employed
wives he used their market wages, for non-employed wives an estimated
"reservation wage", which was higher than the wage rates for women.
Household production contributed 38% to average gross income and 48% to
average aftertax income. This average income consisted of labour income of both
partners, capital income and public transfers. Income inequality showed a 14%
reduction after adding household production, using the Variance to logarithmen
of net income. Income inequality snowed a 17% reduction by using the Gini ratio
(Bonke 1992 p.289 and 290).
Aslaksen and Koren (1993) estimates the value of household production of
Norwegian couples, single people and one-parent families based on a 1990 time
use survey and on the wages of a home help. They disregarded the household
contribution of children and other members of the household. Average
individual aftertax income was doubled by adding the value of household work
The Gini coefficient of aftertax income of all households was reduced by 22.1% by
adding the value of household work (Aslaksen and Koren 1993 tables 5 and 6).
6.5 Unpaid work in the 1985 and 1990 Dutch income distributions
6.5.1 Data and method
For this part of the study micro-data of the 1985 and 1990 Intomart time use
studies have been used, which data are now in the Steinmetz Archief. These two
years have been chosen because the volume of paid and unpaid work changed
significantly in this period. The hypothesis was that this change could also be
seen in income distribution. The samples consisted of more than 3000 cases. All
cases were weighted according to number of persons in the household, sex, age,
urbanity and main occupation (Knulst and Van Beek 1990 p.163). Respondents
registered their activities during a week in autumn in a precoded diary. Before
and after filling in the diary interviews were held. Questions included the
number of persons, sex and age of other members of the household and the
relationship of the respondent to other members of the household. Respondents
were also questioned about their paid work and the paid work of the other
members of the household. One of the last questions in the second interview
concerned net household income per month. For this item the answers of about
2250 respondents could be used. A subdivision was made into 4 household types:
- single people
- couples with one-earner
(respondent breadwinner or partner of breadwinner)
- couples with two-earners
(respondent main breadwinner or partner of main breadwinner)
- one-parent families
111The time use of the respondents was registered in the diary, the time use of other
members of the household was not registered. Respondents consisted of
breadwinners, partners and other members of the household. The average time
use of all respondents was calculated according to sex, household type and age
group. This average time use was accounted to members of the family other than
the respondents. The average time use of other members of the household was
added to the individual time use of the respondent. In this way total unpaid
hours of work of the complete household was counted and valued at net legal
minimum wage. The value of unpaid work per household was added to net
household income in order to obtain total income of paid and unpaid time. The
data of one-earner couples consisted of answers given by the breadwinner, the
partner of the breadwinner or another member of the family, for example a child.
The answers of all respondents in one-earner families in the sample were taken
together for the estimation of family income inclusive of unpaid work. The data
of two-earner couples consisted of answers given by the main breadwinner, the
partner of the main breadwinner or another member of the family. The data of
one-parent families consisted of answers given by the parent or another member
of the family.
Table 6.2. gives an overview of the respondents. The traditional family of male
breadwinner and dependent female partner dominates: in the 1985 sample as
well as in the 1990 sample more than 1000 of the 2250 respondents belong to this
type of household.
The traditional role also dominated the 550 two-earner families: in about 400
households the main breadwinner is the husband. One-parent families were
scarce: less than 100 respondents belonged to this household type. More women
than men were single.
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Source: Micro data of Steinmetz Archief
6.5.2 Results
6.5.2.1 Income per household type
In the tables in this section the respondents have been ranged under the
household type they belong to. In table 6.3. allowance is made for the number of
persons in the household or economies of scale. Household income has been
corrected by using the OECD-equivalence scale. The weight of the first adult is 1.0,
other adults count for 0.7, children under 17 years of age count for 0.5. The
income of a single person is divided by 1.0, the income of a household of two
adults by 1.7 to obtain the income per family equivalence. For the calculations of
extended incomes the minimum wages have been chosen. The subgroups female
headed two-earner families and male headed one-parent families are too limited
to draw any conclusions.
113Table 6.3., column B, shows that in 1985 net money incomes were lowest for the
subgroup single people (Dfl. 1642) and highest for the subgroup two-earner
households (Dfl. 3160). Net money incomes of the subgroup one-parent families
(Dfl. 2369) were only slightly lower than net incomes of one-earners (Dfl. 2480).
However, in these subgroups there is a difference between males and females. Of
all households, the single female has the lowest income whereas the income of
two-earner female-headed household is highest.
Household income inclusive of the value of unpaid work calculated at the
minimum wages (column C) were also lowest for single people (Dfl. 2656) and
highest for two-earner households (Dfl. 5436). One-parent families (Dfl. 4748)
and one-earners (Dfl. 5252) were in between. Single males had the lowest income
after correction for unpaid work, the female two-parent household had the
highest (column C).
In one-earner households one partner works full-time in the household. So one
would expect household income of one-earners to increase most by unpaid work.
Column C shows that this is true: household incomes of the subgroup
one-earners more than doubled by the value of unpaid work (column C/B).
Average net money income of two-earners, as shown in column B, was 27%
higher than average net money income of one-earners. The difference between
two-earners and one-earners decreased to 3% if unpaid work was added (column
C). If corrected for family size the difference in incomes between two-earners and
one-earners was 6% (columns D and E).
The subgroup one-parent families doubled their income by unpaid work mainly
due to female one-parent families. Single males were least productive in unpaid
work: their incomes only increased by a factor 1.4. Male partners of female
one-earners also contributed less to extended incomes than female partners. The
same conclusion could be drawn for male partners of two-earners where females
are the main breadwinners.
Looking at the extended incomes corrected for family size (column E), income of
the single female is highest and income of the female headed one-parent family
is lowest.
Obviously women, compared to men, attach more importance to a well kept
household and well cared for family. Men attach great value to other activities,
they tolerate more dirt, they accept an untidier house. I came to the conclusion
that welfare is partly sex determined: unpaid work contributes more to female
welfare, leisure more to male welfare.
114Table 6.3.
Average net money income per month in Dutch guilders in 1985 per household type, exclusive and
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(Own calculations based on 1985 Intomart time use study)
Table 6.4. shows the 1990 income data based on the Intomart time use studies.
The analysis has been extended: a distinction is made for families with and
without children.
Table 6.4. column B shows that in 1990, as well as in 1985, money income was
lowest for the subgroup of single people and highest for two-earner households.
The difference in money incomes between the households of one-parent families
and one-earners was considerably higher in 1990 than it was in 1985. Column C
shows that if the value of unpaid work was added to money income, single
people had the lowest income (Dfl. 2781) and the subgroup one-earners had the
highest income, whereas in 1985 the two-earners had the lead. Looking at the
extended incomes corrected for family size in 1990 (column E), welfare of the
male two-earner without children was highest and welfare of the female headed
one-parent family was lowest.
Money income of two-earners without children is 35% higher than that of ditto
one-earners, but after adding the value of unpaid work the difference is only 2%.
Money income of two-earners with children is 17% higher than that of ditto one-
earners but after adding the value of unpaid work it is 3% lower. So the value of
115unpaid work nearly wipes out the income differences between one-earners and
two-earners.
Table 6.4.
Average net money income per month in Dutch guilders in 1990 per household type, exclusive and
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(Own calculations based on 1990 Intomart time use study)
Table 4.1. showed that on average the volume of paid work increased between
1985 and 1990, whereas the volume of unpaid work decreased. This can also be
seen in tables 6.3. and 6.4. Money incomes increased more than extended
incomes. Money income of the one-earner households rose for example by 19%,
income inclusive of the value of unpaid work by 15%. However, one should bear
in mind that the data considered were not longitudinal, the size of several
subgroups changed because labour market participation of women rose and last
but not least because the subgroup one-parent families was rather small to draw
any conclusions.
116In section 6.3. equivalence scales of the OECD and SN (Schiepers) have been
described. In the SN-scale net money income has been corrected by different
equivalence scales for one- and two-earners by looking at the extra costs caused by
the participation of both partners in the labour market. In the OECD-scale no
distinction is made between one- and two-earners. In tables 6.3. and 6.4. however
a distinction is made on the income-side between one- and two-earners in
columns C and E because one-earners have, ceteris paribus, a larger household
production. What is the relationship between both methods if there is any? The
Schiepers method assumes that extra expenses of two-earners compared to one-
earners are a criterion for the difference in welfare, if welfare is to be measured by
net money income. In my opinion this assumption is not right for two reasons.
1. Child care is an important issue for two-earners. In the Netherlands
subsidized child care is available for less than 5% of all children aged 0-3 years.
The waiting list is almost as long as the list of participating children (Arachne
19.12.1994). Therefore nearly half of the children of Dutch working women
are cared for by other family members or other unpaid caretakers (Maassen
van den Brink et al. 1995 p 38). Unpaid child care does not show in expenses,
but it can be considered as a gift from the caretaker. The same applies to other
informal help and care. In my opinion such gifts should be left out in welfare
comparisons because one cannot be certain that it will be continued as there is
no binding (legal) agreement.
2. In two-earner families some jobs are not done at all: two-earner families with
children spend 17 to 20 hours a week less on unpaid work than one-earner
families (Ministry of Social Affairs 1995, p.198). The two-earner family with
few hours left for cleaning may decide to leave window-cleaning to nature,
instead of hiring a window-cleaner. Compared to a one-earner family with
enough time for cleaning, the consumption level of the two-earner family is,
ceteris paribus, lower. Differences like this one do not show in the Schiepers'
budget method.
Therefore I think that a welfare comparison method based on comparing
extended incomes corrected by means of the OECD-scale is a better indication than
the one based on comparing net money incomes corrected by means of the SN-
scales. Nevertheless it is interesting to compare the results of both methods as is
done in table 6.5. Net money income corrected by means of the Schiepers-scale is
given in column 1, extended income corrected by means of the OECD-scale is
given in column 2 (Column 2 is almost identical to column E in table 6.4.)
117Table 6.5.

































(Own calculations based on 1990 Intomart time use study)
Comparing the two columns of table 6.5. extended income per OECD family
equivalence scale is 1.2 to 1.7 higher than net money income per SN family
equivalence scale. The difference between the two columns is a reflection of the
different family equivalence scales and of the difference between money income
and extended income. As could be expected, the differences between the two
columns are greatest for the categories with high household production: single
females, one-earners without children and female headed one-parent families.
Table 6.6. shows the ratio between the incomes of one-earners and other
households. The differences between one-earners and other households are
smaller in the money-SN-method (column 1) than in the extended-OECD-
method (column 2). Both methods only show minor differences when
comparing the corrected incomes of one-earners versus single people and one-
earners without children versus one-parent families. The explanation is that the
difference in scales is smallest for these categories of households (see table 6.1.).
The difference between both methods is greatest when comparing the income of
one-earners without children versus two-earners without children and one-
earners without children versus two-earners with children. This is due to the
high household production of one-earners. Table 6.6. confirms my opinion that
the extended-OECD-method is to be preferred.
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6.5.2.2 Income per household type and age group
In tables 6.7. and 6.8. average household incomes have been subdivided according
to age groups. The number of cases in these tables was rather small to allow a
subdivision into age groups. Therefore conclusions should be made carefully.
Age did not have much influence on the contribution of unpaid work to
extended incomes: for one-earners the importance of unpaid work increased
until they are 35 years of age, that is the period they are raising young children.
After that period the contribution of unpaid work to extended income decreased
slightly in 1985, to increase again slightly in 1990.
For two-earners unpaid work becomes more important with age. The subgroup
of one-parent families was rather small to draw any conclusions. For one-parent
families and for one-earners the value of unpaid work was equally important:
they doubled their income by doing unpaid work. There was no clear relation
between the contribution of unpaid work and age.
For single people the contribution of unpaid work to extended incomes increased
with age, although the contribution was smaller than for other household types.
For the rest the same picture emerged as in table 6.3.: household incomes of one-
earners and one-parent families doubled if unpaid work valued at the minimum
wages was added. Household incomes of two-earners increased by a factor of
about 1.7. The incomes of single people increased by a factor of about 1.5. Single
females' incomes increased more than the single males' incomes.
119Table 6.7.



























































































































(Own calculations based on a 1985 Intomart time use study)
Table 6.8.




























































































































(Own calculations based on • 1990 Intomart time use study)
1206.5.2.3 Income inequality
What is the influence on income inequality if the value of unpaid work is added?
To measure income inequality the Theil method has been chosen. Odink (1985)
considers the Theil coefficient to be a reliable, homogene, symmetrical measure
which could easily be decomposed into a weighted inequality within income
subgroups and into weighted inequality between income subgroups (Odink 1985





T can be written as:
T = IjIj(Yij/Y)ln(YijN/Y)
= IjXj (Yij/Yi) (Yi/Y) (In (NSYIJ/YJ) + ln(NYi/NiY))
= lj Ij (Yij/Y0(Yi/Y)
iTi + Ijyi ln(yi/ni)
where: ^i yiTi
is the weighted measure of inequality within income subgroups and
measures the inequality between income subgroups.
Table 6.9.
Theil coefficients of net money income per family equivalence factor (A) and income inclusive of the




























































(Own calculations based on 1985 and 1990 Intomart time use studies)
121In table 6.9. column A shows the Theil coefficient of net money household
income per family equivalence in 1985 and 1990. Column B shows net household
money income inclusive of the value of unpaid work per family equivalence at
minimum wages.
If all households would have equal incomes, the Theil coefficient = 0, there is no
inequality. The closer the Theil coefficient is to zero, the smaller the inequality.
Column A shows that income inequality of net money incomes in 1985 was
smallest among single people and two-earners. Income inequality was greatest
among one-parent families and one-earners. In 1990 inequality was smallest
among two-earners and greatest among one-parent families.
If the value of unpaid work was added to net incomes the reduction of income
inequality was 61.9% in 1985 and 55.8% in 1990. The reduction in income
inequality was higher in 1985 because more unpaid work was done.
In 1985 the reduction of income inequality was highest for one-earners (62.6%)
because the value of unpaid work was added, followed by two-earners,
one-parent families and single people. In 1990 this order had changed: the
reduction in income inequality was highest for one-parent families (58.9%),
followed by one-earners, two-earners and single people.
Tables 6.3. and 6.4. showed that in the period 1985-1990 money incomes of
one-earners rose most, followed by two-earners and single people, whereas
money incomes of one-parent families decreased. In this way the importance of
unpaid work became relatively smaller for one-earners, whereas it became more
important for one-parent families. Consequently they changed places in the
reduction of income inequality.
Table 6.10. shows the decomposition of the Theil coefficient in coefficients for
inequality within groups of household types and between those groups. The
contribution of inequality within household groups is more substantial than the
contribution of inequality between groups. The same conclusion has been drawn
by Homan (1988 p.185) and Bonke (1992 p.291).
Table 6.10.
Contribution of income inequality within household types and between household types to total
income inequality as measured by Theil coefficients of net money income corrected for number of


























122Column A shows that total income inequality of corrected net incomes can bt
attributed to income inequality inside groups of household types for 87% to 89%
and to inequality between groups of household types for 11% to 13%. Column B
shows that in 1985 income inequality diminished from 0.1036 to 0.0395, that
means 62%, if unpaid work at minimum wages is added to money income. Of the
remaining income inequality 95% can be attributed to inequality within groups of
household types and 5% to inequality between groups of household types.
In 1990 income inequality diminished from 0.1166 to 0.05151, that means 56%, if
unpaid work at minimum wages is added to money income. Of the remaining
income inequality 97% can be attributed to inequality within groups of household
types and 3% to inequality between groups of household types.
It can be concluded that in 1990 income inequality remained greater after adding
the value of unpaid work because income inequality was less reduced in 1990
compared to 1985 after having added the value of unpaid work to money income.
The role of unpaid work has become less prominent in the period 1985-1990 thus
reducing income inequality. This could be due to higher unemployment in 1985
compared to 1990: in 1985 12.9% of the economically active population was
registered as unemployed, in 1990 this percentage was 5.9%.(i<>). In 1990 the total
Theil coefficient of money income was 12.5% higher than it was in 1985, whereas
the total Theil of extended income in 1990 was 30% higher than it was 1990. By
adding unpaid work the gap in income inequality was narrowed more in 1985
than it was in 1990.
If any differences in inequality remain between one- and two-earners after
corrections for family size, these differences are mainly caused by demographic or
cultural differences in the own group of households and not by differences in
labour market status between groups of household types.
6.6 Summary and conclusion
Research by Bryant and Zick, by Homan, by Bonke and by Aslaksen and Koren
and by myself show that differences in money incomes between households are
bigger than differences in extended incomes in which the value of unpaid work
has been included. The value of household production turns out to be substanti-
al: 40% to more than 100% of money incomes, depending on the data and the
methods used.
Single males and two-earners without children have relatively little household
production. Single parents without a job and one-earners increase their welfare
most by unpaid work.
16 The definition of economically active population changed between 1985 and 1990. In 1985 people
were counted as economically active if they worked or were willing to work at least 20 hours a week.
In 1990 12 hours work a week was the criterion. This may partly explain the lower unemployment
rate in 1990.
123Household production turns out to be a great equalizer: differences in money
incomes between two-earner households and one-earner households are nearly
wiped out if the value of unpaid work at minimum wages is added to money
income. Income inequality within groups of household types is greater than
between groups of household types.
Women contribute more to household production than men, even if they are
single. Female partners in one-earner and two-earner households contribute
more to money income by doing unpaid work, than male partners in female
headed one-earner and two-earner households. The female one-parent
increases her extended income more than her male counterpart.
Money incomes as well as extended incomes increased between 1985 and 1990 for
one-earners, two-earners and single people. In the same period money income
as well as extended incomes decreased for one-parent families.
The role of unpaid work in reducing income inequality has become less
prominent: money incomes increased more than extended incomes in the period
1985-1990. In 1985 income inequality was reduced by 62% after adding the value
of unpaid work to money income. In 1990 this reduction was only 56%.
1247. UNPAID WORK IN ECONOMIC MODELS
" "Models will improve because better theories and more data become available"
(Jan Tinbergen 1983)
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter structure, scope and shortcomings of macroeconomic models are
described in section 2. In section 3 literature of models which pay attention to
gender are presented. In section 4 Plantenga and Sloep criticise the household
sector of the MIMIC-model of the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau because
unpaid work is absent. In section 5 research is presented which strengenths this
criticism. In section 6 it is suggested to implement unpaid work in
macroeconomic models not only in the household block but also in the
production and consumption function. The feedbacks between paid and unpaid
work are traced. Summary and conclusion are given in section 7.
7.2 Structure and scope of macroeconomic models
A model is a simplified reflection of part of reality. It can be a way to remember
things, e.g. a picture, which can help to get a first impression of an object, a scale-
model of a building, which may serve as a means to gather experimental data, or
the behaviour of a model plane in a windtunnel. Often it is possible to present an
object, a process or a system by a set of mathematical equations (Bottcher 1988).
An economic model tries to reflect the economic aspect of (part of) reality by
means of a set of mathematical equations. The intention of a macroeconomic
model is to reflect the relations between compilations of economic quantities
such as families, firms and governments.
Policy making discipline is promoted by using a model. Politicians are obliged to
make consistent promises, because they have to quantify policy programmes. The
effects of programmes of political parties are calculated with the help of a model.
Economic models can warn policy makers that negative developments may
occur, e.g. inflation or unemployment (Zalm 1988).
With the help of economic models prognoses and scenarios can be made, such as
the Macro Economical Prognosis of the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau
(MEV), which is published every year at the same time as the annual
Government budget. The MEV is looking a year ahead. The CPB also publishes
scenarios, looking ahead 4 to 5 years or even longer, e.g "Nederland in drievoud"
(The Netherlands in triplicate), which presents three growth scenarios of the
Dutch economy until the year 2015.
125In short: it is clear that a macroeconomic model can play an important role in
supporting economic policies: the effects of a change in taxation, of economizing
on government expenditures, and of changes in social security system, can be
simulated and more seriously considered (Zalm 1988).
Models can also be deceiving or meaningless, because a model attaches little
economic consequences to certain decisions or time-lags occur which are not
taken into account by the model. An example is to collect taxes earlier in the year,
which looks like an improvement in tax revenues and a smaller deficiency of
Government budget in a certain year (Zalm 1988).
The way a model is stylized can also be a source of disappointment. In the
mathemetical equations of the model one finds all kinds of parameters and
coefficients, which represent human behaviour. These coefficients and
parameters are often based on statistical time series. Using time series implies
that human behaviour does not change in the course of time, which seems
unlikely (Van der Geest 1983; Zalm 1988). Labour market conduct of women for
example has changed in the course of time because ethical, religious and mental
attitudes have changed. Therefore it is difficult to make a prognosis of future
labour market behaviour.
The oldest macroeconomic model is the business cycle model, published by
Tinbergen in 1936, in which expenses are an important variable. In a business
cycle model short-term changes in industry are the main issue (De Wolff 1983;
Van der Geest 1984).
Business cycle models have following characteristics:
1. They are demand models: production functions are not found in these
models. Value added, net national income, are constructed by aggregation of
expenses or incomes.
2. Relative mutations are important, e.g. percentagewise changes of national
income or short-term employment. Often statistical time series are used
(Wartna 1974). One can consider these models as the first generation of
macroeconomic models. In the seventies models were developed in which
attention was paid not only to demand, but also to supply structures. These
models are meant for a longer term. They are at the same time models of
economic growth and of the business cycle.
Economic structure models are mainly supply models which represent a trend. In
the long term the question arises whether production can be extended: will there
be enough labour and capital available? In economic structure models production
functions are important. In these models the absolute or relative level of units of
account is important instead of relative mutations. By using logarithms
curvilinear trends can be pictured. In economic structure models time-lags are, if
possible, avoided with endogenic variables. The sample period for the statistical
measurement of coefficients should be as long as possible, because an economic
structure model is meant for long-term prognoses (Wartna 1974 p. 102 e.v.).
126In the seventies and eighties sectorial models, which pay attention to branches of
industry and regions were developed in the Netherlands. In the nineties the first
micro-macro models were presented. The macro model was underpinned by
micro models. These models are general equilibrium models in which producers
and consumers play a role. Consumers maximize utility, producers maximize
profits. An equilibrium is reached by compilations of prices and quantities in
such a way that supply and demand in every market are equal and nobody wishes
to change his behaviour (Compaijen and Den Butter 1982 p.22; Gelauff and
Graafland 1994 p.5 ff).
In the seventies the enthousiasm for macroeconomic models dwindled, because
these models could not explain stagflation, pollution of the environment or
massive inactivity of people having social security benefits. Moreover there was
criticism because the theoretical underpinning was not empirically founded by
microeconomical data of human behaviour (Van der Geest 1983; Gelauff and
Graafland 1994 p.4; Graafland and Zalm 1994 p.610). The technique of estimations
was also criticized (Den Butter 1983).
Another shortcoming arose when relations, which existed in reality, were lacking
or wrongly quantified (Zalm 1988). Statistical time series were thought to be
usable for short-term predictions, but not for long-term prognoses (De Jong e.a.
1983; Kuipers 1983). In 1983 Dutch economists concluded a discussion on the
value of macroeconomic models by saying that these models could contribute to
policy making, especially to quantitative economic policy, on the understanding
that economic science as well as macroeconomic models have their limitations
(Kuipers 1983). Hennipman already warned much earlier that it is an illusion to
think that a foolproof and entirely exact economic policy could be attained thanks
to economic science. Every decision brings along an analytically and empirically
smaller or greater uncertainty (Hennipman 1962).
Macroeconomic models do not consider unpaid work and ignore the fact that, as
a result of privatization and public sector reforms, many activities such as health
care have been shifted from the public sector to the private sector. This is
equivalent to assuming an unlimited supply of unpaid labour (Cagatay, Elson
and Grown 1995).
73 Models with special attention to gender
Erturk and Cagatay (1995) presented a theoretical general model of growth cycles
with special attention to gender. It is a simple Kaldorian model in which the rate
of feminization of the labour market and the intensity of female household
labour have been introduced as separate arguments. They assume that one part of
investment demand is induced in short run changes in the capacity utilization
rate, and the other part is cost determined in the longer run. A rise in the rate of
feminization of the labour market stimulates investment because labour costs are
decreasing. A rise in the intensity of female household labour (workload
127determined by length and intensity of effort) makes savings rise. It is assumed
that during an economic contraction the need for dissaving diminishes as the
share of nonmarket goods and services increases, whereas during an economic
expansion savings are negatively affected because less nonmarket goods and
services are produced. If during a contraction of the economy the intensity of
household work rises faster than the feminization of the labour market the
likely hood of economic recovery is less than in the reverse case. The model has
not empirically been tested, because data on the cyclical development of the
feminization of the labour market and on the intensity of household labour were
not available. In my eyes this is an interesting conjecture which should be
elaborated upon further.
In 1987 Graafland presented a model describing and analysing the links between
the formal economy and the informal economy (household sector and
underground sector) in particular the labour market and the consumer market.
He used a small comparative static equilibrium model. The underground
economy was defined as the economy of paid illegal transaction (no payment of
tax or social premiums) which compete with transactions in the formal economy.
The household sector was defined as unpaid transactions (household and
voluntary work) which save expenses in the formal economy. As an exact
estimation of the underground economy was not available, Graafland made two
variations, estimating underground economy at 5% and at 10% of GNP. The
household sector was estimated at 5% of GNP. Graafland made this restriction for
the household sector because he thought that only 5% of the activities inside the
household could compete with activities in the formal economy (Graafland 1987
p.3 and p.18). An individual CES-utility function, in which leisure and
consumption figure, was optimalized. Working people divide their time between
the labour market, the black market and the household sector, nonworking
people divide their time between the black market and the household sector. A
distinction is made between an informal labour market, where the black wage is
the result of supply and demand, and a household sector, where the "wage"
depends on the savings of expenses in the formal sector caused by household
production. It is not clear how Graafland estimated this "wage". This model
shows a simulation of the effects of a lower income tax rate, a lower rate of VAT,
lower government expenses, a wage moderation of 2.5%, a shortening of working
hours with 5%. The quantitative effects of the informal economy (mainly the
underground sector) on the formal economy and vice versa, which Graafland
found, are very small. Graafland himself concludes that a more detailed model of
the household sector would be important (Graafland 1987 p. 46).
In my eyes a percentage of 5% of GNP for household production is much too low.
Substitution of unpaid work by paid work can be realized by using capital goods
or by having paid work done by third persons. However, working women save
time by eating out and hiring home help (Tijdens et al. 1994). Working mothers
use more child care than nonworking mothers. The more hours mothers
participate in the labour market, the more hours of child care they use (Groot and
Maassen van den Brink 1992; CBS 1993; Maassen van den Brink et al. 1995). In
128principle all household production can be done by third persons: one can hire a
housekeeper or go and live in a hotel or boarding house. Working women
without children spend 15-17 hours a week less on household production than
housewives, their male partners spend 2 hours more than the partners of
nonworking women. Working women with children spend 20-22 hours less
than housewives, their male partners spend 0 to 4 hours more than the partners
of nonworking women (Ministry of Social Affairs 1995 Suppl.5, table 2.3).
7.4 Criticism on MIMIC: an extended household sector model of the
Netherlands Central Planning Bureau
MIMIC (Micro Macro model to analyse the Institutional Context), is a
micro-macro model of the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau. To be able to
explain the criticism on MIMIC, the model is rather extensively described in this
section. MIMIC has specially been constructed to show behavioural consequences
of changes in taxation and social security, to predict long-term labour market
behaviour in a changing institutional context. MIMIC is an applied general
equilibrium model with New Keynesian elements. It distinguishes three
submodels, describing the behaviour of the firm and of households and the
confrontation between labour supply and demand. The main elements of the
model of the firm are a monopolistic competitive output market environment, a
monopsonistic (labour) input market, a CES-production function and a cost
function that includes factor adjustment costs. Domestic firms have been divided
into six sectors.
The household model describes private consumption and labour supply. In the
utility function utility of consumption and leisure is maximized:
U = (c/c + pd) (1)
In c/c consumption is compared to the average consumption of a reference
group c. Leisure is given in d and the coefficient of leisure P can be interpreted as
the relative preference for leisure of a household.
The budget constraint is:
PcC = (1 - Sy)((l - tb)(wblb + Zb )+(l - tp)Wplp + Zn)) (2)
in which Pc is the price of consumer goods; Sy is the savings rate; t is the average
rate of taxation and social security premiums; w is the wage rate per hour;
1 is the number of hours worked; z is non-wage income. Subscipts b and p
denote breadwinner and partner respectively. A part of non-wage income is
subject to taxation zb and a part is exempt from taxation Zn.
129The time constraint of the household is:
h = lb + lp + d (3)
in which h is the total time available to the household.
Labour supply in MIMIC is based on the male-chauvinist model, meaning that
only labour supply of partners is endogenized. Generally labour supply of
breadwinners is empirically found to be rather insensitive to income of the
partner participating in the labour market, so working time (lb) of the
breadwinner is supposed to be exogenous. Net income of breadwinners is derived
from gross income and the statutory rates of taxation and social security
premiums through the use of class-frequency income distributions of gross
breadwinner incomes.
Working time of the partner (lp) depends on the wage rate of the partner, the
marginal tax rate, net income of the breadwinner and the partner's preference for
leisure. In the labour supply block the participation rate, the average number of
working hours supplied, the weighted average tax rate and the weighted
marginal tax rate of partners are determined. Heterogeneity has been introduced
by assuming that households differ with respect to the relative preference for
leisure as reflected by the parameter (J in (1). Each household chooses the number
of hours the partner wishes to work on the labour market by maximizing a CES-
utility function with consumption and leisure and a kinked budget curve which
follows from the income bracket tax system.
The third submodel in MIMIC concerns contractual wage formation, the search
intensity of unemployed and the matching process between vacancies and
unemployed persons. Wages ate set above market-clearing levels, generating
equilibrium unemployment. Government behaviour is largely exogenous. Tax
rates and the volume of most public outlays are given, prices of government
expenditure and the public wage rate are linked to private sector variables. The
public deficit is endogenously determined and feeds back into government debt
and interest charges on government debt. Four types of government institutions
can be distinguished: three indirect tax rates; the official minimum wage rate; the
statutory income tax and social security premiums; social benefits for
unemployment and disability.
Plantenga and Sloep (1995) criticise MIMIC because they think that in the
household block more attention should have been given to unpaid work. They
point out that the way formal work has been organized presupposes a certain way
of organizing informal work. If labour market participation of women increases,
less time is available for child care and voluntary work. The interaction between
the formal and informal circuit can only be shown if participation in both circuits
is modelled at the same time. Plantenga and Sloep illustrated their statements in
figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1. (Plantenga and Sloep 1995 p. 46)
Utility curve Ui shows the preferences of a partner with a reservation wage as
high as the wage in point A. A decrease of available hours for the labour market
as a consequence of child care makes the budget function go to the left. This
partner will not participate in the labour market. If U2 is the new preference
curve, the effect of a decrease of available time because of child care has the same
consequences as a decrease of other income. Time on the labour market decreases
with T" - T.
Plantenga and Sloep argue that government policy influences partner's time
available for the labour market by way of child care facilities, parental leave, a
legal right to work part-time. Government policy concerning health care, care for
the elderly and education also influences partner's time: a shortening of
intramural care after hospitalization, waiting lists for homes for elderly people or
reduced government spending on education costs informal time and has
repercussions for partner's time available for the labour market or other
activities. Plantenga and Sloep propose to integrate unpaid work in this model by
implementing the following adaptations:
1. To change the choice between time on the labour market and leisure in a
choice between time on the labour market, leisure and time for unpaid
production.
2. Time available for paid work is dependent on government policy concerning
expenses for child care, health care, care for elderly and handicapped people,
education etc. as shown in figure 7.2.
131Figure 7.2. shows the relations in the householdmodel of MIMIC. An extra
relationship between households and government is added: government policy
is an input variable for the household model together with tax and social
premium rates. The participation rate of unpaid work is an input variable for the
government sector together with tax and social premiums revenues and social
assistance benefits. Figure 7.2. shows the household block of MIMIC in which the




















Figure 7.2. (Plantenga and Sloep 1995 p. 51)
I agree with the criticism of Plantenga and Sloep, but I think their criticism does
not go far enough. In section 7.6. suggestions will be made not only regarding the
way the household block is modelled but also regarding the absence of unpaid
work in the whole model. Before expanding the criticism on macroeconomic
models more research is presented on the relation between paid and unpaid
work, research which in my eyes supports the criticism of Plantenga and Sloep.
13273 The relation between paid and unpaid work .
Knulst of the Social and Cultural Planning Office made several researches about
the relation between paid and unpaid work and other activities by means of a
regression analysis based on time use surveys. He found that for men, unlike
women, paid working time is a good predictor for their time use on other
activities. For women total time spent on paid plus unpaid work is a good
predictor for their time use on other activities (Knulst and Schoonderwoerd 1983
p. 119).
Driehuis (Bruyn-Hundt et al. 1983) also found a significant difference between
men and women concerning the relation between paid and unpaid work and
other activities (Bruyn-Hundt et al. 1983 p.95)
Another approach was used by Van der Lippe and Niphuis-Nell of the SCP (Van
der Lippe and Niphuis-Nell 1994). They made a regression analysis on the
influence of educational level, age, hours of paid work, age of youngest child,
partner, house, and household help, and time spent on household production.
They found that for men paid hours of work were the most important variable: a
man with a paid job of 40 hours or more a week, spends 14 hours a week less on
household tasks than a man without a paid job. For women the age of the
youngest child and hours of paid work were equally important: a youngest child
of 0-5 years old is good for 18 hours more unpaid work. Educational level and age
influence household production for both men and women, but this correlation is
less important. For men and women the lowest level of education is good for
nearly two hours more unpaid work a week. For all men and all women together
one hour of paid work extra in 1990 meant a reduction in unpaid work of 35
minutes for women and of 23 minutes for men. Their research also shows that
unpaid work is most equally divided if paid work is equally divided, that is the
case if both partners have a paid job of 30 hours a week or more (Van der Lippe
and Niphuis-Nell 1994 p.57).
In MIMIC Gelauff and Graafland suggest a close relationship between labour
market participation of women, the level of their professional skills,
employment of the husband and the presence of any children. Indirectly they
recognize that there is a relation by supposing that a partner with child(ren) has
20 hours a week less available for labour market participation.
The relation between paid and unpaid work is further investigated in this section
by using the Intomart time use surveys. These surveys offer the possibility to link
paid and unpaid work, because respondents mark in their diaries the hours of
paid as well as of unpaid work. The size of the samples restricted the possibility to
subdivide the time data over sub-categories. Therefore I put together the samples
of 1985 and 1990 (the same questions were asked in both years). For the calibration
of the labour supply MIMIC distinguishes 8 types of households, which I followed
as closely as possible and I added two other variables: the age of the youngest child
and the way in which partners earn their living.
133In table 7.1. data of household types with 10 or less respondents are left out.
In this way the following combinations cannot be found in table 7.1.:
- single males with a low educational level and working 1-19 hours a week
- female one-earners and their partners
- female-headed two-earner households
Table 7.1.
Time use in hours a week to household production + voluntary work (1), paid work (2) and total work


















































































































































































































134- partners both working part-time
- unemployed low-skilled couples with youngest child 6-12 years
- unemployed high-skilled couples with children aged 0-5 years
Partners with a nonworking breadwinner and a working wife are scarce.
Time use in hours a week to household production + voluntary work (1), paid work (2) and total work



















































































































































































































135Table 7.1. shows that:
1. In all household types the presence of a young child, as well as the
educational level bear a negative correlation with the percentage of
two-earners. The percentage of two-earners is highest in households without
children and a high educational level (41% of male partners without
children; 56% of females). More than 50% of partners without children are
two-earners, whereas only about 1/3 of partners with children are
two-earners.
2. Two-earners with youngest child between 0-5 years of age and a high
educational level have the highest total workload: for men this means on
average 65 hours a week, for women on average 62 hours a week. Fathers
with a high educational level do 2 hours of unpaid work and 4 hours of paid
work more than fathers with a low educational level. The percentage of one-
earners is highest in households with a young child and a low educational
level (78% of male one-earners and 72 of female partners).
3. The female two-earners have a much lower paid workload than the male two
earners. Females work 12 to 19 hours, males 38 to 45 hours a week. These data
confirm the so-called one-and-half-earners strategy of de Jong and Van Olde
(1993).
4. Paid and unpaid work are in competition: there is no big difference between
the total workload of men and women with children under 12. This applies
especially to two-earners: their total workload is 58-65 hours a week. The
workload of partners of one-earners is slightly lower than that of their
husbands: 53-59 hours against 60-62 hours a week.
5. If men are unemployed they have a relatively high unpaid workload.
Partners of unemployed men and of one-earners with a young child have the
highest unpaid workload.
6. It is realistic to assume, as MIMIC does (Gelauff and Graafland 1994 p.103),
that for partners without children the total number of hours available for
work on the labour market is higher than for partners with children. MIMIC
arbitrarily puts this on 20 hours a week. Table 7.1. suggests that the age of the
youngest child should be taken into account instead of the presence of
"children" in general. Table 7.1. shows that female two-earner partners
without children have 9 to 25 hours less unpaid work than mothers. Instead
of an arbitrary amount of 20 hours, a difference could be introduced between
women without children and:
women with youngest child 13 years > : 9-13 h. less unpaid work
with youngest child 6-12 years : 16-18 h. less unpaid work
with youngest child 0-5 years : 21-25 h. less unpaid work
Table 7.1. does not give information on the division of voluntary work between
men and women in the different household types. Therefore in table 7.2. unpaid
work has been divided into household production and voluntary work according
to sex and per household type.
136Table 7.2.
Tune use in hours a week on household production (1) and voluntary work (2) in the period 1985/1990
Single < 65 unemployed
-1-19 hoursemployed





















































































































































































Source: 1985 and 1990 micro data of Steinmetz Archief.
Table 7.2. shows that the size of voluntary work done by nonworking men is
remarkably high, especially if they have older children (5 to 7 hours a week). The
male two-earner does least (1 hour), followed by the working single man. Male
one-earners are in between. The differences in time spent on voluntary work by
women are much smaller: women do 1 to 3 hours voluntary work a week.
Partners of one-earners with older children do most: 3.2 to 3.3 hours a week.
137Research presented in tables 7.1. and 7.2. shows that there is a relationship
between paid and unpaid work. Therefore I have made a correlation analysis
between paid and unpaid work by sex and per household type. It is evident that
this analysis could only be made for those people combining paid and unpaid
work.
Table 7.3. shows that the correlation between paid and unpaid work is highest
with two-earners with young children followed by male one-earners. Among
females single parents score highest whereas correlation is lowest for two-earner
females without children. Among males correlation is exceptionally high with
two-earners with youngest child 0-5 years and exceptionally low with single men.
The intercept is higher for women which means that if women do not do any
paid work they do more unpaid work than men in ditto circumstances. The slope
is strongest with female one-parent families which means that substitution of
paid to unpaid work and vice versa is greatest: 1 hour paid work extra means
0.627 hours unpaid work less. With male two-earners youngest child 0-5 this
substitution is 0.544 hours of unpaid work for every paid hour. For all women
aged 17-64 (including women not participating in the labour market) the
correlation is:
unpaid hours = 46.67 - (0.627 x paid hours) with R2 = 0.326.
This means that if women do not do any paid work, they do nearly 47 hours
unpaid work and every paid hour leads to 0.627 x 60 minuten = 38 minutes less
unpaid work. Nearly 33% of variance in unpaid hours of work is explained by
paid work.
With men aged 17-64 the correlation is following:
unpaid work = 25.60 - (0.244 paid work), with R2 = 0.183.
This means that if men would not do any paid work, they would do 25.6 hours a
week unpaid work. For every hour of paid work they substitute 0.244 x 60
minutes = 15 minutes unpaid work. Only 18 % of variance in unpaid work is
explained by paid work.
138Table 7.3. i




- two-earners without children
- two-earners youngest child 0-5
- two-earners youngest child 6-12
- two-earners youngest child >13
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Tables 7.1. and 7.2. support the criticism of Plantenga and Sloep. Labour market
supply is closely connected with the organization of unpaid work. Economists
explain women's labour market participation by looking at financial incentives
such as the development of female wages, taxation and social security, husband's
income and changes in demographic and socio-economic variables e.g. female
education, number and age of the children (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986).
Social and cultural habits and norms also play a role. Pott-Buter (1993) thinks
that the participation rate of Dutch women was low until the eighties because
Dutch women have a strong preference to care for their children themselves.
139Fewer children, better household technology and rising female wages caused a
change in this attitude. Vendrik (1993) explains women's growing labour market
participation by a shift in individual and collective habits and social norms from
housewife to emancipated woman with a paid job (Vendrik 1993). How habits
and norms can be empirically underpinned and implemented in macroeconomic
models is an unanswered question.
7.6. The implementation of unpaid work in macro models
The influence of unpaid work on the economy is not restricted to the household
sector or labour supply. Size and composition of production, consumption,
savings and investment change, welfare and growth rates differ if unpaid work is
taken into account, fluctuations of the business cycles are better measured,
definitions of employment and unemployment change. Therefore unpaid work
should be implemented in the whole macroeconomic model. The arguments in
favour of implementation of unpaid work in the National Accounts mentioned
in chapter 5 are also valid for the implementation of unpaid work in
macroeconomic models. Figure 7.3. illustrates how our view on the economy is












MOIn figure 7.3. the relations between Households, Firms, Government and the
Social Security sector as they exist in most macroeconomic models are given by
small arrows. No distinction is made between flows of goods and flows of money.
The labour market is situated between Households (supply) and Firms (demand).
The market of consumption goods is situated between Firms (supply) and
Households (demand). For the sake of simplicity Financial Institutions and the
Rest of the World are left out, Government as employer and Government as
supplier of collective consumption goods is thought to be part of Firms. Savings
are left out because financial institutions are left out. Firms produce capital goods
and (partly) finance them themselves. Government influences the labour market
by the construction and level of Income tax and Corporation Tax, by social
provisions e.g. Exployment Exchange, Professional Training, Social Assistance
Benefits, Child care. Size and composition of the market of consumer goods is
influenced by tax policies and social security premiums and benefits. Supply and
demand of investment goods between firms is influenced by Corporation tax,
Income tax and VAT. GNP consists of Consumption goods) and Gross
I(nvestments).
The broad, large arrows are added to show the relationships in a macroeconomic
model in which unpaid work is taken into account: household production
increases GNP and Consumption, Firms deliver not only Consumption Goods
but also Investment Goods to Households. Tax policies, social provisions and
social security policies influence size and composition of household production
as well as other Government programmes for Health Care, Home Help, Homes
for the elderly, etc.
As I am neither an econometrist nor trained in constructing models I hope that
better trained people than I will be able to use the results of the chapters 5-7 to
build a macro model in which unpaid work will be integrated. My suggestions are
following:
1. Household production and voluntary work should be regarded as part of
GNP for purposes of comparing international and intertemporal growth rates
and comparing welfare. I calculated the value of unpaid work at minimum
wages as 51 to 68% of GNP in the period 1975-1990.
2. If a model is used in which a utility function is maximized, household
production and voluntary work should be regarded as a special part of
Consumption and not as Leisure. For women, especially if there are young
children, time not spent on the labour market does not show her preference
for leisure, but the necessity to produce care for her family, to increase income
in kind for the household. The same argument applies for all types of
households: although there are individual differences in the degree of dirt
people tolerate, most people care for a clean house and clean clothes. People
have to do a minimum of unpaid work. The "preference" for unpaid work
could be introduced in the utility function. In MIMIC this would be:
141U=(Cy + Ch + bd ) (1)
where Cy is consumption bought on the market and
Ch is consumption produced at home.
3. If a time constraint is built into the model the time spent on household
production and voluntary work should be given a place. In that way it is
easier to assess how many people and how many hours are available for
participation in the labour market or for voluntary work if the Government
wants to economize on expenses for care by substituting paid care for unpaid
care.
h = lb + hb +vb + lp + hp + Vp + d (3)
lb denotes the number of hours the breadwinner spends on the labour
market, hb denotes the number of hours he spends on household production,
vb denotes the time he spends on voluntary work (for voluntary work see
table 7.2.) The same indications with subscript p give this information for the
partner.
Figure 2 in chapter 2 illustrated the incorporation of unpaid production in the
utility function and in the budget constraint in a micro model of household
production based on Gronau.
4. If the model has a labour supply equation it should be extended with a supply
function of unpaid work. A regression analysis of household production for
the whole population of time use surveys 1985 and 1990 is shown in table 7.4.:
ul = supply of hours of unpaid work;
ch = children present;
lb = hours of paid labour of the (main) breadwinner;
lp = hours of paid work of the partner;
ed = level of education;
s =sex
Table 7.4.
Regression of unpaid household production for the whole population




















142The level of education does not have any influence, being a female is most
important for the supply of hours of unpaid work.
Correlation becomes stronger (R^ is 0.62) if the analysis is restricted to
partners with and without children as is shown in table 7.5.
Table 7.5.
Regression of unpaid household production for partners with and without children





















The presence of children and the sex of the respondents are the strongest
factors which influence the supply of hours of household production. The
influence of hours of paid work of the partner has a positive, although small,
effect, the level of education is now significant and has a negative effect, that
means the higher the level of education the lower the hours of household
production.
If the analysis is restricted to partners with children, the age of the youngest
child has a significant positive effect on hours of household production. For
single people the analysis shows that being female, having a low level of
education and a low level of hours of paid work, have a significant positive
effect on unpaid household production. The sex of the single parent together
with the age of the youngest child have a significant influence on the total
hours of household production. For older children living with their parents
the only significant effect is being female. For single people of 65 and over
being female, having a low level of education and no or few hours of paid
work, have a significant positive effect on household production. Being the
wife of partners of 65 and over also has a significant influence on hours of
household production.
5. The demand function of labour should be extended to unpaid work,
distinguishing unpaid work in the own family and voluntary work. The
demand for voluntary help is important for government policies with respect
to aged, disabled and sick people. If, for any reason, people can no longer do
unpaid work because they are ill, too old or handicapped, they have to buy
household help or pay for a hotel, a hospital, or a home for elderly or disabled
143people. Often the community assists by providing money to buy the necessary
care or by furnishing care in kind. In most industrialized countries
government expenses increase because more care is required for the ageing
population. Governments assume that it is possible to economize on paid
care in health programmes, because it can be substituted by unpaid care.
People are discharged after hospitalization, assuming that unpaid care will be
available at home, even if the patient is a single person. The capacity of
homes for elderly or handicapped is reduced at the same time as the capacity
of subsidized home help, assuming that a partner or daughter will take care of
these people. However, nobody knows how much unpaid care is actually
available. The connection or coherence between paid and unpaid care is not
known. The same applies to the influence which the substitution of paid care
by unpaid care has on labour market behaviour, on youth criminality, on the
health of the entire population. Time use surveys could be the basis of the
estimation of these equations.
7.7 Summary and conclusion
Economists have paid more attention to unpaid work in microeconomic models
than in macroeconomic models. First steps in modelling unpaid work in
macroeconomic models are set in a theoretical growth model with the
feminization of the labour market and the intensity of household labour as extra
arguments (Erturk and Cagatay), in a model which links the formal and informal
economy (Graafland) and in criticism by Plantenga and Sloep on the way labour
supply is modelled in MIMIC, a micro-macro model of the Netherlands Central
Planning Bureau.
Research by Knulst, Driehuis, Van der Lippe and Niphuis-Nell and myself
shows that the organization of paid and unpaid work is closely connected. In
section 7.6. it is suggested that unpaid work should be implemented not only in
the modelling of labour supply, but also in the modelling of production,
consumption, utility etc. The same arguments which plead for implementation
of unpaid work in National Accounts are valid for its implementation in
macroeconomic models.
144PARTD
UNPAID WORK AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE8. ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: DEFINITION AND
MEASUREMENT
"While doors to education and health opportunities have opened rapidly for women, the
doors to economic and political opportunities are barely ajar"
(UN Human Development Report 1995).
8.1 Introduction
As a child grows up it has an increasing tendency to do things by himself. The
older the child gets, the more it will act without the help of older people. The
child will sit, walk, eat and wash itself. School and professional education
complete this process of becoming independent. The essence of independence is
that one is not dependent on other people for daily care and maintenance. This
applies especially to married or cohabitating women in relation to their male
partners, as is argued in section 2.
Economic independence is a prerequisite of equal rights although it is not
sufficient in itself to gain an equal position for adults in fields e.g. political power,
living-space, leisure, education, experience on the labour market, status, quality
of work etc. What minimum income and time for care should one have to be
economically independent? Who is to decide how much money and time are
needed for a decent living? This minimum will differ depending the
circumstances, e.g. the climate, the state of the household inventory, people's
skills in household and do-it-yourself activities. In section 2 economic
independence is defined as well as micro and macro instruments to measure
economic independence. Section 3 explains why economic independence is more
a woman's than a man's problem. In section 4 microeconomic independence of
women in the Netherlands is measured, whereas in section 5 economic
independence of Dutch women on a macro level is pictured. In section 6 it is
argued that women's dependence has been a problem since the Middle Ages,
whereas section 7 mentions resolutions of international conferences and
programmes of international organizations to stimulate women's economic
independence. Taking into account women's unpaid work into National
Accounts will not solve this problem, as is argued in section 8. Section 9 contains
a summary and conclusion.
8.2 Definition of economic independence
The Dutch Equal Rights Policy Plan, which was accepted by Dutch Parliament in
1985, defines economic independence as "the situation in which all adults
whatever their sex, civil status or lifestyle can build up an independent existence.
In this context it means they can support themselves and take care of their daily
needs. In principle this will be achieved through a growing participation in paid
work and, if they are incapable to do so, through acquiring (individual)
147entitlement to benefits. The objective assumes a general participation, as general
as possible, in paid work but also assumes an equally general participation in
different types of unpaid work" (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment,
1985). In short, there are two important elements in this definition. The first one
is financial independence through paid work. The second one is care
independence through unpaid work, which means doing domestic chores for
one's own benefit and possibly for dependent children and sick persons.
In the introduction to this chapter it has already been mentioned that the
definition of economic independence will differ depending the circumstances. A
minimum of economic independence will be reached depending on money
income, size of the family, climate, state of the household inventory, people's
skills in the household and do-it-yourself activities etc. I define maximum or
complete economic independence as a situation in which men's and women's
working conditions are equal, and men's income distribution is the reflection of
women's income distribution. Complete economic independence means that
paid and unpaid work is divided equally between men and women, that women
as a group not only get the same amount of paid and unpaid work, but also have
the same distribution of quality of work as men. Between the minimum and the
maximum a scale of varying degrees of economic independence can be
distinguished. On the one hand minimum economic independence exists if
individuals can support themselves and look after themselves. On the other
hand maximum economic independence is the situation in which paid and
unpaid work have equally been divided between men and women, a situation in
which about half of the economically active population would be female and
women would receive half of the country's labour income.
8.3. Economic independence and sex
The traditional division of labour between the sexes - the husband is the
breadwinner and the wife is the housewife - means that paid labour is men's
domain and unpaid labour is women's terrain. Pujol (1992) analysed that in
neo-classical thinking unstated assumptions about all women are that they are:
- married, or if they are not, they will be;
- economically dependent to a male relative;
housewives;
- unproductive in the industrial workforce;
- irrational, hence unfit to make the right economic decisions.
Pujol quotes neo-classical economists e.g. Jevons, who asserts that "there are no
duties which are more important in every respect than those which a mother is
bound by with regard to her own children". For Pigou the main determinant of
women's labour supply is their husbands' income, although in Pigou's time a
substantial proportion of women were and remained unmarried, and among
those who were married, full economic support by husbands was often far from
reality. Pigou advocated the prohibition of employment for mothers and
148proposed some form of state-funded "relief to those families whom the
prohibition renders necessitous" (Pujol 1992, p.8 and 13). Marshall maintained
that women's employment "tempts them to neglect their duty of building a true
home, and investing their efforts in the personal capital of their children's
character and abilities" (Pujol 1992 p. 10). f
In his famous 1962 article about the labour force participation of married women,
Mincer asks why these married women are in the labour force, rather than asking
why women's working conditions differs from men's (Mincer 1962). This
ideology about women as housewives and mothers has not disappeared and still
pervades economic thinking. This partly explains why economic independency is
more a women's than a men's problem. Applying the definition of economic
independence to financial as well as care independence, on average neither men
nor women are economically independent. However, women's life income is
lower than men's because:
- on average women work less years on the labour market than men
- if they work on the labour market, they work less hours than men
- averagely their hourly wage is lower than men's.
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Figure 8.1. (Joshi 1987 p.177)
149The upper line represents the average annual income of men, the middle line
the average annual income of unmarried women, the lower line the average
annual income of mothers with children. Mothers do not work between the age
of 25 to 32 and they stop at the age of 50. Joshi estimates that life income of
married English women born in 1946 was 46% lower than life income of
unmarried women, because averagely mothers leave the labour market for eight
years and when they return after that period, they work part-time for 12 years.
Joshi attributes 40% of the loss of life income to the years the mothers had left the
labour market, 36% to the years they worked part-time and 25% to the lower
hourly wage (Joshi 1987 p.122-131).
Mincer and Polachek (1974) found that white American women lost 1.5% of their
wage during the rest of their life for every year that they stayed out of the labour
market. Dutch research of Groot, Schippers and Siegers (1988) indicates a
permanent wage loss of 2% for every year outside the labour market. The loss is
only 0.5% if women continue to participate in the labour market part-time
instead of leaving the labour market.
Another reason why economic independence is more a women's than a men's
problem is that a money income enables people to buy household services and
household help, as has already been mentioned. In this way men are often able to
buy ZiutwWivrAi iHift'p, &&.\» M'cvroev; nvin^ pasiiJy find any paid work if they miss the
required labour market experience or recent professional qualifications.
Is economic independence of partners conflicting with partnership*'?)? in
economic literature one can find several theories about decision making in
marriages. Becker developed a model in which the male specializes in paid and
the female in unpaid labour if household production functions have constant or
increasing returns to scale. Becker assumes that partners have different
comparative advantages. As women have a biological commitment to the
production and feeding of children and are, in his eyes, biologically committed to
the care of children in other more subtle ways, women will specialize in unpaid
labour. Women are not in the labour force when they have young children
because their time is worth more at home. This is especially the case in countries
where women receive less schooling than men (Becker 1981 chapter 2). Becker
believes that the major cause of changes in the family in the USA, like the
decline of the legitimate birth rate, like the increase in divorce rate and like the
growing labour force participation of mother with young children, is the growth
in earning power of women (Becker 1981 chapter 11). In the utility function of the
head of the family figures his own consumption and that of his "beneficiaries".
'" Partnership dot's not necessarily mean team productions as defined by Alchion and Demsetz
(1972). Team production is production in which 1. several types of resources are used and 2. the
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperation resource. Although a certain form of
cooperation between husband and wife will exist, this need not take the form of team productions
with an inseparable production function. Assume Z = child care which is given by both husband (H)
and wife (W). If child care takes the form of team production, the production function would be:
Z «= Th.Tw Activities such as child care are nearly always done by either husband or wife, so the
production function would look like: Z = Zh + Zw, as a result of Z = aHh + bHw
ISOAltruism is the reason the head transfers general purchasing power to all
members of his family. "If he does not care much, they don't get very much" is
Nelson's criticism (Nelson 1995 p.62).
In the Barten model of demographic effects a dependent wife and children have
price-like effects on the head's utility function, because the decision maker has to
buy more than is necessary for his own needs. The household composition
dictates how much of each purchase the head has to buy:
U = U (Zi/mi, Z2/m2, Zj/mj) where the Zj (j=l. . . . J) are household purchases
of J goods and the m, are functions of the household composition. Having
children makes ice cream, milk and sot drinks relatively more expensive and
makes whiskey or cigarettes relatively cheaper. The internal workings of the
family are a black box (Nelson 1995 p.63). Samuelson suggested to look at family
decisions as the result of maximizing a "social welfare function" defined over the
vector of member utility functions.
More recently bargaining models with divorce threat points have been developed
for example by Notburga Ott (1995). In her dynamic model partners bargain about
the division of unpaid work in period one because they realize that specialization
in unpaid work will influence the future earning capacity of the female
irreversibly in a following period. The bargaining effect may result in time
vAlUvuviinr -tha* JCUW .WJ\» .mnfcvmixp .HruwnhjiU' fmnduntinr. «ClV .Ahini-j- ithrv* ithr
wish for a child may create a prisoner's dilemma if this wish can only be realized
by a disruption in the working life of the mother and recommends policies like
child care and shorter working hours for both parents (Ott 1995).
Nelson (1995) suggests a concept in which each family member is considered to be
embedded in relationship both as an individual and as a person. Such a concept
involves economic responsibility as well as economic independence.
Responsibility in questions of financial provisioning, child care and child
support, in the allocation of household tasks, in the dividing up of decision
making and in the maintenance of inter-family connections. Dependence takes
financial forms, physical forms (for example a dependence on someone else to do
one's laundry or to feed one as a child), and developmental forms (the need of an
infant for attention and bonding in order to thrive). Responsibility means that
actions may be taken quite apart form personal preference. Nelson refers to
Amartya Sen (1982) who has discussed the same notion of "persons-in-relations"
and the contrast between "altruism" and "responsibility". Her advice is to look at
the economy of marriage as involving three dimensions: living standards, agency
and affiliation. Living standards refers to the welfare one gets from goods and the
use of one's time. Agency is the ability of each person to recognize and promote
his or her interests. Affiliation represents the need of human beings to belong
and to be loved. She thinks it plausible to posit that marriages in which the
spouses each explore a wider range of "doing and being" have welfare-enhancing
properties that outweigh any losses from lessened specialization (Nelson 1995
p.73).
151My conclusion is that economic independence of both spouses need not conflict
with partnership.
84 Microeconomic measurement of economic independence
All inhabitants of the Netherlands are entitled to a minimum subsistence benefit
thanks to the National Assistance Act (Algemene Bijstandswet-ABW). This
minimum is related to the legal net minimum wages. For someone aged 23 and
over and living alone the law provides for a benefit of 70% of the net minimum
wages. The percentage of 70 has been taken as the minimum money income
below which an individual cannot live independently. A single parent receives a
social benefit of 90%, which has been taken as the minimum money income
below which single parents cannot live independently. However, it is obvious
that the National Assistance Act presupposes that the individual takes care of
his/her own household chores. The benefit is not large enough to buy household
services or hire a household help. People with high incomes can of course buy
household help, so the higher the income, the less the need to include unpaid
time in the definition of economic independence. Time use research showed that
averagely a single male spends at least 19 hours a week and single fathers 21
hours a week doing unpaid work. Single females spend on average 31 hours a
week and single mothers 42 hours a week on unpaid work (see table 4.6.). In this
way an income of 70% of the net minimum wages and 19 hours a week spent on
household work is the minimum beneath which one cannot speak of an
economically independent person. In the same way single parents need a
minimum income of 90% of the net minimum wage plus the statutory
childrens' benefit, and at least 21 hours a week of unpaid time for housework and
child care. Table 8.1. shows the 1985 and 1990 percentages of men and wommen i
earning a labour income higher than the legal minimum benefit for a single
person.
In 1989 30% of all women aged 18-64 and 71% of men (column 2 and 4) reached a
minimum of financial independence by working on the labour market. If the
group was restricted to individuals with a labour income 70% of all women and
97% of all men had a minimum financial independence in 1989 (column 6 and
8). Financial independence for 18-19 year old women and men is nearly the
same, but the percentage of older women having a labour income equal or higher
than the minimum social benefit is much lower than that of men, because many
women have part-time jobs. So for women even a job does not mean financial
independence.
152Table 8.1.


















































































































Source: SCP 1993 p. 168
Table 8.2. shows that the percentage of Dutch men without any income decreased
by 75% and the percentage of women by 35% during the period 1977-1989. The
percentage of men without a labour income decreased by only 7.5%, whereas the
percentage of women decreased by 20%.
The preliminary conclusion from this table is that both men and women in the
Netherlands make progress in economic independence.
Table 8.2.






































Source: SCP 1993 pp.140,168
153Research by Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) shows the same trend for married
women in the United States: the percentage of white wives without income
decreased from 83.7% in 1940 to 30.6% in 1980.
Having an income of a certain level is a minimum condition for financial
independence. Sorensen and McLanahan (1987) measure the rate of economic
independence by looking at the wife's share in the couple's income. They leave
out the value of unpaid work. In my eyes this is a practical solution to measure
microeconomic independence because on average women's money income is
much lower than men's and because one can buy household services if one's
money income is high enough (see also section 8.3.). They did not pay attention
to care independence.
Table 8.3. shows that the percentage of Dutch wives who contributed 5% or less to
the couple's income decreased from 73% in 1977 to 49% in 1989, whereas the
percentage of wives who contributed more than 45% to the couple's income
increased from 8% in 1977 to 15% in 1989.
Table 8.3.
Wife'* share in couple'* income (all ages)
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Source: SCP 1993 p.162
The same trend has been shown for the United States: Sorensen and McLanahan
(1987) report that the percentage of white wives in the United States, who
contributed 50% or more to the couple's income increased from 9.2% in 1940 to
32.1% in 1980 (Sorensen and McLanahan 1987 p.667).
8.5 Macroeconomic measurement of economic independence
Women's labour market participation rate is often taken as a macroeconomic
measure of the development of women's economic independence. However, the
participation rate does not tell much about the income people earn. Therefore the
goal of this section is to determine women's share in disposable income.
Labour force participation has three dimensions: the first dimension is whether a
person participates or not, the second one is the number of hours the person
154participates and the third one is a measure of the quality of the work. The third
step is not yet dealt with in this chapter. If men and women would have equal
opportunities on the labour market, women's share in the economically active
population would be about 50%. Actually, women's share in the economically
active population in the age group 18-64 years has grown from 28% in 1975 to
39% in 1990, as shown in table 8.4
Women's share in disposable income is lower than the proportion of women in
the economically active population. Disposable income is defined as primary
income + (social benefits - social charges - tax).
Table 8.4.




























Sources: Statistics Netherlands (SN) (different years): Statistische Zakboeken,
Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistieken, Arbeidskrachtentellingen & Inkomensstatistieken
Women's share in total labour income is lower than the proportion of women in
the economically active population. Why is this so? The first reason is that
registered unemployed people are counted as part of the economically active
population. Women's standardized rates of registered unemployment are higher
than men's in EC countries, with the exception of Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom (OECD 1988 p.142). So proportionally more unemployed women than
men are counted in the active population. If the criteria for unemployment are
seen less strictly, the gap between women's and men's unemployment becomes
even bigger as is shown in chapter 5.5.4.
The second reason why women's share in total labour income is smaller than the
proportion of women in the economically active population is that more women
than men work part-time. In the OECD Employment Outlook 1988 the
proportion of female part-time employment in EC countries is three to fourteen
times higher than male part-time employment. In the Netherlands in 1992 65%
of all women worked part-time, compared to 8% of all men (Ministry of Social
Affairs 1994).
155The third reason why women's share in total labour income is smaller than the
proportion of women in the economically active population is that the average
wage rate for women is lower than the average wage rate for men. This is
illustrated in table 8.5.
Table 8.5.





























Source: SN - halfyearly statistics of earned wages
Women earn less than men in all countries worldwide. However, for Australia
and most European countries as well as for the United States statistics of hourly
earnings of manual workers in the manufacturing industry reveal a widespread
increase in relative female earnings since the nineteen sixties (OECD 1988 p.170;
Blau and Ferber 1986 p.181; Willborn 1991 p.2). Explanations for this wage gap and
its decrease differ from country to country. Part of the wage gap can be explained
by differences in human capital (education, experience, on-the-job training),
occupational and functional sex segregation, but also discrimination of women
plays a role (Bielby and Baron 1984; Blau and Ferber 1986; Schippers 1987; Michael
et al. 1989; Willborn 1991). In literature several policies have been followed or
suggested to eliminate the wage gap including equal employment opportunities,
affirmative action and comparable worth. However, as the wage gap is a complex
problem, it is not clear which policy is best (Michael et al. 1989). This subject will
be dealt with again in chapter 9.
In the 1995 United Nations Human Development Report an index to measure
gender equality was introduced: the Gender-related Development Index (GDI).
This index measures the same basic capabilities as the Human Development
Index (HDI) but takes note of inequality in achievement between men and
women. The HDI contains three indicators: life-expectancy, educational
attainment and real Gross Domestic Product. To construct the GDI each of these
three components is expressed in terms of the female value as a percentage of the
male value. Then the HDI is multiplied by this simple average female-male
ratio. GDI has been constructed for 130 countries. The report concluded that:
1. Gender equality does not exist anywhere. Gender equality ranks from 0.919
(Sweden) to 0.169 (Afghanistan). The Netherlands are fourth on the HDI-
ranking, but twentieth on the GDI-ranking, with an index of 0.851. Life
156expectancy of Dutch women, adjusted for biological differences, is good, their
literacy is the same as that of Dutch men, but women's share in earned
income is only 25%U8)
2. Gender equality does not depend on the income level of a society. Countries
showing a marked improvement in their GDI- ranking over their HDI-
ranking have invested in the education and health of their people,
irrespective of gender, whereas their gender equality in income has become
bigger than average.
3. Significant progress has been achieved over the past two decades. The Report
calculated the GDI in 1970 and in 1992 for 79 countries. The average GDI
showed an improvement of 48%. Developing countries showed an
improvement of 62%, industrialized countries a rise of 28%.
8.6 Economic independence as a target of economic policy
Economic independence of women was already a problem in the Middle Ages
(Biicher 1909). Biicher, an economist belonging to the Historical School of
Economic Thought, studied women's position in German society in the Middle
Ages. Because more men than women died because of warfare, dangerous trade
travels, diseases such as the plague, society counted more women than men from
the age of 20 (Biicher p.8). These single women earned their living by means of a
variety of professions: wool and linen weavers, furriers, girdlemakers, shearers,
tanners, goldsmiths etc. In short women were not excluded from any profession
which they could master with their physical abilities (Bucher p.19). Sullerot (1969)
mentions that in France women were not excluded from professions until the
sixteenth century when guilds began to restrict the rights of widows and to
exclude other women, with the result that in the eighteenth century hardly any
women could be found in handicraft (Sullerot 1969 pp.57; 65-70). Other solutions
for single women were to enter a convent or a beguinage (Bucher pp.24-35).
Because more products were made and used at home, in which wives played an
important role, the dependency of wives was not a problem (Rathbone 1924 p.3).
When the guilds disappeared and the industrial revolution began, the wives'
role in production became smaller. The responsibility for the support of the
family was thrown on to men, especially after child labour in mines and industry
had been banned and female labour restricted (Rathbone 1924 p.7).
Economic independence was an important item in the first emancipation wave
in the western world in the beginning of the twentieth century, which dwindled
when women got the vote. After World War II economic independence became
an important issue in the emancipation of women. Since the end of World War
II all Dutch Governments have strived after five objectives of economic policy:
economic growth, a stable balance of payments, stable prices, full employment
and an acceptable income distribution. In 1988 Dutch Government sought advice
" The report mentions that women's share in earned income has been calculated based on data "for
the latest available year" but there is no mention of the year in question. This explains the
differences from the shares mentioned in table 8.4
157of the SER (Sociaal Economische Raad - Social and Economic Council) whether to
add a sixth one to these five objectives of economic policy: economic and care
independence of all adults. The SER regarded this target of women's economic
independence to be of broader purport and of higher hierarchy than the
socio-economic targets (SER 1988).
8.7 Resolutions of women's international conferences
In 1985 the International Women's Conference in Nairobi recommended that:
"The renumerated and, in particular, the unrenumerated contributions of
women to all aspects and sectors of development should be recognized and
appropriate efforts should be made to measure and reflect these contributions in
National Accounts and economic statistics and in the gross national product.
Concrete steps should be taken to quantify the unrenumerated contribution of
women to agriculture, food production, reproduction and household activities"
(Waring 1988 p.307; UN 1986, section 120).
In 1987 28 international women's organizations, e.g. trade unions, human rights,
anti-slavery organizations, urged the United Nations Commission on the Status
of Women to make a priority of the above-mentioned recommendation and to
coordinate the efforts made by several international organisations, including the
1LO, to measure the economic contribution of unpaid work to society. They point
out that investment in training, credit facilities and appropriate technology to
subsistence farmers in Africa (a majority of which are women) is not given
because their contribution is unassessed and unrecorded. They argue that the
invisibility of women's work also has serious implications in the area of social
protection, as the number of one-parent families increases. In most cases
one-parent families are headed by female homemakers who have no earnings
and qualify for social security benefits only as dependent of "protected" paid
workers (United Nations 1987 a).
In a report of the Dutch Government on concrete measures to execute the
recommendations of the international 1985 Nairobi Conference (Netherlands
Parliament, Second Chamber stuk 21 505 nr.2, 1990) no mention has been made of
measures to register the unrenumerated contributions of women to agriculture,
food production, reproduction and household activities in National Accounts,
economic statistics and in the gross national product. Neither have any concrete
steps been mentioned in an Ecosoc-resolution (UN 1990) about the execution of
the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies.
In 1992 a report of a high-level group of experts of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) stated that the social and economic value
of non-market forms of activity should be acknowledged. The OECD argued that
domestic production and voluntary or community work is essential to keep
societies and their supporting economies functioning. Structural trends, such as
the state retrenchment in the provision of some health and welfare services, and
136the growing demand for services to the elderly, are increasing the pressure on
unpaid workers. Because family and community services have mainly been
provided by women, especially home-based women, they have largely remained
invisible and undervalued. Women's increasing labour market participation has
reduced the pool of people able to fulfil these tasks. Without a significant
revaluation of these activities participation in these tasks is unlikely to increase
(OECD1992 p.26).
In 1993 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which included a request
to the European Commission to make comparative studies about the
contribution of household work to Gross National Product and to make
recommendations about the evaluation and recording in GNP of member states.
It was argued that economic evaluation of household work is important:
to discuss the position of unpaid workers in social security;
- to take into account unpaid activities in fiscal policy;
- for financial compensation after divorce;
- to have the possibility to do paid work after a period of caring for children;
- for claims for inheritances;
- for claims for damages
(European Parliament 1992; Eurolink Age July 1993 p.7).
The central message of the 1995 United Nations Human Development Report
was the necessity to engender human development.
8.8 National Accounts and economic independence
The goal of the statements and resolutions mentioned in section 8.7 is
acknowledgement of unpaid work and its position in social security, fiscal policy
and some legal matters.
Waring (1988) argues that if unpaid work would be registered in National
Accounts "every decision made by government would be influenced in a
profound way". She mentions that per capita Gross Domestic Product would
change markedly. Furthermore she mentions that "the needs for credit facilities,
fertilizers, seeds would be clear for subsistence agricultural producers. The needs
for training and retraining the unpaid work force would receive attention as a
policy priority. Unpaid workers could make a realistic claim on the public purse
as opposed to being condemned to "welfare" (Waring 1988 p.285).
Economic or financial independence is not the issue of the statements and
resolutions of women's organizations and international conferences mentioned
in section 8.7. Waring (1988) explicitly mentions in her book that "payment or
replacement is not the point of issue" (Waring 1988 p.277). Acknowledgement of
unpaid work in social security, for example in old age benefits, benefits for
one-parent families, maternity leave, child and family benefits, provisions in
case of illness and disablement (European Parliament 1992; OECD 1992), may
159improve the financial situation of men and women doing unpaid work if faced
with calamities. More attention for the needs of training and retraining the
unpaid work force may improve their chances on the labour market, but these
measures will not lead to equality or economic independence of paid and unpaid
workers. Acknowledgement of unpaid work in the National Accounts could
even be role affirming because one can use this as an argument to keep women
in their place at home. However, taking into account the value of unpaid work in
National Accounts does not lead to (more) economic independence. The unpaid
worker remains financially dependent on paid workers or the State.
Several attempts have been made to influence the financial position of unpaid
workers directly. These attempts will be dealt with in sections 9.2. and 9.3.
8.9. Summary and conclusion
Economic independence is defined as the situation in which all adults can build
up an independent existence. It consists of financial independence plus care
independence. Financial independance is acquired by doing paid work and if
persons are incapable to do unpaid work by individual entitlement to benefits.
Care independence is acquired by doing unpaid work for one's own benefit and
for dependent children and sick people. Economic independence can vary from a
minimum to a maximum. For the Netherlands a minimum is defined as having
an income in conformity with the National Assistance Act (Algemene
Bijstandswet-ABW) (70% of legal minimum wages) and being able to do
household chores for one's own benefit and dependents. In 1989 3% of Dutch
men and 40% of Dutch women aged 18-64 with a labour income earned less than
this minimum.
A maximum is defined as a situation in which men's and women's working
conditions are equal, and men's income distribution is the reflection of women's
income distribution. In 1989 2% of Dutch men and 39% of Dutch women had no
income at all. In 1990 women's share in disposable income was 30.2%.
The 1995 United Nations Human Development Report concludes that gender
equality does not exist anywhere. The Report uses a Gender-related Development
Index which measures gender equality in life-expectancy, educational attainment
and income. As early as the Middle Ages economic dependence of women was
pointed out as a social problem. In Resolutions of International Women's
Conferences, statements and publications of the OECD, the EC and other
publications the absence in National Accounts of women's contributions to the
economy by doing unpaid work, is mentioned.
The conclusion of this chapter is that although progress has been made, economic
independence for women throughout the world is still far away because paid and
unpaid work are asymmetrically distributed over men and women. In chapter 9
ways and means to improve women's economic independence will be analysed.
MO9. ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND UNPAID WORK
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from herer
That depends a good deal on where you want to get to" said the Cat.
(Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll 1865)
9.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters it has become clear that unpaid work contributes much
to general and individual welfare. Unpaid work represents the "care" component
of economic independence, the other component of economic independence is
"financial" independence. In chapter 8.3 the asymmetric contribution of unpaid
and paid work to economic independence has been analysed. On the one hand
renumeration of paid work makes it possible to buy household services; paid
work is hardly a hindrance to do unpaid work. On the other hand the
renumeration of unpaid work is in kind (food, housing, clothes), it does not
enable people to buy whatever they wish; doing unpaid work is an obstacle for
paid work, because time spent on unpaid work does not give the necessary labour
market experience and on-the-job training.
In this chapter several solutions will be reviewed for the dilemma of on the one
hand the valuable contribution of unpaid work to general and individual welfare
and on the other hand the economic dependence which unpaid work entails. The
organization of paid work and welfare is an important item for the solution of
this dilemma. Therefore in section 2 a typology of welfare states and their
solutions for a combination of paid and unpaid work is given as well as three
types of labour market participation of women. In section 3 "wages for
housework" and in section 4 a negative income tax or a basic benefit are suggested
as a solution for women's economic independence. If these suggestions are not a
proper answer to this problem, which way could we go then, is the question dealt
with in section 5. In section 6 the development of equal rights policies and
attitudes in the Netherlands from 1975 on are described. Finally in section 7 three
sets of policies are described to ensure an equal division of paid and unpaid work
over men and women. Summary and conclusion are given in section 8.
9.2 Welfare-systems in Europe
Esping-Andersen distinguishes three systems of the welfare state: the liberal, the
conservative corporatistic and the social-democratic welfare state (Esping-
Andersen 1992). Although the division of unpaid work over men and women is
not explicitly mentioned, the characteristics of the three systems are of interest for
this subject also because the labour market participation of women, the way the
tax system, social security, pensions, and social provisions are organized differ
greatly. Pure examples of the three systems do not exist in reality, welfare-state
variations are not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime-types.
1611. In one cluster we find the liberal welfare state, in which means-tested
assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans
predominate. Entitlement to benefits is often associated with stigma. The
role of the government is minimized. Governmental help is restricted to
cases where the market or the family fall short, to people who cannot help
themselves, mainly the poor, widows or one-parent families. It is thought
that the market mechanism is the best mechanism to ensure a maximum
welfare. Labour market participation of men and women is a matter of
course, but practically no allowance is made for care for children and elderly
people. Social security benefits are modest and means-tested. The United
States of America, Canada and Australia are archetypal examples of this
model.
2. In the conservative corporatistic welfare state family and church are very
important. Private insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a
marginal role. Social insurance typically excludes nonworking wives and
family benefits encourage motherhood. Day care and similar family services
are underdeveloped. Labour market participation of women is low. Austria,
France, Germany and Italy are clear examples.
3. The most salient characteristic of the third cluster, the social-democratic
welfare state, is its fusion of welfare and work. Not equality of minimal
needs is pursued, but equality of the highest standards. The public sector is
large. Social security, provisions for children and elderly people are legally
arranged. Social benefits are universal and as a rule independent of other
income. Child care is arranged for by the Government, is of good quality,
available for all children and subsidized by the government. Paid parental
leave is available for parents with young children. Tax and social security
have been individualized. Labour market participation of women is high.
On the one side the right to work has equal status to the right of income
protection. On the other side the enormous costs of maintaining a welfare
system based on solidarity and universality means that it must minimize
social problems and maximize revenue income. The Nordic countries are
examples of this type of welfare state.
Financing a welfare system with high social security benefits and good social
provisions depends on the percentage of people participating in the labour
market. Several European countries try to reform their social security and social
provisions in the way of the liberal welfare state, because the costs of social
security are very high.
What type of welfare state is best for women's economic position? To find an
answer we will look at their labour market position and the GDI-ranking (see
section 8.5) in the 1995 United Nations Development Report.
Labour market participation of women is a reflection of the organization and
division of unpaid work. Eurostat (as shown in figure 9.1.) distinguishes three
models of labour market participation of women in different stages of life which
partly correspond with the above given classification of welfare states.
















Source: Ministry of Social Affairs 1995 p.44
In so-called "plateau countries" women participate in the labour market in all
stages of life in the same way as men do. This is made possible because much
child care and provisions for elderly people are available. In figure 9.1. France and
Denmark are plateau-countries. These are also social-democratic countries with
a large public sector.
163In "M-countries" women disappear from the labour market to care for young
children or they work part-time. They re-enter the labour market when their
children get older because provisions for elderly people are taken care of by the
government, so they do not have to take care of their parents. In figure 9.1. the
Netherlands, West Germany and the United Kingdom are examples of this type
of country although they do not belong to the same type of welfare state.
In "peak-countries" mothers leave the labour market when their children are
born and they do not return to the labour market when their children get older,
because parents have to be cared for. Government leaves all care arrangements
for children and elderly people to the private sector. It goes without saying that
married women look after their children and their parents. In countries with a
sharp peak in the labour market participation, mothers stay on the labour market
as long as grandmothers are fit enough to look after their grandchildren.
Examples are Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg. In countries where the peak in the
labour market participation is weaker, some child care is available. Portugal, Italy,
Belgium and Greece are examples of this type of arrangements (Ministry of Social
Affairs 1995 p.44; EC nr. 36 1991).
In the GDI-ranking of the 1995 United Nations Development Report Sweden,
Finland, Norway, Denmark and the USA are among the first ten countries. The
United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands are among the second ten
countries, whereas Greece, Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg are at the tail end of
the countries ranking from 21 to 35.
It turns out that the Nordic countries are first regarding the economic position of
women: the female labour market participation is plateau-shaped, their GDI-
ranking is among the first ten. So one can conclude that a social-democratic
structure of welfare seems to have a positive influence on women's position.
In the next sections policies to improve women's economic position will be
reviewed.
9.3 Wages for the housewife
Around the turn of the twentieth century the question of a wage sufficient to be
able to support a family, or family endowments, was discussed in industrialized
countries. In France in 1890 family allowances were started by the Railway
Companies, followed by the Mining Companies (Rathbone 1924 p.193). In
Germany in the first decades of the twentieth century Zeiss, Krupp and other
large firms paid allowances to families in addition to wages. In Belgium family
allowances were introduced in the Charlero region in 1915 and in the Liege
region of in 1922.
According to Rathbone (1924) about the same development could be found in the
Netherlands, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Spain,
164Australia and New Zealand. In the Netherlands feminist organizations opposed
the system of family allowances because they thought that "equal pay for equal
work" should be the rule. Their endeavours led to a policy of a uniform living
wage, sufficient to support a family, and comparatively luxurious for the childless
workers (Rathbone 1924 pp.227-229).
In 1910 a resolution was adopted by the international Women's Conference in
Copenhagen for an insurance to give mothers a benefit in case of pregnancy and
confinement in order to fulfil her duties as a mother. (Wibaut 1976, p.78). In
England in the nineteen twenties a discussion was started about a wage for
mothers payable by the State. The English labour economist, Beatrice Webb, was
of the opinion that every person should be entitled to a minimum income. A
State Child Fund should pay for the costs of living of children (Rathbone 1924
p.165).
Rathbone (1924) pleaded for a family endowment in order to abolish child labour
and labour of mothers. She points out that "there is no money renumeration for
the mother's task, no guarantee of her maintenance while she performs it, no
consequential relationship recognized by society between the quantity and quality
of her product and the quality of the tools and materials which she has at her
disposal" (Rathbone 1924 p.65). She concludes that "the soundest form of direct
provision for mothers would not be a flat-rate allowance, but a sum on account
of each child" (Rathbone 1924 p.297).
In Sweden ideas about labour market participation of women got priority over
ideas of wages for the housewive. In 1934 Gunnar and Alva Myrdal published a
book "Crisis in the population question", in which they pleaded the right for
working women to have children. In 1939 a law was introduced which forbade
the dismissal of women because of marriage, pregnancy or confinement
(Gustafsson 1984 p.136). Notwithstanding this early beginning of a family policy
which favoured working women, a fierce debate was held in Sweden in the
nineteen seventies about the role and status of housewives. Feminist Eva Moberg
did not favour the idea to augment the status of a housewife by giving her a wage
or benefit. In her view a wage or benefit would consolidate the role of the
housewife. In her ideas the housewife-system should be abolished by creating
creches, professional household services, separate taxation for husband and wife,
more part-time jobs also for men etc. Men should be obliged to do their own
household work and parents should be entitled to a temporary benefit for the care
of their children (Moberg 1968).
In the nineteen seventies women in Italy and England asked "wages for the
housewife". In Italy Mariarosa della Costa (1972) influenced women's
organizations and pointed out that women are the heart of societal production
because they produce the real manpower. "Women are the slaves of the wage
slave and her slavery assures the slavery of her husband". For that matter Della
Costa herself thought that housewifery should vanish.
165In England women's organizations and unions fought British Government who
wanted to shift payment of "family allowances" from the wife to the husband.
This intention gave rise to a debate about wages for household work. This
discussion about wages for housework spread to other countries.
In the Netherlands publications by Galinka Ehrenfest (Ehrenfest 1972; 1979) on a
wage for the mother and by myself on payment for household work
(Bruyn-Hundt 1973) were the starting point of much discussion. In Ehrenfest's
ideas care of children was the main reason to give mothers a wage. A child is
entitled to good care. The wages should encompass the costs of consumption of
the child plus a wage for the caretaker. The sum should be high enough to
guarantee the economic independence of the caretaker. In order to prevent that
too many children would be born, Ehrenfest wanted to restrict this compensation
for costs of consumption to two children. The wages should be given to the
mother for a period of 10 to 15 years after the birth of the child. The wages should
decrease the older the child gets, because the mother could gradually return to the
labour market. Compensation of household work for adults should be arranged
between the adults and should not be part of the wages for the mother. Ehrenfest
wanted to finance the wages for mothers via social security for which all
inhabitants had to pay a premium (Ehrenfest 1972; 1979).
At that time I was of the opinion that women and men should be rewarded for
their unpaid work, care of children included. Unpaid work guarantees that a new
generation grows up and that children and adults are cared for. Because women
do more unpaid work than men, in practice women would benefit more from
wages for unpaid work than men. The wages would depend on the magnitude of
the caretaking task, which could for example be measured by taking the number
and ages of the persons being cared for. This implied that the wages would
decrease as children grew up. I wanted to finance the wages for unpaid work via a
small increase in indirect taxes. In the beginning tax proceeds would not be
sufficient, but thanks to a growing national income all unpaid hours of labour
could be rewarded at the level of legal minimum wages after a period of about 30
years. Local government could be the employer of the unpaid worker
(Bruyn-Hundt 1973). At a later stage I abolished this idea of wages for unpaid
work.
The Advisory Council on Government Policy - WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad
voor het Regeringsbeleid), an important advisory body for the Dutch
Government, published a paper and made calculations about a wage for mothers
(WRR 1981, section 6.4). The WRR proposed to give mothers a full benefit during
five years after the birth of a child, whereas in the subsequent 10 years the benefit
would decrease little by littly to zero. Four variants were assumed: the benefit
could either be of the same level as benefits provided by the National Assistance
Act (Algemene Bijstandswet - ABW) or of the level of the legal minimum wages
for adults. These two variants were combined with two possible changes in
labour market supply of mothers. In both variants mothers with a full benefit
were assumed not to participate at all, whereas for mothers with a decreasing
166benefit two different participation grades were assumed. The result could be a
reduction of 13,000 labour years or an increase of 4,000 labour years. The WRR
estimated the costs at 6.3 to 8.7% of Gross National Product. The benefit would be
financed via social security premiums which all inhabitants would have to pay.
The economic consequences of the benefit were simulated in a macroeconomic
model. The simulation indicated that in all four variants wages and prices would
rise as a consequence of higher social premiums and that economic activity
would decrease leading to a lower consumption level. Unemployment would
decrease in the variant with benefits at the level of the National Assistance Act
and a lower labour supply, whereas unemployment would increase in the other
three variants. Income would be redistributed from high to low incomes, from
households without children to household with children (WRR 1981 p.211).
What were the arguments to give mothers or housewives a wage? The
arguments in this debate were that invisible household work would become
visible by paying a wage, housewives would become economically independent,
wages for household work would be a guarantee for better child care, income
distribution between individuals would become more equal, birth and
upbringing of a next generation, important not only for parents but for the whole
society, would be guaranteed and national income accounts would be more exact
(Grotenhuis 1980; WRR 1981 and 1983; Bruyn-Hundt 1985).
In 1978 I abolished the idea of a wage for housewives. Specializing in unpaid
work is a pitfall for economic independence, even if the mother or the housewife
receives wages during a certain period:
1. In all proposals wages are low: the minimum level of Social Assistance or
the legal minimum wages. This is because wages of household staff on the
market are low. A second reason is that society is not willing to finance high
incomes for mothers or housewives.
2. In all proposals wages are temporary. Wages are decreased or stopped as soon
as children grow up. This implies that the mother is obliged to return to the
labour market at the age of 40 or 45 years if she wishes to maintain her
financial independence. In the period the mother stays at home, her
professional training becomes obsolete and she does not gain labour market
experience (see chapter 8.3).
3. The unequal distribution of paid and unpaid labour over the sexes would
continue. Women's short term financial position would be improved by
paying her wages, but her long term position on the labour market and her
financial position will never be the same as men's.
4. In as far as a wage for housewives is proposed, the contribution to unpaid
work of men, single women, children and elderly people is neglected. This
does not seem just.
5. The burden of collective expenses would become higher and the price of
labour on the labour market would increase. This means a negative impuls
for the growth of employment.
6. Labour market participation of women would be discouraged. Research on
the elasticity of female labour supply shows that female labour supply
167elasticities are large both in absolute terms and in relation to male elasticities.
The elasticity of hours of work with respect to exogenous income is negative
and rather small (Killingsworth and Heckman 1986 p.185 and 190).
Therefore I reject the idea of a wage for housewives.
9.4 Negative income tax or a basic income
In the nineteen sixties the economists James Tobin and Milton Friedman
suggested that a negative income tax would be a cheaper and more humane
method to give welfare to those who needed support (Samuelson 1973 p.810).
Families who come below a certain level of income because of unemployment,
sickness, disablement etc. would receive a government benefit of the Internal
Revenue Service which guarantees a minimum level of subsistence. The
negative income tax would diminish if there are private earnings, but the
percentage of reduction would leave enough incentive to accept paid work. In
Samuelson's illustration this percentage is 50 (Samuelson 1973 p.811). Negative
income tax would be a great improvement over welfare programmes that
deprive people of all assistance the moment they get a job, even a miserable one,
because the marginal rate of taxation is 100%.
The idea of a negative income tax resembles Robert Theobald's (1976) idea of a
"guaranteed" income. Theobald's prognosis was that scarcity of goods would
vanish because of automation of production. For the same reason jobs would
become scarce. In Theobald's idea a guaranteed income would enable some
people to produce goods and services ("consentives") without making profits,
while other people would produce goods and services for the market
("marketives").
The difference between negative income tax and a basic income is that the basic
income does not diminish if other independent income increases. It is an
individual income (Geleynse et al. 1993 p.54).
In the Netherlands the idea of a basic income is still a subject of discussion.
Several times The Advisory Council on Government Policy for example advised
Dutch Government to consider a basic income as an alternative for the complex
social security benefit system (WRR 1981; 1983; 1985). In 1992 the Central Planning
Bureau published three long-term growth scenarios. In one of these scenarios a
negative income tax is taken as an alternative for income maintenance. In 1994
Gelauff and Graafland of the CPB simulated the effects of a negative income tax of
50% of legal minimum wages for all people except children and students. At the
same time benefits of the social security system in the event of disability and
unemployment should be abolished as well as social assistance given by
government. Social benefits for people of 65 years and over are reduced in such a
way that the rise in net income from the negative income tax is just offset, so that
their net income does not change. Legal minimum wages are adapted in a similar
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income tax, whereas the transferability of the basic allowance is abolished. A flat
tax rate is introduced to prevent very high marginal tax rates for high income
groups and in such a way that budgetary neutrality is obtained. Unions and
employers' organizations are supposed to reinsure the loss of disability benefits by
75% or by 50% and the loss of unemployment benefits by 10%. In the 75% variant
flat tax rate rums out to be 53% and in the 50% variant it turns out to be 51.5%. In
simulations with the MIMIC model private production and private employment
decrease, unemployment and taxes as a percentage of national income increase.
Net real income of employed breadwinners and single people improve, but net
real incomes of unemployed and elderly people decrease.
The authors conclude that on the one hand a negative income tax would initiate
a strong reduction in unemployment by stimulating the willingness to accept
jobs. On the other hand it causes a large fall in labour supply as partners become
less inclined to participate in the labour market. The fall in labour supply exceeds
the fall in unemployment, hence employment is also reduced. The negative
income tax will cause a strong financial loss for people completely dependent on
a benefit income although their number will be substantially smaller because of
the reduction in unemployment (Gelauff and Graafland 1994 pp.239-259).
Negative income tax or a guaranteed or basic income is in my opinion not a good
solution to guarantee the economic independence of unpaid workers. If the
negative income tax or basic income is considered a family benefit, the unpaid
worker does not receive anything if the income of the (main) breadwinner is
high enough. In this case the magnitude of the benefit depends on the income of
the partner. But even if the benefit is given to each individual adult, it will
always be a minimum income, which will only bring a minimum of economic
independence. A basic income above the minimum would discourage
individuals to work on the labour market and would increase collective spending
and taxation, because more individuals than before would be entitled to a benefit.
The outcome of the Gelauff and Graafland simulations is very clear: if a basic
income is introduced female labour supply falls by over 40%. The immediate
necessity to earn an income on the labour market diminishes, so more women
specialize in unpaid work. But unpaid work does not bring labour market
experience, so in the long run women are worse off in case of a divorce or the
death of the breadwinner. More women become dependent on a minimum
income or on the breadwinner's income with small chances of improving their
own lifetime income to a level above the minimum.
It would be interesting to know the results of a simulation with slightly different
labour supply elasticities. Because Gelauff and Graafland (1994) use the male-
chauvinist model, elasticities of breadwinners, single people and one-parent
households are supposed to be zero, whereas the own wage elasticity of partners
is estimated at 1.0 and elasticity of breadwinner income at -0.2 (Gelauff and
Graafland 1994 p.103). I wonder whether a male-chauvinist model is realistic for a
long term prognosis as a growing number of fathers want to share in the joy of
169raising children by doing less paid and more unpaid work (Ministry of Social
Affaire 1995 p.31).
9.5 Unpaid work: a pitfall
If wages for housework or a basic income is not a good solution to combine paid
and unpaid work in such a way that economic independence of women equals
that of men, what should be done then? It can be concluded that there is a big
difference between the labour market positions of men of women and therefore
their financial independence is also far from equal (EC 1993). Which way are we
to go to ensure equal economic positions for women and men?
The 1992 OECD-report "Shaping structural change: the role of women" concludes
that structural changes in the organization of paid and unpaid work are necessary
in order to utilize women's capacities and abilities for economic growth and
social development. The OECD thinks that the so-called "social contract" should
be renewed. This social contract has two components: the "sex-contract", which
supposes that women take the responsibility for care of home and children and
that men are the breadwinners and the "labour contract" between employer and
employee which encourages the division of labour between men and women by
treating all employees as full-time breadwinners. This "social contract" does no
longer fit the social and economic reality, which supposes that women can
participate in the labour market and take the responsibility for care of home and
children at the same time. This situation leads to stress for individuals and
families, less care for elderly people, increase of one-parent families,
sickness-leave and turnover of staff.
People consider the existing division of labour between men and women a
"natural" one, as something that goes without saying. It is a matter of course that
women bear the responsibility for child care and household and men are
responsible for an income sufficient to support a family. This is a psychological
and sociological obstacle for equal positions of men and women. Unpaid work in
itself is not an obstacle, but its unequal distribution is a barrier for women to
obtain a better position in society. In industrialized countries two-thirds of
women's total working time is spent on unpaid work and one-third on paid
work. For men these shares are reverse (UN Human Development Report 1995).
Men's and women's contributions in paid work are becoming more equal in
industrialized countries because the labour market participation of women is
increasing. The distribution of unpaid work is also becoming more equal, mainly
because women have decreased their hours of unpaid work (UN Human
Development Report 1995 p.93/94). For men it is difficult to do their share of
unpaid work because they are supposed to have a full-time paid job. During the
period young children are growing up, the amount of unpaid work is so huge
that combining a full-time paid job and half of the family's unpaid work in the
Netherlands would lead to total working hours of at least 65 hours a week (see
170table 7.1.). It can be concluded that equal sharing of unpaid work is impossible
without a change in the organization of paid work. Otherwise the burden of total
working time will become too heavy. There are big differences between
(European) countries in the way paid labour and welfare are organized.
9.6 Equal rights policy and attitudes in the Netherlands since 1975
Changing the positions of men and women in society is sometimes thought to be
more a question of changing attitudes, of changing mentality than a question of
policies. In my view policies and attitudes influence each other.
Policies for an equal distribution of paid and unpaid work can contribute to a
process of change. The announcement of a new policy by government or political
party, trade union, church or any other organization may be the start of a public
discussion. A public discussion may change people's attitudes; things that used to
go without saying, are no longer taken for granted. Changing attitudes in their
turn may contribute to the introduction of legal or other measures. In this way
there is an interaction between (legal) measures and attitudes, they influence each
other.
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Government's policy since 1974. In 1977 a Junior Minister was appointed
responsible for the coordination of these policies. This Junior Minister has his
own civil service machinery in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
To coordinate ministries' equal rights policies an Interministerial Coordinating
Committee on Equal Rights has been set up. An independent governmental
Equal Rights Advisory Council has been installed. The directives of the European
Community on equal pay and equal treatment on the labour market and in social
security have resulted in new legislation. Financial support has been given to a
number of experimental training projects for women returning to the labour
market. Taxation and social security legislation have been altered to ensure a
more equal treatment of married women and to diminish breadwinners'
facilities. Since 1980 a specific policy on equality in education is conducted. A
policy to combat sexual intimidation has become part of equal rights policy.
Maternity leave has been extended with four weeks. An unpaid parental leave of
20 hours per week during 6 months for both parents has been introduced. Part-
timers have become entitled to the legal minimum wage.
In the same period 1975-1990 attitudes towards the role of mothers changed
considerably in the Netherlands. Table 9.1. shows that a rising percentage of the
Dutch population approves of mothers' labour market participation and paid
child care.
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Attitudes towards child care (in percentage of total population)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1991
- Objection to labour market
participation of mothers with
children of 6 > 84 44 42 34 29 22
- Women are better suited to
raise children than men 77 66 54 44 38
- Child care should be a
shared responsibility M 76 88
Source: SCP 1993 p. 188
Because policies to improve women's labour market participation did not lead to
equal positions, in 1994 the Netherlands Government sought advice of an Expert
Committee on how to execute a redistribution of unpaid work between men and
women in order to give women better opportunities in paid work. By
Government order this Committee was to construct four redistribution scenarios
for a future in which unpaid work would be equally divided between men and
women. This redistribution should be completed in the year 2010 (Ministry of
Social Affairs 1995). The Committee based its advice on an analysis of the four
Intomart time use surveys, executed in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, used earlier in
this book. In the Committee's analysis households were divided into single
people employed or non-employed; one- and two-earner couples and couples
both non-working, with and without children; single people and couples of 65
and over; and children living with their parents. This analysis showed, not
surprisingly, that unpaid work was most unevenly divided between one-earner
partners and most evenly between two-earners with a wife working on the
labour market for 30 hours or more. However, in two-earner households, in
which the wife worked part-time, women also did the lion's share of unpaid
work and even working single females had more hours of unpaid work than
working single males.
9.7 Policies for equal sharing of paid and unpaid work
Equal sharing of unpaid work is impossible without equal sharing of paid work.
To illustrate this point let us have a look at the distribution of unpaid work in
one-earner families. Redistribution of unpaid work between partners in
one-earner households is devoid of sense because the male half of the couple
would have to do all paid work and half the unpaid work, so males would
become overburdenend. It is self-evident that in this case women will do part of
paid work. That is why policies aimed at dividing unpaid work more equally will
also have to lead to a more equal division of paid work and vice versa. Therefore
min section 9.7.1 to 9.7.3 three sets of policies will be mentioned and analysed
which lead to a more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work between sexes.
They can mainly be found in social-democratic welfare states with a
plateau-shaped labour market profile of women. No distinction is made between
policies aimed at obtaining a more equal division of unpaid work and aimed at a
more equal division of paid work, as they both lead to more equal positions of
men and women in society. Because this book deals with economics, special
attention will be paid to policies with financial incentives which have not yet
been realized in the Netherlands and also to policies which have not yet been
introduced, but are the subject of recent public and scientific discussion. Sections
9.7.1 to 9.7.3 are at the same time an inventory and an evaluation of existing
policies as well as of policies not yet introduced. The policies have been divided
into three groups: family policies, income policies and labour market policies
9.7.1 Family policies
Maternity leave
This is one of the most important provisions needed by working women. In all
European countries a maternity leave is given varying between 14 weeks and 40
weeks. The benefits vary from 70 to 100% of the latest earned wages. In case of a
very long leave part of it is unpaid (Pot 1992). In the Netherlands maternity leave
is sixteen weeks with a 100% social insurance benefit. The maternity leave is
flexible: women can start their leave 6 to 4 weeks before the supposed date of birth
of the child and it ends 10 to 12 weeks after the actual date of birth of the child.
The 100% benefit is continued for a maximum period of 52 weeks after the final
day of the maternity leave, if the mother is ill as a consequence of the birth. Dutch
law forbids employers to dismiss a pregnant woman or a woman who has given
birth until 12 weeks after the date of birth. Self-employed women have to rely on
private insurance.
Parental leave
This is a leave to care for babies and young children. Parental leave differs from
country to country. In Sweden for example both parents are given the
opportunity for a paid leave. In that case they earn 70% of the latest salary during
a 12 month period, which is followed by a 13 week period at a fixed rate. They are
also entitled to a paid leave during 120 days in the event of sick children. Either of
the parents is entitled to shortening working hours to 6 hours a day until the
child is 8 years old, however without compensation (Gustafsson 1995). In other
countries parental leaves vary from 10 weeks to 24 months.
In the Netherlands parental leave was introduced in 1991 when the Parental
Leave Act took effect: both parents have the right to decrease their paid working
week to twenty hours during six months. People in the civil service receive a 75%
payment of the hours that they do not work. An evaluation shows that nearly
29% of all employees who are entitled to paid leave make use of it, whereas only
9.5% of all employees who are entitled to unpaid leave make use of it.
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Federation of Unions decided on a part-time leave of three months if employees
become parents or if other family circumstances require it. The leave can be
spread out over an eight year period. Employees cannot be dismissed during this
leave and it is the intention of the agreement between Employers and Unions
that employees keep their rights in social security (Trouw 7 November 1995).
Because parental leave is much in dsicussion in Europe and especially the
question whether it ought to be a paid leave and who is to finance it, the
Netherlands Central Planning Bureau (CPB) evaluated the effects of a simulation
of a two months paid parental leave for breadwinners after the birth of a child.
The CPB assumed that this leave does not diminish productivity, causes no loss
in the use of capital goods and is paid for by a relative decrease of all wages. The
effects are positive for production, employment and labour supply in persons, as
they increase, as well as for unemployment, as it decreases. Consumption,
however, also decreases (Ministry of Social Affairs 1995).
Calamity leave
This is a short leave to care for sick family-members, neighbours or friends or in
case of other calamities in the family. Calamity leave is in existence for instance
in Sweden, Denmark, Germany and in Belgium for civil servants. Germany
knows a parental leave in case of sick children for a maximum of 10 days a year
per child (Dankmeyer et al. 1992). In Sweden parents are entitled to 120 days leave
a year per child under the age of 12 (Dankmeyer et al. 1992; Pot 1991; Gustafsson
1995).
In the Netherlands some collective wage agreements entitle employees to take
leave in case of calamities. Research among members of one of the leading Dutch
unions shows that 89% of the respondents would like to have the possibility to
take a 2 or 3 day leave for such calamities with a maximum of 6 to 10 days a year
(Dankmeyer et al. 1992).
Child care
Child care arrangements differ considerably from country to country. The one
pole of child care arrangements can be found in the Nordic countries, where the
Government arranges and subsidizes nearly everything, the other pole can be
found in the USA, where child care is considered a market regulated
arrangement. If we take Sweden as an example for the Nordic countries:
subsidized child care is available for 48% of all children under seven and private
child care for another 10%. The quality is regulated by the Central Government.
Parents pay 10% of the costs, Municipal Government 43% and Central
Government 47% (Gustafsson 1995). In the USA parents organize child care
themselves. The Netherlands is in between: subsidized child care is available for
only 5% of young children. Parents pay about one third of the costs, employers
one fifth and Central Government pays the rest. A tripartite way of financing:
parents. Municipal Government and employers each for one third is the target of
a new policy. A minimal legal quality is garantueed for a period of 4 years
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Child care is in discussion in many countries and consequently much attention is
paid to an evaluation of research in this field in the Netherlands. Child care is a
vexed question with many aspects. Is it good or bad for a child's psychological and
sociological formation? (Singer 1993). This is a question related to the quality of
child care. Does child care improve women's economic independence? If this
question is answered affirmatively, then another question is, whether the
enlargement of the life income of mothers is big enough to compensate for the
costs of child care. The answer to the last question depends on the amount of
government subsidies. However, for the Government the question is whether
the cost of subsidizing are compensated for by a higher tax revenue because life
incomes of mothers are enlarged. Is Government regulated and subsidized child
care a way to improve equity between men and women? Should subsidized child
care be restricted to mothers (and fathers) who participate in the labour market
for a minimum number of hours or is it a social provision to which all children
of a certain age should be entitled like primary education? Should employers
contribute for some of their female employees as is the custom in the
Netherlands nowadays? The State Committee that formulated scenarios for an
equal division of unpaid work in the year 2010 advised that child care should
become a basic-provision and a Government responsibility in the same way as
education, as formulated in Article 208 of the Dutch Constitution.
Some answers to the above-mentioned questions are available from research.
Gielen (1993) simulates the effects of more subsidized child care with the model
MIDGET (Mini model Designed to experiment on G_rowth and Economic
Iheory). This model has nearly the same characteristics as MIMIC. He assumes
that extension of subsidized child care would lead to substitution of non-
subsidized child care, so the demand for child care on the non-subsidized market
would diminish. For this reason the effect of more subsidized child care on
labour market supply of women is small. He restricts his analysis to the effects of
changes in the price of child care. Other factors such as the quality and availability
of public child care are also important. Working mothers prefer public child care
or paid care at home over other informal child care (Research voor Beleid as
quoted in Ministry of Social Affairs 1995 p.35). They appreciate public care because
of its continuity and reliability (Tijdens et al. 1994).
Maassen van den Brink and Groot (1995) simulate the effect of the use of child
care and conclude that the use of child care increased female labour market
participation. After deducting the cost of subsidized child care women's labour
income was nearly twice as high as the labour income of non-users of child care
(Maassen van den Brink and Groot, 1995). So in the Dutch situation women's
economic independence improved by the use of subsidized child care. Groot and
Maassen van den Brink (1992) regard Government subsidies in the form of a
deduction on income tax a more efficient way of subsidizing because 30% of the
women who make use of subsidized child care in the Netherlands do not
participate in the labour market.
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labour market participation (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992; Ribar 1992; Blau and
Robbins 1988 as quoted by Maassen van den Brink, Gustafsson and Groot 1995). A
lower income and a higher price of child care lead to a lower use of child care
(Hotz and Kilburn 1991; Ribar 1992; Groot, Maassen van den Brink and
Oosterbeek 1991 as quoted by Maassen van den Brink, Gustaffson and Groot 1995).
In the Netherlands the users of paid child care are better educated and have
higher labour incomes than the users of unpaid child care (Maassen van den
Brink and Groot 1995). The cosst of child care may influence labour market
behaviour of mothers and hence their unpaid work.
Research in Sweden and the United States (Gustafsson and Stafford 1992; Blau
and Robbins 1988; Ribar 1992; as mentioned in Maassen van den Brink et al 1995)
showed that labour market participation of women is negatively influenced by
high costs of child care. Use of child care by mothers not participating in the
labour market is even more influenced by the costs of child care (Hotz and
Kilburn 1991; Ribar 1992; as mentioned in Maassen van den Brink et al 1995).
Groot, Maassen van den Brink and Oosterbeek (1991; 1992) also found a negative
influence of high costs on the use of child care (quoted by Maassen van den
Brink, Gustaffson and Groot 1995). However, research by Maassen van den Brink
and Groot (1995) showed that the price of child care has no significant influence
on labour market supply of mothers. As possible explanations the authors
mentioned: 1. Income related prices do not reflect the relation between demand
and supply of child care; 2. As public child care is rationed demand exceeds
supply.
Maassen van den Brink and Groot (1995) calculated that for the Government the
costs of subsidizing child care are 23% higher than the extra tax revenues of one
year of the women who make use of this subsidized child care. They did not
calculate the extra tax revenues over the life time income of these women. For
every year that a woman is out of the labour market her yearly income
diminishes with 1.5 to 2% (see chapter 8.3) and so does the tax she has to pay.
Earlier Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1992) concluded that if the
Government subsidizes child care to improve women's economic positions it is
efficient to restrict child care to mothers (and fathers) who participate in the
labour market. If the policy is a recognition of children's rights as social subjects,
all children should be entitled to child care. Maassen van den Brink and Groot
point out that there is an exchange between equity and efficiency: entitlement to
subsidized child care for all children of a certain age seems just from a social point
of view, but restriction of subsidized child care to working mothers is efficient for
the treasury, especially if employers contribute in the costs of child care. If a
Government has limited means to subsidize child care an optimum is reached if
the number of children who receive this care is as high as possible, whereas the
price the parents have to pay is not as high as to restrict the use of child care
(Maassen van den Brink and Groot 1995).
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should be (partly) paid for by the employer, the advantage is that women's labour
market participation is stimulated. The disadvantage is that child care is restricted
to mothers and contributes to sex segregation on the labour market. Another
disadvantage is that employers will pay only for employees they consider
important, for example women with a high education. A third disadvantage is
that it ties women to employers who are willing to pay for child care.
Conclusion: from the point of child care as a means to improve women's
economic position, child care subsidized by tax facilities seems to be efficient and
just.
Subsidized Home-care
Subsidized Home-care is a social provision much discussed in the Netherlands
because it is scarce and the Government is economizing on care subsidies.
Waiting lists for home-care can be found in many municipalities. The question
in the present debate on care is to what degree voluntary unpaid help can and
may be expected. Government is of the opinion that subsidized help is a
supplement to voluntary help whereas women's organizations think that
voluntary help is a supplement to subsidized home-care. On the one hand
demand for help increases as a consequence of the growing share of elderly
people in the population. On the other hand one can expect that supply of
voluntary help is diminishing as a consequence of the growing labour market
participation of women. Prognoses show that the demand for help based on a
demographic extrapolation of population data will increase with 1.5% a year in
volume (Commissie Welschen 1994; De Boer et al.1994). Current Government
policy is aimed at decreasing subsidies to one third of this percentage and at
substituting paid home-care for sick, elderly and handicapped people by unpaid
care.
9.7.2 Income policies
- Tax policy concerning unpaid work
In all industrialized countries income tax is levied on money income only. The
value of unpaid goods and services is taxed as an exception to this rule, for
instance if part of the wage consists of food and boarding. Because the value of
unpaid household work is not taxed, families with the same level of economic
well-being are not treated in the same way. From a welfare perspective it would
appear reasonable to tax all kinds of income, because a tax-free household
production leads to unequal treatment of people in essentially the same positions
(Bonke 1992 p.284). Already in 1973 Due and Friedlaender (1973) argued that
adjustments of the tax systems "must be along the lines of allowing deductions of
expenses of having housework done, since that is a cost of earning income" (Due
and Friedlaender 1973 p.255). In 1975 the OECD pointed out that exemption from
taxation of unpaid work "imposes a bias favoring unpaid work in the home
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Leuthold formulated it like this: The argument for taxing home production
income rests in the principle of equal taxation of equals. A person who works
outside the house and earns an income of X dollars should pay the same tax as
someone who produced goods at home with a value of X dollars" (Leuthold 1981
p.277).
The non-taxation of unpaid labour has an influence on the allocation of time,
especially on the allocation of time of women with a low-earning capacity. Their
household production is free of any tax. If man and wife maximize household
utility, working on the labour market is efficient only in case the net hourly wage
of the wife is higher than the value of her hourly home production. The
allocation of time between home production and labour market is disturbed by
the fact that home production is not taxed. In the time allocation comparison the
hourly wage minus tax and social premiums must compete with the hourly
value of home production which is not taxed at all. To my knowledge no
research has been done on this subject.
- Tax policy concerning paid work
In many countries a tax relieve is given to the single breadwinner family: the
single breadwinner has tax facilities for his "dependent" wife. Such a policy is a
further disincentive for the second earner of a family to participate in the labour
market. The more so if income tax is progressive and the family is the unit of
taxation. The income of the second earner is put on top of that of the first earner
and taxed according to his highest rate.
An alternative is to tax each person as an individual. The effects of this
individualization have been investigated by several researchers. A 1990 OECD
comparison of tax systems shows that separate taxation is an incentive to switch
earnings form the husband to the wife. This comparions further shows that tax
influences are causing cross-country differences in overall rates of female labour
participation up to 20 percentage points (OECD 1990 p.166/167).
Comparative research of several tax systems has shown that individual taxation
is an incentive for women to enter the labour market (Gustafsson and Ott 1987;
Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt 1991). It was shown that the wife's gross share in
family income turns into a larger net share under a system of individual taxation.
Under a system of joint taxation or another system that favours the single earner,
the wife's net share in family income is smaller than her gross share, as is shown
in table 9.2. In this table a microeconomic analysis of the wife's share in family
income is made, based on micro datasets for couples in West-Germany, Sweden
and the Netherlands. The 1984 German tax system was a splitting system. In this
splitting system the assessable incomes of man and wife were added up and
divided by two. The basic tax allowance for a married couple was twice as high as
the basic tax allowance for a single person. Tax was calculated on half of the
taxable income and multiplied by two. The Swedish tax system has completely
been individualized. The Dutch tax system has been individualized for labour
178income, but the single earner is entitled to the general tax deduction of his
dependent partner, apart from his own general tax deduction. The wife's
contribution to the net family income is interpreted as the net decrease in family
income if she withdraws from the labour market. This measure, which varies
from zero if the wife does not work on the labour market to one if the wife is the
only wage earner, has been computed using three datasets and three tax systems.
Table 9.2.























SourcerGustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt 1991
The German wife's gross share in family income of 15% is reduced to 12.4%
under the German splitting system, is enlarged to 16.6% under the Swedish
individualized system and reduced to 14.7% under the Dutch tax system. The
Swedish and Dutch wife's share is also bigger under the Swedish tax system than
under the German or Dutch tax system.
The Netherlands Central Planning Bureau (CPB) also investigated the abolition
of a marriage relief. In the current Dutch tax system the income of the partner is
subject to the tax and national social insurance premium rate from the first
guilder onwards. Cancelling the transferability of allowances between partners
has following consequences: labour income of wives below the basic allowance is
no longer subject to tax and premium rate of the first tax bracket. It encourages
wives to participate in the labour market, because the husband looses his
marriage relief, as is the loss of income supposing the husband has a full-time
job. Gelauff and Graafland (1994) of CPB presented six variants of the abolition of
marriage relief. They presented three variants in which the legal minimum
wages are raised in such a way that a breadwinner who earns these minimum
wages with a non-participating partner is just compensated for his loss and three
variants in which the minimum wages are not raised. In two variants the
abolition of the breadwinner facilities is used for a reduction of the government's
financial deficit, in two variants the first bracket in income tax is lowered and in
two variants the family allowance is raised to compensate households for the loss
of breadwinner facilities. In all six variants labour supply as well as private
production are higher. In the variants with higher minimum legal wages
unemployment rises because the higher labour supply is not fully absorbed.
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elderly people and breadwinners with a disability benefit. In other variants net
income decreases for nearly everyone (Gelauff and Graafland 1994 p.226).
I regret that no variant has been presented in which the effects of the abolition of
the transferability are shown on their own in order to be able evaluate the net
effects and the net proceeds of this change in taxation. Such a variant would
better show the disincentive aspects of taxation than variants in which the
proceeds are used for other purposes. Dutch women's emancipation movement
wants to remove the disincentives and to use the proceeds of this change in
taxation to encourage labour market participation of women, for example by
financing individualization of social security and /or by extending public child
care.
Recent research is done by Bekkering (1995). She investigates the effect of the
abolition of the transferability of the basic tax allowance to the sole breadwinner.
Her argument for this investigation was that the marriage relief causes price
distortions for females who wish to participate in the labour market. Their
marginal net wage rate depends on their household situation, whereas an
optimal allocation requires that marginal net wages only depend on productivity.
Firstly she estimates the relation between labour supply and income in a so-called
Markov-model in which four possible situations figure: persons can offer their
labour supply full-time, part-time, people are disabled or have no labour supply.
As expected males' reactions to changes in own income are small, females'
reactions are high. With this model she simulates the effects of the abolition of
the marriage relief with two variants: one in which the loss of the breadwinner
facility is compensated for by a generic increase of the tax exemption level and
one in which the children's allowance is increased. Her argument for these
compensations is that it was "reasonable" that the large gains of the abolition of
the marriage relief for government are to be used for some kind of compensation:
"individualization is not meant to increase tax revenues" (Bekkering p.99). She
finds that in the variant with a higher tax exemption level in the long run female
labour supply increases with 13 percentage points. The demand side of the labour
market is not included, so in her view these long-term effects are not reliable.
Therefore the first year effects are presented in more detail: the number of
households in which either both partners or none of the partners participate
increases after individualization. The reason: if the one-earner situation is made
less attractive two reactions are possible: either the household becomes a
two-earner family or the breadwinner applies for a welfare benefit and both
partners withdraw from the labour market. So the dichotomy between
households is stronger after individualization. This is also the case in the variant
with higher children's allowance. The effect on the dichotomy of households is
stronger for generic compensation and for higher educated people.
Bekkering finds that individualization does not affect male labour supply. Her
conclusion is: "Thus individualization of taxes is not the best policy to stimulate
men to do more household work. The division of household work does become
180more equal, but only because women have less time for household work, not
because men spend more time in the household" (Bekkering p. 104). 1 do not
entirely agree with this conclusion because it suggests that individualization does
not contribute to a more equal distribution of unpaid work between men and
women. This is not true as can be read from her own statement that "division of
household work does become more equal".
My conclusion is that Bekkering's analysis shows that after individualitttion
there are less one-earners and more (full-time) two-earners. This will make the
division of unpaid work between men and women more equal. Another
conclusion that can be drawn from Bekkering's data is that after
individualization the number of partners both non-participating in the labour
market has increased. Time use survey shows that men's share in unpaid work is
higher if both partners do not participate in the labour market (Ministry of Social
Affairs 1995 p. 198/199).
Bekkering mentions (p.102) that the most "pure" form of tax individualization is
the abolition of the marriage relief without any compensation. The reactions of
females would be different if no compensation was given in the form of generic
tax decrease or an increase in children's allowance. The increase in family income
resulting from these compensations is a disincentive to female labour supply as
Bekkering herself remarked on pages 102 and 110. In my eyes it is inconsistent to
investigate the effects of the abolition of marriage relief on income and at the
same time increase income by giving compensations for the loss of the marriage
relief. If "individualization is not meant to increase tax revenues" as Bekkering
poses, the gains of the aboliton of the marriage relief could be used to facilitate the
combination of paid and unpaid work. For example by creating a possibility to
make costs of household services income tax deductable or by extending
subsidized child care. It is a pity that models such as Bekkering's or MIMIC do not
take into account unpaid work. Women are supposed to look after children and
to run the household. They have to choose how to divide their time over paid
work, unpaid work and leisure. If a woman accepts the possibility to substitute
unpaid care by qualitative well-paid care and such a choice can be realized in
practice, the marginal (after tax) revenue of an extra hour on the labour market
should cover the extra cost of this hour inclusive of costs of child care. Because
men do not consider child care costs, women react more strongly to financial
incentives than men.
Tax policy concerning substitution of unpaid work by market goods
The household has to make a choice between allocating time to the labour
market or to home production, but it also has to choose between home
production and buying goods and services on the market, provided such goods
and services are available. Two factors are important: the availability of goods and
services on the market and the price.
The availibility of goods and services has changed in the course of time. New
products e.g. dishwashers, washing machines, tumble dryers, microwaves, TV-
181sets, audio-equipment increased people's preference for market-produced goods
and reduced the relative value placed on nonmarket time (Blau and Ferber 1986
p.99-101). As is the case with buying meals in a restaurant, household help or
child care, this decision is also influenced by taxation. Home production is
cheaper than buying similar products on the market, because the costs of products
and services on the market include Value Added Tax and social premiums.
Buying on the market is more efficient only if the price on the market is lower
than the "price" of home production, being the sum of value added plus cost of
intermediate goods. There are two ways in which changes in taxation stimulate
substitution of unpaid work by goods or services bought on the market:
1. Deducibility of costs from income tax; for example the incentive for mothers
to produce child care by staying at home, could be changed in an incentive to
work on the labour market if the cost of child care could be deducted from
taxable income as already pointed out by the OECD in 1975 (Darling 1975
p.92). Polachek (1993) argues that the unavailability of low-cost day care
centers has the same effect on female labour market participation as high
marginal tax rates (Polachek 1993 p. 14). Instead of deductibility, the State
Committee for Redistribution of Unpaid Work suggested a tax credit in
income tax, for people who combine unpaid work with paid work (of at least
20 hours a week) because they have less time for household production
(Ministry of Social Affairs 1995).
2. Lowering Value Added Tax on purchases of goods or services which
substitute unpaid work such as dishwashers, ready-made products,
window-cleaning services, house-cleaners or commercial laundries. Dutch
Government gave a good example by fixing VAT on child care at 0.0% in
1995.
As far as I know no research is available on this subject.
Social security
Social security systems were mainly determined in the first half of this century,
when men were "breadwinners" and women "housewives". Policies based on
this notion of sex differentiation regard the family as the basic administrative and
economic unit. It was considered equitable to assign certain benefits to married
men on the assumption that they are the sole or primary source of economic
support for the family. Married women's claims on the social security system are
still circumscribed in various ways on the grounds of assumed dependence on a
husband.
At present social security systems are in a transitional phase: some policies are
based on the notion of equal roles for men and women, whereas others tend to
retard the process of social and economic change. Reforming the social security
system is complicated by the fact that women have not yet achieved equality on
the labour market and still bear a disproportionate high share of unpaid labour.
Even if formal equality exists, meaning that there is no direct reference to sex,
indirect inequality arises when disadvantages which women encounter on the
labour market, are reflected in the social security system. The OECD remarks that
182this form of inequality is particularly pronounced in social security systems,
which base entitlements on earnings and/or employment records. The OECD
mentioned three causes for indirect inequality: 1. many women interrupt
employment in order to care for young children; 2. women are generally confined
to low-earning occupations; 3. women form a large segment of the part-time
labour force (OECD 1985 p.140).
The OECD remarks that income-tested systems, with apparently neutral rules of
entitlement, tend to put women at a particular disadvantage since many
provisions are based on marital status (OECD 1985 p. 140). Many schemes take the
couple rather than the individual as income unit for means-testing. Given that
the labour supply of married women is more elastic than that of men, joint
means-testing might be expected to exercise a stronger work disincentive for
wives than for husbands. Because in nearly all countries concerned there are
more married women who have a husband with income, than there are
husbands who have a wife with income, the percentage of working wives who
receive a means-tested benefit is smaller than the percentage of husbands.
Most women work part-time and have a low hourly wage, so their labour income
is lower, equal or only a little bit higher than means-tested family benefits. An
individual unemployment benefit, independent of family income, would
stimulate women more to (re)enter the labour market (Millar 1988; Bruyn-
Hundt and Van der Linden 1989; Gelauff and Graafland 1992). Research by Millar
in the United Kingdom (Millar 1988) and Kersten et al. in the Netherlands
(Kersten et al. 1993) shows that the percentage of households in which both
partners are unemployed rose because the effect of a family income means test
discouraged partners to look for a job. Another disincentive is the insurance of
housewives for cost of illness and in some countries a small state pension and /or
the entitlement of the breadwinner to a supplement for his dependent spouse
(Pieters and Schell 1990).
Abolition of breadwinner's supplementary benefits under the
Supplementary Benefits Act (Toeslagenwet - TW)
In the Netherlands breadwinners who receive benefits because of sickness,
unemployment, disablement or old age, are entitled to supplementary benefits
under the Supplementary Benefits Act (Toeslagenwet-TW). This supplementary
benefit ensures that a one-earner couple will always have a minimum income of
100% of net legal minimum wages. Breadwinners of dependent partners born
after 1 January 1972 do no longer receive this supplementary benefit, except when
a child under 12 forms part of their household.
The State Committee for Redistribution of Unpaid Work advised the gradual
abolition of these benefits and suggested the gradual introduction of social
premiums for dependent partners in social security against the cost of sickness,
state pension and child endowments. So far breadwinners do not pay extra
premiums for dependent partners
183- Abolition of the means test under the National Assistance Act (Algemene
Bijstandswet - ABW)
The Unemployment Benefits Act (Werkloosheidswet - WW) has a dual
character. During the first phase of unemployment people receive an individual
salary-related WW-benefit, independent of the income of other household
members. The duration of this benefit depends on the number of years
previously worked. After this period the unemployed person receives from the
government a benefit under the National Assistance Act (ABW) which is means-
tested and is reduced proportionally if other members of the household have an
income. The ABW-benefit is 100% of legal minimum wages for couples, 90% for
one-parent families and 70% for single people. The means test is very
discouraging for labour market participation of female partners who work part-
time, because they have to earn more than 100% of the legal minimum wages
before net family income is raised. An individual ABW-benefit of 50% for each
partner is a strong incentive for unemployed couples to look for a job. Gelauff
and Graafland (1994) simulate two extreme variants of individualization of
ABW-benefit: one in which improper use can effectively be prohibited and one
with a maximum of improper use. By improper use they mean that all
housewives and wives with small part-time jobs apply for a benefit and the
authorities cannot check effectively if they really want a job or if not enough jobs
are available. The effects of individualization are positive for private production,
employment, tax rate and public expenditures if no improper use occurs,
although the unemployment rate is raised. When improper use is at a maximum
the effects for private production, employment, tax rate and public expenditures
are disastrous, although the unemployment rate lowers (Gelauff and Graafland
1994 p.233). They conclude that although it is very hard to make a final probability
judgment on improper use, macroeconomic results are unfavourably influenced,
if more than one in eight partners collect AWB-benefits on improper grounds.
Two notes on this exercise:
It is not realistic to suppose that in 1995 all hitherto unentitled women and
even women with part-time jobs claim benefits. Nor is it realistic to suppose
that the administration of social security has no means and no sanctions to
check if these women really want to participate in the labour market. A
precedent in 1984 is proof of thist").
- It is not reasonable to individualize taxation by cancelling the transferability
of the basic tax allowance and to argue at the same time that
individualization of unemployment benefits is impossible. Moreover, even
if maximum improper use is supposed, the public deficit increases only by
0.1% of NNP if unemployment benefits are individualized. This is less than
the decrease in the public deficit of 2.0% of NNP as a result of the abolition of
19 Before 1**84 married women were not entitled to an unemployment benefit under the WWV (Wet
Werkloosheidvoorziening - Unemployment Benefits Act). By virtue of the third Equal Treatment
Directive of the European Community this law was changed in 1984 in favour of married women.
The costs were estimated at 1 billion. Dutch Guilders. Because of an overestimation of the number of
women claiming this benefit as well as an overestimation of the level of the benefit the definitive
COtls turned out to be 0.315 billion Dutch Guilders, or less than one third of the original estimation
(Van t Eind et al. 1986).
184die basic tax allowance transferability (Gelauff and Graafland 1994 pp.226 and
233).
- Pensions
In a majority of EC-countries pension schemes are linked with employWMk M4
benefits are calculated on the basis of years of contribution. Such schemes are
typical examples of provided primary benefits for insured workers, from which
benefits for wives of workers are derived on the assumption that married women
are unlikely to have worked sufficiently long to acquire independent
entitlements. Rising female labour force participation rates have meant that an
increasing proportion of women are gaining autonomous pension rights. At the
same time, changing family patterns and new perceptions of women's role have
created dissatisfaction with derived rights (OECD 1985 p.142).
In most industrialized countries widows of breadwinners receive a (small)
widows' pensiontfO). Under earnings related insurance systems these usually take
the form of a proportion of the deceased worker's pension (for example Germany
and France). Under universal or income-tested arrangements (for example the
Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Great-Britain) survivors are entitled to
old age pensions in their own right (Pieters and Schell 1990).
The OECD remarked that derived rights raise two major problems:
A. Derived rights may entail gaps or inadequacies:
If the survivor's pension is linked with the breadwinner's employment
period, the level of widow's pension is often so low, that there are high
poverty rates among widows. In some countries pensions are payable to
widows under a certain age only if they have dependent children. The
qualifying age for widows without dependent children may be as high as fifty
or fifty-five. So for women with little employment experience the gap
between the time when the children cease to be dependent and the
re-qualifying age for the pension may entail considerable hardship.
B. Derived rights may lead to inequities:
The continued provision of derived rights in countries with a high and
rising labour market participation rate of women, leads to inequities. It may
happen that the pension of an employed women is less than the derived
pension of a widow. Another inequity is that the combined pensions of
couples who worked part-time is less than the pension paid to one-earner
couples with similar earnings (OECD 1985 p.146).
The inequities arising from the coexistence of individual and derived rights are
likely to increase as more women enter the labour market. A solution for this
problem would be a phasing out of derived rights as is done in Sweden.
The OECD remarks that "it may be viewed as an easier political exercise in the
20 In the Netherlands the widows' pension will be gradually abolished after 1 July 1996, unless the
widow was bom before 1950 or has children under 18. The benefit is reduced if she has a labour
income (Arachne 2.2.1996).
185short term to improve derived rights, or even to make them reciprocal" (OECD
1985 p.148).
To my knowledge France is the only country which entitles parents to a right on
pension based on caring for children. A parent who has raised at least three
children is entitled to a supplement on his basic pension if his spouse is
dependent and he does not have other income (Pieters and Schell 1990 p.74). In
other countries unpaid labour does not give a right to pension. So women, for
whom unpaid work is their main or principal activity, are dependent on a
breadwinner in old age (the same applies however to France, because he is only
entitled to a supplement).
9.73 Labour market policies
In chapter 5.5.3 and chapter 8.5 attention was paid to the different positions of
men and women on the labour market. As has already been stated in chapter 5.5.3
the characteristics for the labour market position of people doing much unpaid
labour (mostly women) are:
they work only part of their adult life on the labour market and if they work
on the labour market they work part-time, in temporary jobs or other forms
of atypical employment (European Commission 1993 pp.34-44);
their hourly wage is lower than the hourly wage of people doing the same
jo6(ECI993pp.45-51);
- they are concentrated in fewer professions and sectors of industry than
people working full-time (EC 1993 pp.13-23);
- in most countries they are more often and longer unemployed than people
working full-time during their adult life (EC pp.24-33);
they have less rights in social security and pensions than people working
full-time during their adult life (EC p.32).
consequently: people who spend a considerable part of their lifetime on
unpaid labour have another position on the labour market than people who
work full-time in the productive phase of their life. Their lifetime income is
much smaller, because they work fewer years, fewer hours per year, earn less
per hour, have fewer rights in social security and pensions (see for instance
OECD 1988).
Strategies to improve women's labour market position are programmes to
diminish the wage gap between men and women, to change the
underrepresentation of women in technical and economic professions and in
management positions, to pay special attention to women's choice of profession,
to decrease their higher rate of unemployment, to entitle them to equal rights in
social security and pension schemes. Although some of these policies have been
in operation for years, they are still under discussion.
186- Equal opportunities
In 1919 the International Labour Organization stated that women should receive
the same wages as men for the same work. In article 119 of the 1957 Treaty of
Rome this principle has again been laid down. From 1974 on the European
Commission has launched several social action programmes for equal rights and
opportunities for women. International Women's year in 1975, the United
Nations Decade for women, the International Women's Conferences in 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 as well as Conventions of the International Labour
Organization have been enormously important for the development of equal
rights policies. In the seventies and eighties the European Commission
elaborated the principle of equal treatment in five Directives. The directives on
equal pay and equal treatment on the labour market (hiring and firing,
on-the-job-training, promotion, secundary labour conditions, social security and
pensions) have had a major impact and have resulted in new legislations or
amendments to existing legislation in these fields in EC countries.
The question arises: what is equal treatment? Direct discrimination, being
unequal treatment based on sex or a characteristic that refers to sex is forbidden.
However, neutral legal formulations do not lead to equal material positions as
women differ from men biologically, they give birth and bear the brunt of child
care and household tasks. Indirect discrimination is unequal treatment based on
other characteristics than sex, which nevertheless puts women at a disadvantage.
If for example a minimum body length is required for a job, women are at a
disadvantage. Indirect discrimination is only admitted by the International EC
Court of Justice of the if there is an objective justification. Equal treatment under
equal circumstances is right, but unequal circumstances demand unequal
treatment. What circumstances should be taken into account if women are to
have equal opportunities? Special rights, a preferential treatment, positive action
are means to enhance actual equal conditions for women. This question has not
been solved (Van Vleuten 1992).
Despite the 1976 Equal Wage Act the wage gap between men and women in the
Netherlands still exists. Recent research in the Netherlands shows that women's
wage is 74% of men's (SZW-Nieuws 23 November 1995). In other EC-countries
similar Acts came into being between 1975 (Belgium) and 1984 (United Kingdom)
but women's wages are 63 to 81% of men's (EC 1993 p.47).
The EC developed several projects to improve women's labour market position.
CEDEFOP is the European Center to advise the European Committee on the
development of professional training for women. Via the network
Diversification experts in professional training for women are united to
investigate why women choose traditional female professions and to enlarge
their possibilities by giving information and positive action. Via the so-called
IRIS-network member countries can participate in more than 200 projects,
including conferences, exchange programmes, newsletters, to learn from each
other's experiments and experiences. NOW is a new community initiative to
improve equal opportunities for women in employment and education by
187stimulating the establishment of small enterprises and cooperatives, by giving
help in financing, child care and technical advice. The European Social Fund
provides financial aid for projects which improve employment chances.
In several national media campaings the Dutch Government pointed out that
women should choose an education in technology and participate in traditional
male professions. Slogans like: "Choose something else-choose exact" ("Kies eens
wat anders, kies exact"), "A clever girl anticipates her future" ("Een slimme meid
is op haar toekomst voorbereid"), and "A real bloke irons his own shirt" ("Een
echte vent strijkt zijn eigen overhemd") were used to break through traditional
male/female roles in society. Subsidies were given to introduce women in the
building and metal industries and projects were started to inform women on
technical education and professions.
Although the concentration of women in female professions diminished
between 1983 and 1989 in all EC-countries except France and Spain, sex
segregation in occupation and jobs has not disappeared. Women are still
concentrated in fewer professions than men (EC 1993 p.20/21).
Positive Action
Postive Action (or Affirmative Action) is an instrument to improve women's
position in labour organizations. It is a coherent Droeramme of reeulations inside
labour organizations to attain a representative composition of women in
personnel (De Jong 1992). Programmes can be set up on different levels and with
different sanctions. Positive action is mostly concentrated on the firm, but can
also be executed on the level of Central Government. The first example was
given in 1941 when President Roosevelt forbade discrimination against black
workers in contracts the US Government made with the war industry. Later
presidents extended these contracts to other terrains. In 1967 legislation was
introduced which forbade discrimination against women. Government suppliers
were obliged to make positive action programmes and regulations in order to get
a representative composition of their personnel (contract compliance) (De Jong
1992).
In Europe in the eighties and nineties programmes of the European Commission
gave an important impuls to positive action programmes. In 1988 the European
Commission approved a Code of Practice with directives for making and
executing these programmes to improve women's position. The aim of a
programme can differ from child care to transport from home to work, from
gathering data about the male/female ratio in personnel, to preference for
women over men in selecting and hiring personnel. The programme should
have quantitative targets, a time path, a packet of measures, a registration system
and control on the progress (De Jong 1992).
Central Government in the Netherlands have subsidized the hiring of special
assistants for positive action and special activities since 1989. Municipalities and
non-profit organizations request subsidies for a special assistant, business firms
USrequest it for special activities such as an analysis of the personnel file, a special
training or a hiring campaign. The subsidies have had positive effects on the
development of positive action although research shows that people do not like
the term "positive action": it is associated with discrimination of men (Ministry
of Social Affairs 1994). In 1994 positive action was introduced in management
positions in education, because many women work in the educational system but
few have management positions. In 1995 Government decided to continue the
positive action subsidy to search for new instruments and entries in business. In
Britain and the Netherlands a campaign "Opportunity 2000" has started or is
about to start, which aims at improving labour market participation of women,
quantitatively as well as qualitatively (Ministry of Social Affairs 1995).
Positive action has become contested. A verdict of the International EC Court of
Justice by the end of 1995 in the case Kalanke versus Bremen brought much
uncertainty concerning preferential treatment of women in hiring (Op Cielijke
Voet 1996). Yet Governments in the European Union continue to promote
positive action.
Comparable worth
Comparable worth (or pay equity) is a strategy to improve labour conditions for
women on the occupational level. This strategy relies on the use of objective
criteria to value the content and requirements of jobs. Systems to evaluate jobs
often turn out to be gender biased (Michael et al. 1989; Van Doorne-Huiskes
1992). Job evaluation systems do not evaluate jobs in an objective scientific way,
they measure what is found just in a certain culture (Van Doorne-Huiskes 1992).
Michael and Hartmann (1989) think that if differences in wages or other labour
conditions are attributed to legitimate market forces there is no social ill and
hence no rationale for any medecine. Comparable worth strategy comes in the
picture if:
1. there is a gender difference in wages which is not explained by legitimate
market forces.
2. the gender difference is linked to the undervaluation of jobs held
disproportionally by women
3. the jobs can be objectively evaluated (Michael and Hartmann 1989). Research
shows that the percentage of women in an occupation has a significant effect
on the wage: 10% more women account for a 2 to 2.6% lower wage (Sorensen
1989; Baron and Newman 1989).
Job classification-systems are systems to evaluate the weight of different
functions inside a labour organization. Evaluation can take place by giving points
or by compairing different characteristics. The EC-Directive 75/117 prescribes an
equal wage for work of comparable worth. As most jobs are done either by men or
by women it is difficult to establish what work of comparable worth is. The job
evaluation is arranged in such a way that the attached weights are in conformity
with the practice inside the labour organization. In other words: a job evaluation
system is not an objective scientific instrument. Therefore job evaluation is a
vicious circle: if structural inequality exists between the renumeration of male
189and female work, job evaluation will not change this inequality. It turns out that
skills needed for female professions are valued lower than skills needed for male
professions. The Hay System which is used in Canada tries to establish a gender
neutral evaluation (Van Doorne-Huiskes 1992).
- Direct measures to improve women's labour market positions
As Dutch women's unemployment rate is higher than men's, the special Offices
responsible for finding jobs for the unemployed have an assignment to make
women's share in mediating the same as their share in unemployment. An
initiative of trade union women in the eighties to start special schools in which
women returning to the labour market were trained for professions with good
employment opportunities and for jobs suitable for women, was very successful.
Another successful initiative was the start of centers where women returning to
the labour market could get information and advice on job opportunities and
where 9hort informative courses were given about the functioning of the labour
market. Unfortunately subsidies for both initiatives have been diminished and
the activities have been integrated in the Labour Offices (Arachne 15.2.1996).
Dutch women are leaders in part-time jobs: 62% of all working women work
part-time against 8% of all working men (Ministry of Social Affairs 1994). In the
nineties the Minimum Wage Act and social security regulations were changed in
a way that part-time workers are also entitled to a minimum wage and social
security benefits. By the end of 1995 draft legislation was drawn up prescribing
that part-time workers should receive equal treatment in other aspects like
promotion, on-the-job training, quality of work and workers' right of say
(Arachne 2 February.1996).
About one third of working female employees experiences hindrance due to
some form of sexual harassment or, as it is called in Dutch Law: sexual
intimidation. The Government launched media campaigns about this
phenemenon and since 1994 all employers have become obliged under the
Labour Conditions Act (Arbeidsomstandighedenwet) to develop a policy to
prevent sexual intimidation (Ministry of Social Affairs 1994).
Recent proposals by the State Committee who made scenarios for an equal
distribution of unpaid work between men and women are:
A packet of measures to make the length of the paid working week more
flexible and promote fully-fledged part-time jobs
(Ministry of Social Affairs 1995).
- A legal right to work part-time should allow more men to fulfil their wish to
have a shorter working week. Research shows that only 15% of all Dutch
couples consider the one-earner situation ideal, yet 41% of all couples are
living in this situation because men find it difficult to work part-time.
Negotiations between employers and trade unions should lead to the right of
fully-fledged part-time jobs for all employees, stated in collective wage
agreements. Fully-fledged part-time jobs are defined as jobs with equal
190career prospects as full time jobs and an income which ensures financial
independence. The traditional one-earner family is making place for the
two-earner family, where both partners have to combine unpaid and paid
work. Hence a "new employee" is coming up who does not want to work
full-time the year round during 40 years.
Employees who decide to change their full-time job into a part-time one
maintain their old rights in social security (unemployment, sickness and
disablement benefits) during a one year period.
Employers receive subsidies for their contribution in social security for any
form of shortening the working week.
Flexible working hours enable parents to take care of their children and
home in turns. In the new Dutch Act on Working and Resting Hours
(Arbeidstijdenwet) the fact that employees should be able to combine labour
and care has been formulated as a target.
9.8 Summary and conclusion
Unpaid work contributes much to general and individual welfare but its unequal
distribution between men and women is a pitfall for women to obtain economic
independence by doing paid work. Neither wages for housework nor a basic
income provide a structural solution for this problem. Comparing different
welfare states it turns out that the Nordic countries have succeeded best in
improving women's position by stimulating policies which make it possible to
combine paid and unpaid work. In the Netherlands Government policies before
1990 stimulated women's labour market participation, but the unequal
distribution of unpaid work did not get much attention. This only changed after
1990. In 1995 a State Committee published scenarios for an equal distribution of
unpaid work in the year 2010. In the last section of this chapter three groups of
policies which stimulate a more equal distribution of paid as well as of unpaid
work are described and analysed.
19110. SUMMARY
People in developed countries spend over 40% of all time available in their lives
on personal care (eating, sleeping, personal hygiene etc.), 25 to 30% on leisure
(watching TV, sports etc.) and 25 to 30% on labour. When talking about labour
most people automatically think of "paid" labour. This is remarkable as the total
of unpaid hours of work is 1 to 1.5 times higher than the total of paid hours of
work. In all countries women's share in unpaid work is considerably higher than
that of men.
The central question of this study is the economic value of unpaid work. A
second question discusses the consequences if this value is taken into account at
determining economic phenomena such as production and consumption,
economic growth, employment and unemployment, personal income
distribution etc. These questions are dealt with in Part I.
Part II discusses the question of the influence of the unequal division of unpaid
work between men and women on the their economic independence and
consequently on their positions in society. Is it impossible to change economic
independence without changing the unequal division of unpaid work.
In chapter 2 the growing attention of economic science for unpaid labour is
discussed. The American economists Mincer, Becker and Gronau made it clear
that family households are households of productions as well as of consumption.
Unpaid work consumes the scarce time individuals have available, which could
also be used for other purposes. Although unpaid work does not pass a market,
its value could be estimated by considering a market substitute. Any human
activity which could be performed by a third person could be referred to as unpaid
work. In this respect not only the value of unpaid work done by people who also
do paid work is of importance, but also the value of unpaid work of people who
are outside the paid labour market because they are too young, too old,
unemployed or handicapped. After all by doing unpaid work these people yield
savings, which have value.
Chapter 3 deals with different methods to determine the value of unpaid work.
The input method takes the total of unpaid hours as a starting point and
multiplies it by a price per hour. This price per hour may be a price which is paid
on the labour market for a worker who can replace the unpaid worker. This price
per hour may be gross or nett or gross inclusive of employer's contribution in
social security. Another approach is to take the wages that the unpaid worker
loses by not working on the labour market, the so-called "opportunity costs".
The "output method" takes as a starting point the value that goods and services
produced with unpaid work would have on the market. In economic literature
macro estimations of the value of unpaid work differ from 6 to 72% of the Gross
National Product, depending on the method adopted, the number of people and
193the ages of the people who are considered to do unpaid work, the activities which
are counted as unpaid work and the price which is used for the estimations. As
time use studies are available, contrary to data for the output method, I chose the
input method. Gross market wages plus employer's contribution in social
security of a general substitute were chosen as price component because they are
also used in the National Accounts.
In chapter 4 the calculation of the value of unpaid work in the Netherlands is
based on the "input method", the hours of time input as time studies of 1975,
1980, 1985 and 1990 indicate. These time use studies can be compared with each
other because the same questionnary and method have always been used. Unpaid
hours of the entire Dutch population of 12 years and over are multiplied by three
different gross hourly wages inclusive of employer's contribution in social
security, being the legal minimum (hourly) wages, the wage of a home help in
wage scale 12 and the average earned wages in the relevant year. The outcome of
these calculations is a value for the entire population of 12 years and over, which
varies from 51 to 110% of GNP, depending on the estimated wages. In case only
the value of unpaid work of the population in the age of 25 to 64 is taken into
consideration, the value of unpaid work is 36 to 78% of GNP, depending on the
estimated wages. The percentages are higher than those of estimations in other
countries. This was due to the fact that during the period considered the labour
market participation of Dutch women was lower than elsewhere and in this
study gross wages inclusive of employer's contribution to social security was used
instead of nett wages. The share of unpaid work in all work increased until 1985 ,
but in 1990 it was lower than in 1975. The number of hours of unpaid work done
by men increased, that of women remained more or less the same. The total
workload of paid and unpaid work in all age groups was higher for women than
for men. In the years 1985 and 1990 the age group 35 to 49 was an exception to this
picture. The work load of elderly women was considerably higher than that of
elderly men. In the research period the number of working hours of women
increased, whereas that of men decreased. Household work takes most hours of
unpaid work.
Since the development of National Accounts in the nineteen twenties,
economists and statisticians have discussed the question whether unpaid work
should be incorporated in National Accounts. The arguments in favour and
against are dealt with in chapter 5. Moreover it is indicated in which way unpaid
work could be incorporated in National Accounts. My conclusion is that the
difficulties of implementation of unpaid work in National Accounts could be
overcome by presenting old and new accounts during a transition period. The
presentation of the value of unpaid work in an Addendum or Satellite Account I
see as a first step towards implementing the value of unpaid work. If the value of
unpaid work would be incorporated in National Accounts, all kinds of economic
variables would change. If unpaid work would be incorporated in economic
statistics, the economic growth per head of the population would have been
lower in seven of the nine calculations for the period 1975 to 1990. Cyclical
fluctuations would be less substantial, the working population would be 45%
194higher, unemployment would also be higher, whereas in 1990 total consumption
and investments would have been 75% and savings would have been 60%
higher. Optimal Pareto allocation would get a different contents.
In most cases the personal distirbution of income is used as an indicator for
individual welfare, taking into account the differences in size and composition of
households. The change to which the personal division of income is submitted if
the value of unpaid labour is taken into account, is the subject of chapter 6. The
income of one-earners and single parents turn out to become twice as high. The
income inequality between different types of households decreases by 56 to 62% if
the value of unpaid work is being counted.
In macroeconomic models unpaid work is not incorporated as a variable. In
chapter 7 this is considered a deficiency. The few models in economic literature
that do take unpaid work into account are discussed. In the Netherlands
Plantenga and Sloep were the first who indicated that unpaid labour should be
taken into account when creating models of the labour supply, as the
organization of paid and unpaid labour are closely connected. Eventually
suggestions are being made to take unpaid labour into account in macroeconomic
models not only when modelling labour supply but also when modelling
production, consumption, investments and savings.
In chapter 8 economic independence is defined as financial independence plus
care independence. Financial independence is a bigger problem than care
independence, because money income enables to buy goods and services which
guarantee care independence. Also because insufficient data are available on care
independence, this chapter mainly deals with financial independence. Although
there are noticeable changes, still far more women than men do not have
(labour) incomes. If they do have a (labour) income, there are more women than
men for whom this income is below the social minimum. The lesser degree of
financial independence is also shown by the limited number of women who earn
half the family income and the small percentage that women represent in the
total labour income.
Chapter 9 discusses the way in which economic independence of women can be
improved. A wage for the housewife and a basic income do not turn out to lead
to equal economic positions of women and men. It is not the unpaid work itself,
but its unequal division between men and women, which is the pitfall for
economic independence of women. The same applies for paid work. Chapter 9 is
concluded by discussing three packages of measures, which are intended to divide
paid work more equally between men and women: family policy, income policy
and labour market policy.
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Mensen in ontwikkelde landen besteden ruim 40% van alle beschikbare tijd in
hun leven aan persoonlijke verzorging (eten, slapen, hygiene enz.), 25 a 30% aan
vrije tijd (TV. kijken, sport enz.) en 25 a 30% aan arbeid. Bij arbeid denken de
meeste mensen automatisch aan "betaalde" arbeid. Dat is merkwaardig omdat het
aantal uren onbetaalde arbeid 1 a 1,5 x zo groot is als het aantai betaalde uren
arbeid. Het aandeel van vrouwen in de onbetaalde arbeid is in alle landen
aanzienlijk groter dan dat van mannen.
De centrale vraag in deze studie is wat de economische waarde van onbetaalde
arbeid economische waarde. Een tweede vraag is wat de consequenties zijn als
deze waarde meegeteld wordt bij het bepalen van economische grootheden zoals
productie en consumptie, economische groei, werkgelegenheid en werkloosheid,
de personele inkomensverdeling e.d. Deze vragen worden behandeld in deel I.
Deel II behandelt de vraag welke invloed de ongelijke verdeltng van onbetaalde
arbeid over mannen en vrouwen heeft op de economische zelfstandigheid en
daarmee op de maatschappelijke positie van mannen en vrouwen. Kan de
economische zelfstandigheid veranderd worden zonder de ongeiijke verdeiing
van onbetaalde arbeid te veranderen?
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de groeiende aandacht van de economische wetenschap
voor onbetaalde arbeid behandeld. De Amerikaanse economen Mincer, Becker en
Gronau maakten duidelijk, dat de gezinshuishouding zowel een productie- als
een consumptiehuishouding is. Onbetaalde arbeid legt beslag op schaarse
menselijke tijd, die ook voor andere doeleinden aangewend kan worden. Hoewel
onbetaalde arbeid geen markt passeert, kan de waarde geschat worden door te
kijken naar een marktsubstituut. Als onbetaalde arbeid kan iedere menselijke
activiteit aangeduid worden die door een derde persoon verricht kan worden.
Het gaat daarbij niet alleen om de waarde van onbetaalde arbeid van mensen die
daarnaast betaalde arbeid verrichten, maar evenzeer om de waarde van
onbetaalde arbeid van mensen die buiten het betaalde arbeidsproces staan omdat
zij te jong,te oud, werkloos of gehandicapt zijn. Het verrichten van onbetaalde
arbeid levert voor deze mensen immers besparingen op, die waarde hebben.
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt verschillende methoden om de waarde van onbetaalde
arbeid te bepalen. De "input-methode" gaat uit van het aantal onbetaalde uren
en vermenigvuldigt deze met een uurprijs. Die uurprijs kan zijn een prijs die op
de markt betaald wordt voor een arbeidskracht, die de onbetaalde werker kan
vervangen. De uurprijs kan zijn bruto of netto of bruto plus werkgeverspremies
in de sociale zekerheid. Een andere benadering is te kijken naar het loon dat de
onbetaalde werker netto derft door niet op de arbeidsmarkt te werken, de z.g.
"opportunity costs". De "output-methode" gaat uit van de waarde die de met
onbetaalde arbeid geproduceerde goederen en diensten op de markt zouden
217hebben. De macro-schattingen van de waarde van onbetaalde arbeid in de
economische literatuur lopen uiteen van 6 tot 72% van het Bruto Nationaal
Product, afhankelijk van de gevolgde methode, het aantal personen en de
leeftijden van de personen die geacht worden onbetaalde arbeid te verrichten, de
activiteiten die tot de onbetaalde arbeid worden gerekend en de prijs die voor de
schattingen wordt gebruikt. Omdat tijdsbestedingsonderzoeken beschikbaar zijn,
in tegenstelling tot data voor de output methode, koos ik de input methode.
Bruto lonen plus werkgeversbijdrage van een algemene vervanger zijn gekozen
als prijscomponent omdat deze ook in de Nationale Rekeningen worden
gebruikt.
De berekening van de waarde van onbetaalde arbeid in Nederland in hoofdstuk 4
is gebaseerd op de "input-methode", zoals deze blijkt uit het aantal uren
onbetaalde arbeid in tijdbestedings-onderzoeken uit de jaren 1975, 1980, 1985 en
1990. Deze tijdbestedingsonderzoeken zijn onderling vergelijkbaar omdat steeds
eenzelfde vragenlijst en methode is gebruikt. De onbetaalde uren arbeid van de
gehele Nederlandse bevolking van 12 jaar en ouder worden vermenigvuldigd
met drie verschillende bruto uurlonen inclusief de werkgeverslasten, nl. het
wettelijk minimum(uur)loon, het loon van een gezinsverzorgster in loonschaal
12 en het gemiddeld verdiende loon in het betreffende jaar. Het resultaat van
deze berekeningen is een waarde voor de gehele bevolking van 12 jaar en ouder
die varigeert van 51 tot 110% van het BNP, afhankelijk van het geschatte loon.
Wordt uitsluitend gekeken naar de waarde van onbetaalde arbeid van de
bevolking van 25-64 jaar, dan is de waarde van de onbetaalde arbeid 36 tot 78%
van het BNP, afhankelijk van het geschatte loon. Deze percentages liggen hoger
dan die van schattingen in andere landen, omdat tijdens de onderzoekperiode de
arbeidsmarktparticipatie van Nederlandse vrouwen lager was dan elders en in dit
onderzoek het bruto loon inclusief werkgeverspremies werd gebruikt voor de
schattingen in plaats van het netto loon. Het aandeel van het onbetaalde werk in
alle werk nam toe tot 1985 maar was in 1990 lager dan in 1975. Het aantal uren
onbetaalde arbeid van mannen nam toe, dat van vrouwen bleef ongeveer gelijk.
De totale werklast aan betaald en onbetaald werk was hoger voor vrouwen dan
voor mannen in alle leeftijdsgroepen, met uitzondering van de leeftijdsgroep
35-49 in 1985 en 1990. De werklast van oudere vrouwen was aanzienlijk hoger
dan die van oudere mannen. In de onderzochte periode steeg het aantal
arbeidsuren van vrouwen, terwijl dat van mannen daalde. Huishoudelijk werk
vraagt de meeste onbetaalde arbeidsuren.
Sinds het ontstaan van de Nationale Rekeningen in de jaren twintig van deze
eeuw discussieren economen en statistici over de vraag of onbetaalde arbeid in de
Nationale Rekeningen opgenomen zou moeten worden. De argumenten pro en
contra worden behandeld in hoofdstuk 5. Tevens wordt aangegeven op welke
wijze het onbetaalde werk in de Nationale Rekeningen opgenomen zou kunnen
worden. Mijn conclusie is dat de problemen die implementatie van de waarde
van onbetaald werk in de Nationale Rekeningen met zich meebrengt,
overwonnen kunnen worden door oude en nieuwe waarden gedurende een
218overgangsperiode naast elkaar te presenteren. Opneming van deze waarde in <
Addendum of een Satelliet Rekening zie ik als een eerste stap in de richting vtn
implementatie. Indien de waarde van onbetaalde arbeid in de Nationale
Rekeningen verwerkt zou worden, zouden allerlei economische grootheden
veranderen. Als de onbetaalde arbeid in de economische statistieken zou worden
opgenomen zou de economische groei per hoofd van de bevolking in de periode
1975-1990 in zeven van de negen berkeningen lager zijn geweest. Conjuncture^
schommelingen zouden minder groot zijn, de beroepsbevolking zou 45% hoger
zijn, de werkloosheid zou eveneens hoger zijn, terwijl de totale consumptie en
de investeringen in 1990 75% hoger zouden zijn geweest en de bcsparingen 60%.
Optimale Pa re to allocatie zou een andere inhoud knjgcn.
Als indicator voor de individuele welvaart wordt meestal de personele
inkomensverdeling gebruikt, rekening houdend met de verschillende omvang
en samenstelling van gezinshuishoudingen. De wijziging die de personele
inkomensverdeling ondergaat als rekening wordt gehouden met de waarde van
onbetaalde arbeid, is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 6. De inkomens van
alleenverdieners en alleenstaande ouders blijken daardoor te verdubbelen. De
inkomensongelijkheid tussen verschillende typen huishoudens vermindert met
56 tot 62% als de waarde van de onbetaalde arbeid wordt meegeteld.
In macro-economische modellen wordt de onbetaalde arbeid niet als variabele
opgenomen. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt dit als een gemis aangemerkt. De paar
modellen in de economische literatuur, die wel rekening houden met onbetaalde
arbeid, worden besproken. Plantenga en Sloep waren de eersten in Nederland die
er op wezen dat in de modellering van het arbeidsaanbod rekening gehouden
zou moeten worden met onbetaalde arbeid, omdat de organisatie van de betaalde
en onbetaalde arbeid nauw met elkaar verbonden zijn. Tenslotte worden
suggesties gedaan om in macro-economische modellen niet alleen in de
modellering van het arbeidsaanbod, maar ook in de modellering van productie,
consumptie, investeringen en besparingen rekening te houden met onbetaalde
arbeid.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt economische zelfstandigheid gedefinieerd als financiele
zelfstandigheid plus zorgzelfstandigheid. Financiele zelfstandigheid is een groter
probleem dan zorgzelfstandigheid, omdat met een geldinkomen goederen en
diensten gekocht kunnen worden die de zorgzelfstandigheid garanderen. Mede
omdat over zorgzelfstandigheid onvoldoende gegevens bekend zijn, wordt in dit
hoofdstuk vooral de financiele zelfstandigheid behandeld. Hoewel er verbetering
te bespeuren valt, zijn er toch nog steeds veel meer vrouwen dan mannen die
geen (arbeids)inkomen hebben. Als zij wel een (arbeids)inkomen hebben, ligt dit
voor meer vrouwen beneden het sociale minimum dan voor mannen. De
geringere mate van financiele zelfstandigheid blijkt ook uit het geringe aantal
vrouwen dat de helft van het gezinsinkomen inbrengt en het geringe aandeel
darvrouwen hebben in het totale arbeidsinkomen.
219Hoe kan de economische zelfstandigheid van vrouwen verbeterd worden is de
vraag die in hoofdstuk 9 behandeld wordt. Huisvrouwenloon en een
basisinkomen blijken niet tot gelijke economische posities van vrouwen en
mannen te leiden. Niet de onbetaalde arbeid zelf, maar de ongelijke verdeling
daarvan over mannen en vrouwen zijn een valkuil voor de economische
zelfstandigheid. Datzelfde geldt voor de betaalde arbeid. Hoofdstuk 9 eindigt met
de behandeling van een drietal pakketten maatregelen, die beogen zowel de
onbetaalde als de betaalde arbeid gelijker over mannen en vrouwen te verdelen:
gezinspolitiek, inkomenspolitiek en arbeidsmarktpolitiek.
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